The Competing Omnipotents Problem
Leftow also argues
that if there is more than one divine being who possesses the property of
omnipotence, then we tun into the impossible result that the will of an
omnipotent being is subject to being thwarted or that the divine persons are
omnipotent but not as powerful as the Trinity as whole: “Thus if there are two or
more discrete omnipotent beings, as in S[ocial]T[rinitarianism], one must either
concede that omnipotence can be thwarted, deny that the Persons are omnipotent
(precisely because they can thwart each another), or hold that . . . for no P
can it be the case that one Person tries to bring about P and another effects
is that the first one fails.” (Brian Leftow, “Anti-Social Trinitarianism,” in
Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald Collins, eds., The Trinity: An
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999], 210)
However, I believe
that this supposed problem with omnipotence is quite easily answered given the
view of God that I propose here. Necessarily, there cannot be competing
omnipotent wills because, if the wills are in competition, they are, by
definition in the view that I have proposed, not omnipotent. Further, the
divine persons will not compete with one another to achieve competing interests
because they are perfectly transparent to one another, knowing each other’s
will perfectly. In addition, they are perfectly rational, and it would be
irrational to compete with another and cease to agree as one because to do so would
result in ceasing to be omnipotent. Thus, the divine persons would see that it
is impossible to accomplish any purpose unless they agree. It follows that
they, in fact, will never disagree because it would be stupid to do so. It is
indeed the divine persons themselves who are maximally powerful. Each of them
severally possesses the property of “being maximally powerful,” but only to the
extent that they are in a relationship of indwelling unity and full agreement
with each other. They are like flashlight batteries for each other. They have
the capacity to let their light shine only if they are in the presence of a
power source. They are a power source that energizes each other such that, when
they are united as one, their intrinsic capacity to shine is actuated. The
divine persons empower one another; they do not create yet another divine
entity. In other words, they cannot exercise omnipotent power unless they are
agreed, so there is no possibility that their wills could conflict and that
they could desire to exercise omnipotent power in competing ways. If they are
not in accord, then they do not jointly possess omnipotent ways. If they are
not in accord, then they do not jointly possess omnipotent power or divine
power. Of necessity, there can be only one divine power that is realized in any
all-powerful act.
Of course, it is logically
possible that the divine persons may disagree with one another. They have
distinct wills—not just one will among them. Further, there is no contradiction
in first-order logic in the assertion that “the divine persons disagree with
one another.” However, “disagreement of omnipotent wills” is impossible
because “omnipotent will” entails “wills in agreement as one.” Thus, they could
cease to be omnipotent if they so chose, but such a choice would conflict
with their perfect cognitive faculties, and thus it is rationally assured that
they will not disagree.
Leftow also argues
that persons who have all the same mental properties of will and knowledge
cannot be individuated or distinguished. However, it seems to me that David’s
response to the shared-minds argument raised by Leftow is adequate to dismantle
the argument for this view of the Godhead and for the very same reasons. Despite
the fact that the members of the Godhead share the same knowledge of all things
and always agree with one another, there is a ready-made way to distinguish the
divine persons by unique individual properties. Each of the divine person
eternally possesses unique personal properties of an individual essence unique
to that person. Each possesses unique first-person reflexive knowledge. For
example, “I am the one who sent my Son” is unique to the Father, and “I am the
one who atoned for sins” is unique to the Son.
It may be asked why
there are three united from all eternity instead of two—or three million. The
answer is that the number of divine persons united from eternity could have been
any number, but revelation discloses that the number just happens to be three.
Because the choice to be so united is a free choice in a libertarian sense, it
is a mistake to seek some answer outside of the will of the divine persons that
dictates that they must make that choice.
It may also be asked
how it is possible for persons to choose from all eternity to be in such a
relationship. It seems that there must be at least some temporal moment prior
to the time that they chose to be in the divine relationship of indwelling
unity. However, it is not true that there must be a time before they freely
chose to enter into relationship with each other. It is logically possible that,
in each moment of the existence for divine persons, they make such a choice;
therefore, it is logically possible that they make that choice in every moment
of eternal existence. It may be that they made the choice in every moment of
everlasting time because the inherent degree of intelligence that divine
persons possess has always made it pellucidly clear to the three of them that
being in a loving relationship of indwelling unity is the most rational and
fulfilling choice that they can make. In every moment, they have seen and
recognized that it is both in their personal best interest and in the interest
of everything and everyone else that such a relationship be chosen. In this
sense, among others, God is more intelligent than the other intelligences (Abr.
3:19). Further, by its very nature the loving relationship seeks to expand to
include everyone else in the same peer relationship. For love is fulfilled when
it is freely returned, and the greatest possible good is realized when persons
freely choose to share the same divine love in response to the divine love that
has been offered as a sheer grace. By its very nature, the divine love seeks
peers. (Blake T. Ostler, Exploring Mormon Thought, Volume 3: Of God and Gods
[Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2008], 311-13)
