In an attempt to support the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, Weldon Lanfield (ex-RLDS who converted to the Church of Christ [“Cambellites”]) wrote:
James expressed the
finality and completeness of the New Testament in this manner: “But whoso
looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a
forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed”
(James 1:25). By referring to the New Testament as “perfect,” the passage tells
us first that it has no room for improvement. Secondly, it is complete, since
perfection implies completeness. The original term for “perfect” in this
passage is teleion, which means “having reached its end, finished,
complete, perfect.” Unquestionably, the wording of James rules out further
periods of revelation. (Weldon Langfield, The Truth About Mormonism: A
Former Adherent Analyzes the LDS Faith [Bakersfield, Calif.: Weldon
Langfield Publications, 1991], 65-66)
There
are a number of problems with Langfield’s comments on Jas 1:25. Firstly, James
cannot be speaking of the New Testament as not all of the 27 books of the New
Testament were inscripturated when James wrote his epistle. If Langfield’s comments
are correct, this would mean that Jas 1:25 precludes any further books being
divinely revealed, resulting in Langfield having to accept a truncated New
Testament canon!
Furthermore,
as discussed in the section "Falling at the First Hurdle: Why Sola
Scriptura is an exegetical impossibility" in my lengthy essay, Not
By Scripture Alone: A Latter-day Saint Refutation of Sola Scriptura, for
Sola Scriptura to be operative as the (final/ultimate) rule of faith,
there must first be tota scriptura (i.e., all of the books of scripture
must first be inscripturated). As James was writing at a time of special revelation,
of all the potential exegetical possibilities of this verse, the “pro-Sola
Scriptura” interpretation is not an exegetical possibility.
According
to non-LDS scholars, while there is some debate as to the meaning of the term “the
perfect law,” all are agreed that it is not the New Testament texts.
Consider the following:
The “perfect law” (νόμον τέλειον) could have several
referents. James could be discussing the Torah, the Torah plus Christ, the
basic gospel message, or any combination of the three. He adds a further
modifier, though, which aids in the identification—the descriptive genitive “of
liberty” (τῆς
ἐλευθερίας)—demonstrating
that this law does not trap, bind, or weigh one down but is characterized by
freedom. We would argue that this most likely refers to the gospel message,
particularly in its role as fulfilling the OT prophecies about a new or renewed
covenant (see esp. Jer 31:31–34). All of the qualifications given in this verse
make it unlikely that just the Mosaic law is in view, but rather something that
contrasts with or at least adds to it. It is true that similar qualifiers can
be found in Jewish literature describing Torah pure and simple (see esp. Aboth 6:2; b. B. Metz. 85b), but when Jas 2:12 refers again to the law of
liberty, it is in clear contrast to Old Testament laws (2:11). Even here, v. 25
functions as the concluding positive model to vv. 22–25, just as v. 21b did for
vv. 20–21, so it seems likely that the law of liberty must correspond to the
implanted word. Additionally, the transition from “word” to “law” occurs within this small pericope that is
clearly one section, thus strengthening the correspondence.
At the same time, James would not likely have
retained the term “law” if the Hebrew Scriptures did not also feature in his
thinking. Thus Davids defines the law of liberty as “the OT ethic as explained
and altered by Jesus.” Moo concurs, explaining that “the addition of the word
‘perfect’ connotes the law in its eschatological, ‘perfected’ form, while the
qualification ‘that gives freedom’ refers to the new covenant promise of the
law written on the heart” and “accompanied by a work of the Spirit enabling
obedience to that law for the first time.” The earlier this letter is and the
more Jewish James’s communities are, the more likely the Hebrew Scriptures form
an integral part of “the perfect law of liberty,” even if they must be
interpreted in light of the coming of the Messiah and his revelation. (Craig L. Blomberg and Mariam J. Kamell, James [Zondervan
Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament 16; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan,
2008], 91-92)
into the perfect law of freedom: The law (nomos)
has now replaced the mirror as that into which the person gazes. This is the
first mention of nomos in James. In
2:9, 10, 11, and 4:11, it appears absolutely. In 2:8, it is called “the royal
law” and in 2:12, the “law of freedom.” Here, James combines two terms: teleios (“perfect”) must obviously be
associated with the use of the same word in 1:4 and 1:17. God is the source of
“every perfect gift,” and the law, for James, is certainly among them. The
praise of God’s law is frequent both in Torah itself and in later Jewish
literature. LXX Ps 18:8 calls the law amōmos,
i.e., without fault/perfect. LXX Ps 118 elaborates the ways the law mediates
the qualities of God: it is a source of mercy (118:29), a light (118:105; see
Prov 6:23), and truth (118:43). The Ep.
Arist. 31 declares the law “full of wisdom and free from all blemish.” That
the observance of the law is, in turn, to be associated with freedom (eleutheria) is emphasized by Philo, That Every Good Man is Free 45, 4 Macc
5:22–26; 14:2; PA 3:5; 6:2. It will
be remembered that Paul also can characterize nomos as “spiritual” (Rom 7:14) and “good” (Rom 7:16; see 1 Tim
1:8) and the entolē (“commandment”)
as “holy and righteous and good” (Rom 7:12). The position that obedience to the
law renders a person free reminds some commentators (e.g., Dibelius, 116–18;
Mayor, 73–74) of the Stoic principle that only obeying the law of nature makes
a person truly free and that, therefore, only the sage is truly free (see
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent
Philosophers [Zeno] VII,121; Epictetus, Discourses
IV, 1, 1; Seneca, On the Blessed Life
15:7; Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler
3 [Mor. 780C]), but the idea is
widespread enough—as the examples from Jewish literature attest—to make any
direct dependence on Stoic ideas unnecessary. Of more pertinence is the
question of what James includes within the concept of nomos. At the very least, the use of the figure of the mirror
suggests that he saw it as containing exempla
of moral behavior (see 2:20–26; 5:10–11; 5:16–18), as was seen by Oecumenius.
