On the whole, then, Athanasius’s
doctrine in the Contra Gentes—De Incarnatione is one that clearly
distinguishes between the relation of the Word and the Father and that between
both the Word and the Father, taken together and creation. The Word is other
than creation and belongs in a unique fashion to the Father: ος αλλος μεν εστι των γενητων και πασης της κτισεως, ιδιος δε και μονος του αγαθου Πατρος υπαρχει (CG 40). Moreover . . .
creation is described as related precisely to the relation of Word-Father.
These aspects of Athanasius’s Trinitarian doctrine have a definite and
significant bearing, it seems to me, on his particularly emphatic presentation
of the inseparability, or even convergence, of the aspects of divine otherness
and nearness. It is well to note, at this juncture, the way in which previous
Christian apologists had articulated a conception of the Logos as mediator
between God and creation. Within a framework that was more or less
subordinationist, such a conception tended toward the implication that
transcendence, conceived as otherness was more properly divine than a
transcendence involved with creation. If the Word, who represents direct divine
involvement was also not truly divine. On the other hand, in Athanasius too,
the Word is represented as Mediator. But here there is no trace of
subordinationism, and the Word who is active in the world is himself clearly
other than the world and belongs wholly to the Father. With reference to divine
transcendence and nearness, such a perspective naturally implies that divine
transcendence is in no way mitigated by nearness. IN being more intimately
involved in the world, God does not cease to be wholly other, as the Word is
other than creation. Conversely, divine otherness does not entail distance from
creation, as the Word is powerfully and intimately present to creation, yet
belongs essentially to the transcendence of the Father: “Who could analyze the
Father in order to discover the powers of his Word? For he is the Word and
wisdom of the Father, and at the same time condescend to creatures (τοις γενητοις συγκαταβαινων )
to give them the knowledge and conception of his begetter” (CG 47).
However, if Athanasius rejects the
attempt to delineate the distinction between divine otherness and nearness
along the lines of an ontological prioritizing of the Father over the Son, he
does not relinquish the project of actually making this distinction. But he does
not locate the distinction within the Godhead itself. Rather, it is articulated
in terms of God being “outside” creation by his essence and yet present within
it by his power (As in DI 17: εν παση τη κτισει ων, εκτος μεν εστι του παντος κατ'’ουσιαν, εν πασι δε εστι ταις εαυτου, δυναμεσι. Cf. Irenaeus, AH IV, 20,
5. The distinction goes back at least to Philo). This essence-power distinction
in Athanasius seems to be a distinction between the divine realm in se,
encompassing both Father and Son (not to mention the Spirit), and ad extra.
Its point is simply that God’s active agency within creation does not mitigate
against his otherness as an agent; God does not become consubstantial with
creation through his activity within it. However, in being outside creation by
his essence, God does not become consubstantial with creation through his
activity within it. However, in being outside creation by his essence, God does
not cease to be effective within it and to effect creation’s participation in
his own activity. The essence-power distinction is thus parallel with the more
pervasive nature-works distinction, whereby it is articulated that God is
invisible, incomprehensible, etc., according to his nature, and yet manifests
himself in his works (CG 35; DI 32). In both cases, it is a
matter of speaking in one breath of the otherness and nearness of God. (Khaled
Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought [Routledge Early
Church Monographs; London: Routledge, 1998], 45-46)
Athanasius’s Christology can only
be interpreted correctly in view of both the irreducible distinction between
God and humanity that is integral to his system and his conception of the
incarnation as modifying while not annulling that distinction, in such a way
that the relation between the Word and his human body is precisely not
external, but one of “appropriation.” (Ibid., 212 n. 9)
