Thesis 3. Not all the works of
sinners are sins.
. . . the acts of a sinner, just because
they are done without habitual grace, are not necessarily sins. For, they can
be either salvific (if they take place with the help of elevating grace . . .),
or simply good acts, that is, in conformity, with his rational nature as such
both because of the subject (which is something nor forbidden), and from the
intention of the one acting (which is not inordinate). By reason of this
thesis, however, it is not excluded that these latter acts take place with the
help of medicinal grace. . . .
29. Proof from Holy Scripture.
God exhorts sinners (and also unbelievers) to do certain works, and he praises
them for some of their works. But this would be repugnant, if such works were
sins. Therefore not all the works of sinners are sins.
The major: For,
he exhorts sinners to pray (Sir. 21:1), to do penance (Ezek. 18:30), to give
them alms . . . (Dan. 4:27); and he praises them for some of their works,
v.gr., the prayers of Manasseh, the wicked king (2 Chron. 33:11-13), the prayer
of the publican (Luke 18:13f.), the desire of Zachaeus to see Jesus (Luke
19:1-10), the alms and prayers of Cornelius (Acts 10:4).
The minor:
It would be repugnant to the divine holiness and truth.
30. Proof from tradition.
. . . St. Augustine contrasted avarice with charity; however, not so exclusively
that he did not acknowledge some works as naturally good. For he wrote: “One type
of charity is divine, another human; some human things are licit, some illicit
. .. Human love is licit by which a wife is loved . . . It is licit for you
with a human love to love your wife, to love your children, to love your
friends, to love your fellow citizens . . . But you see that such love can also
be shown by the impious, that is, by pagans, Jews, and heretics” (R 1528; see
1733, 1827). St. Fulgentius held the
same doctrine, since he said about unbelievers and sinners: “Some good things
that pertain to the justice of human society can be present in them; but
because they are not done from faith and the love of God, they cannot be beneficial”
(R 2244).
Now if a pagan or unbeliever can
do such things, a fortiori a sinner who is endowed with supernatural faith can
also do them.
. . .
32. Objections.
1. From Matt. 6:24: No one can serve two masters . . . But the sinner
serves the devil, not God. Therefore the sinner sins in everything.
I distinguish the major.
No one can habitually serve both God and the devil, conceded; one who
habitually serves the devil cannot sometimes offer some service to God, denied.
I also distinguish the minor. Habitually, conceded; always and in
all things, denied.
2. From John 9;31: We know that
God does not listen to sinners, but if anyone is a worshipper of God and does
his will, God listens to him. Therefore the prayer of a sinner, and for the
same reason his other works, which have the appearance of being good, are
displeasing to God.
I respond: a)
the intended meaning of the man born blind was this: if Christ were a sinner,
as his enemies contended, then he would not have been able to cure my
blindness.
b) I distinguish the major.
God does not listen to sinners who petition in a sinful way, conceded;
who petition correctly and properly, denied. See II-II, q. 83, a. 16.
3. From Matt. 7:18: A sound
tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. But a
sinner is an evil tree whose fruits are his works. Therefore a sinner cannot
perform good works.
I respond:
a) that Christ is talking about false prophets whose doctrine of itself cannot
produce good fruits.
b) I retort, inasmuch as
therefore it would follow that a just person could never sin because he is a
good tree; and this is false.
c) These words of Christ contain a
proverbial way of speaking; this way of speaking expresses what happens
generally, but not what happens always.
4. St. Augustine writes about the precepts
of charity: “All these precepts of love, that is, of charity, which are so
great and of such a nature that whatever a man thinks he has done well, if he
does it without charity, in no way does it well” (R 1943). But this charity is
understood as theological charity, which is joined together with sanctifying
grace. Therefore the sinner can in no way act well.
I distinguish the major.
According to St. Augustine, whatever takes place without charity is not done
well, inasmuch as it happens either in a bad way against charity, or it is not
condignly meritorious of eternal life, conceded; according to St.
Augustine a sinner cannot do anything naturally good, denied. I concede the
minor and distinguish the consequent. A sinner cannot do anything naturally
good, denied; condignly meritorious of eternal life, conceded.
The words of St. Augustine quoted in n. 30 should be read again. According to
what he says there it is certain that, in addition to avarice and charity,
there are also naturally good works. (Severino González Rivas, Sacrae
Theologiae Summa, 4 vols. [trans. Kenneth Baker; Keep the Faith, Inc., 2014],
3-B: 27, 28-29, 30; “R” refers to M. J. Rouët De Journel, Enchiridion
Patristicum)
Thesis 4. Not all the works of unbelievers
are sins.
. . . .
