In logic,
there is a fallacy called the “fallacy fallacy.” Simply put, it is a fallacy to
claim that one’s conclusion is, ipso facto, in error if one uses fallacious argumentation
to support it. A great example (and a comical one) can be seen in The Adventures of Fallacy Man.
Christian
Cotton, in his “Argument from Fallacy,” wrote:
Also known as argumentum ad logicam, argument to logic, fallacy fallacy, and fallacist’s
fallacy, the argument from fallacy occurs when one reasons that because the
argument for some conclusion is fallacious,
the conclusion of that argument is false.
Truth and falsity are features of claims. Fallacies are errors in reasoning,
not errors about truth or falsity. That is, if someone has committed a fallacy,
then he has made an error in reasoning; but it doesn’t follow that he has made
an actual error. Consider the following
example.
(1) If Atlanta is the capital of Georgia,
then it is in the United States.
(2) Atlanta is in the United States.
(3) Therefore, Atlanta is the capital of
Georgia.
This argument illustrates the fallacy of affirming the consequent. As a deductive
argument, it is invalid – one cannot draw/infer the conclusion from the
premises – and yet the conclusion is true. As such, it should be clear that
poor reasoning (committing a fallacy) does not entail a false conclusion. One
would not, in the above example, respond reasonably if she were to suggest
that, because a fallacy has been committed, it is false that Atlanta is the
capital of Georgia. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the fallacious argument may
well be false. The reason is that it’s one thing to commit an error in
reasoning and quite another to get the facts wrong. The one does not follow
from the other. Therefore, because the truth or falsity of a claim cannot be
inferred solely from the quality of the reasoning, concluding that a claim is
false because an error in reasoning (a fallacy) has occurred is itself an error
in reasoning. Hence, the name fallacy fallacy. (Chistian Cotton, “Argument from
Fallacy,” in Robert Arp, Steven Barbone, and Michael Bruce, eds. Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important
Fallacies in Western Philosophy [Oxford: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2019], 125-26)
To give an
example from the realm of LDS apologetics, many LDS (errantly) appeal to Isa 29
and Ezek 37 as prophecies of the Book of Mormon, and argue thusly:
The Bible in
Isa 29 and Ezek 37 are prophecies of the Book of Mormon
Conclusion: the
Book of Mormon is true as it fulfils biblical prophecy
To see why
these texts are not prophecies of the Book of Mormon, see:
and
However, it
would be fallacious to argue against the Book of Mormon thusly:
LDS claim
Isa 29 and Ezek 37 are prophecies of the Book of Mormon
Exegetically,
they are not prophecies of the Book of Mormon
Conclusion:
The Book of Mormon is false
Such would
be to commit the fallacy fallacy, as the authenticity of the Book of Mormon
does not depend upon whether the Bible prophecies of the Book of Mormon, or, as Daniel
Peterson once wrote in response to one critic:
. . .
even if the argument from Isaiah 29 could be shown not to support the
Book of Mormon, the fact that it did not -- which I am simply assuming here for
purposes of argument -- would not constitute evidence AGAINST the Book of
Mormon, but only against certain arguments that have been offered on behalf of
that book.
While LDS
should strive to provide logically sound reasoning and valid evidence
supporting our claims, our critics should avoid the “fallacy fallacy” too.