39. Objections.
1. From Rom. 14:23: For whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.
Therefore all the works of unbelievers are sins.
I respond
that it is clear from the context that in this case faith signifies the dictate
of conscience. Hence: sin is whatever takes place against the dictate of
conscience, conceded; whatever does not take place from theological
faith, denied. . . .
2. From Tit. 1:15: To the pure
all things are pure, but to the corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure; their
minds and consciences are corrupted. Therefore an unbeliever sins in
everything.
I respond
that this is the meaning: For Christians who knew very well that no food is
unclean, because the Mosaic Law about the prohibition of certain foods had been
abolished, all foods are clean. But the Judaizers, thinking that the laws was
still in force, sin against faith and against their own conscience.
3. From Heb. 11:6: Without
faith it is impossible to please God. Therefore an unbeliever cannot please
God.
I respond that
the Apostle is asserting only, certainly, that faith is necessary, for
salvation, so that an adult cannot be justified unless an act of faith in God
who exists and rewards has been made. Therefore: without faith no adults can be
justified, conceded; without faith all works become evil, denied.
(Ibid., 31, 34)
Thesis 5. Any man, even without
grace, can perform some naturally good acts, which he also sometimes does.
. . .
44. Proof from tradition. The
Fathers acknowledge that there can be naturally good acts performed by
unbelievers and de facto they say that such works are at times done by them.
See Chrysostom (R 1162); St. Augustine (R 1528, 1733); St. Fulgentius (R 2244).
. . .
46. Objections.
1. From Orange, cn. 22 (d 392), where the teaching that Augustine taught often
is quoted: “No one has nothing of his own except lying and sin. But if a man
has anything of truth and justice, it is from that foundation for which we
should thirst in this desert, so that, as though refreshed by some of its
drops, we may not falter along the way.” Therefore no man, without grace, can
do anything good.
I respond that
this canon has been interpreted in different ways. Perhaps it should be understood
like this: No one has of his own, or from himself alone, anything that he
has not accepted from God, the author of both the natural and the supernatural
orders, except lying and sin. For, if a man has some good, he has
received it from God, who is the fountain from which flow into us all good
things, both natural and supernatural. Therefore, I distinguish the
antecedent: Whatever goods a man has, they come from God, the author of the
natural and the supernatural orders, conceded; they come from God, the author
of the supernatural order only, denied. Therefore, a man can perform,
not only salvific acts, but also natural or ethically good acts.
2) From Orange cn. 9 (D 379): “It
is a divine gift, both when we think rightly and when we restrain our feet from
falsity and injustice; for as often as we do good, God operates in us and with
us, that we may work.” Therefore grace is required for all acts, both salvific
and merely natural; nor man, without grace, cannot do anything good.
I respond that
this controversy is with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians about the necessity
of grace for salvific works, but not at all whether at times without grace a
man can perform some good work, even though it is not salvific. See canons 6-8
(D 376-378). Therefore, the words quoted apply to salvific acts, conceded;
to purely natural acts, denied.
3) From Matt. 22:37, where the
universal precept of charity is imposed. But such a percept cannot be fulfilled
by that relation alone to God which by its nature is present in every morally
good act. Therefore, lest the precept of charity be violated, all works must be
referred to God with an actual or virtual intention.
I distinguish the major.
A universal precept is imposed, negatively, inasmuch as it forbids the
violation of any precept, conceded; positively, inasmuch as everything
must be done from a motive of charity, denied. I distinguish the minor also;
It is not fulfilled as negative, denied; as positive, conceded.
Therefore the precept of charity is universal by reason if its end, because the
other precepts are referred to charity, either to acquire it or to increase it.
See II-II, q. 23, a ad 3.
4) From 1 Cor. 10:31: So, whether
you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God. Therefore
all works, in order to be good, must be referred to God as the supernatural
end. But this can take place only through acts of charity.
I distinguish the antecedent.
Everything must be done for the glory of God, negatively, negatively, inasmuch
as nothing should be done contrary to the will of God, conceded; they
must be done positively by referring everything to God, I subdistinguish;
by the way of counsel, as St. Bonaventure says, conceded; by way of
precept, as St. Thomas holds, I make a further distinction; with an actual
or at least virtual relation on the part of the agent, denied; with a
virtual relation on the part of the work, conceded.
5) A man is bound to elicit acts
of charity. But to elicit acts of charity is the same thing as to refer actually
everything to God. Therefore a man is bound to refer actually everything to
God.
I distinguish the major.
Sometimes in life, conceded; whenever a good act is performed, denied.
I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent. Sometimes in life, conceded;
always and in everything, denied. (Ibid., 35, 37, 38-39)