Bede takes the “law of liberty” to mean the grace of the Gospel, and
Theophylact identifies it with the “Law of Christ.” (Luke Timothy Johnson, The Letter
of James: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AYB 37A; New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2008], 209)
The blessed person
looks into “the perfect law of liberty”; this expression is a major
interpretive problem for James. On the one hand, it is well known that the
Stoics saw life according to the rule of reason, i.e. the law of nature, as a
life of freedom (so Epict. 4.1.158; Seneca Vit.
15.7; Cicero Parad. 34; cf. H.
Schlier, TDNT II, 493–496; J. Blunck,
DNTT I, 715–716). Thus it is quite
reasonable to see James’s phrase as linguistically possible in the Stoic world,
although this expression has not yet been found (cf. Dibelius, 116–117). It is
also true that Philo took the Stoic concept and identified it more or less with
the law of Moses (Op. Mund. 3; Vit. Mos. 2.48) and correlated the
keeping of that law with freedom (Omn.
Prob. Lib. 45; cf. 4 Macc. 14:2), so that even within some Jewish circles
such Stoic influence was possible. On the other hand, there is absolutely no
question that Jews saw their law as perfect (Pss. 19:7; 119; Aristeas 31; Rom.
7:12), that they found joy in its observance (Pss. 1:2; 19:7–11; 40:6–8; Pss
119; Sir. 6:23–31; 51:13–22), and even that they saw the law giving freedom (m.
Ab. 3:5; 6:2; B. K. 8:6; b. B. M. 85b). E. Stauffer, “Gesetz,” claims to find
the very expression “law of freedom” in 1QS 10:6, 8, 11, and this has been
supported by S. Légasse, 338–339. But while Légasse’s general point of the
freedom which the sectaries found in their law is true enough, Nauck, “Lex,”
and Nötscher have convincingly proved that this exact citation must be
translated “inscribed law” as in Ex. 32:16 before
rabbinic exegesis, which Nötscher believes to be a reaction to Christian
claims. Still, even without the exact phrase, these Jewish parallels mean that
although the author freely uses words and phrases from the general Hellenistic
pool to which the Stoics added their share, unless one finds specific Stoic
concepts (such as natural law or passionless life) it is more likely that he is
still within a Jewish Christian world (cf. Bonhöffer, 193: “With the exception
of individual expressions and the relatively good Greek in which it is written,
one will hardly discover a trace of Hellenistic influence in James”).
It is within this
Jewish world that one can understand the phrase. For the Jewish Christian the
law is still the will of God, but Messiah has come and perfected it and given
his new law (cf. Davies, Torah). Thus
one finds the Sermon on the Mount (especially Mt. 5:17) and other similar
passages in the early Christian tradition that present Christ as the giver of a
new or renewed law. James’s contact with the tradition behind the Sermon on the
Mount is certain (see Introduction, 47–48), and one must agree with Davies that
James sees Jesus’ reinterpretation of the law as a new law (cf. 2:8, royal law;
Davies, Setting, 402–405;
Schnackenburg, 349–352). Similar conceptions of Jesus’ teaching appear in Barn.
2:6; Hermas Vis. 1.3; Iren. Haer. 4.34.4; but they also are not
lacking in Paul. Certainly Paul was against legalism, the use of the law as a
way of salvation—that could only lead to death—but when it came to the ethical
life of the Christian, it was another matter. On that topic Paul draws on the
earlier Christian tradition in terms similar to James (Gal. 5:13, which
combines freedom and law; Gal. 6:2; 1 Cor. 9:21; and 1 Cor. 7:10, 25, where a
dominical saying ends the discussion; cf. Dibelius, 119). Although in James one
is in a different area of Christianity than in Paul, he nonetheless finds
similar ideas, especially when looking at what Paul says about James’s sphere
of concern (cf. Eckart, 521–526).
The one who looks and
remains in the law of freedom, i.e. the OT ethic as explained and altered by
Jesus, is clearly defined: he is one who does not simply hear and forget, but
practices what he hears. Both expressions are unusual Greek: ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς (the latter word
found in biblical literature only in Sir. 11:27) is a Semitism, “hearer of
forgetfulness,” and ποιητὴς ἔργου
is apparently built so as to make an obvious parallel (the problem is that
there is a change from a genitive of quality to an objective genitive; cf.
Mayor, 74; but while the Greek is unusual the meaning is clear enough; cf. m.
Ab. 3:8 and the citations in Str-B III, 754).
Such an obedient
Christian is pronounced μακάριος (another term with a Semitic background as in
1:12; Matthew 5; Psalm 1; Is. 56:2, etc.) in his deeds (οὗτος is for emphasis: this person, the doer, in contrast to
the hearer only). Does this eschatological type of pronouncement refer to
blessing as one acts or a future joy at the parousia (Schrage, 23)? The future ἔσται, the use of μακάριος in 1:12, and the
normal eschatology of James make one agree with Mussner, 110, that this saying
is future-oriented: there is an eschatological blessing in store for the one
whose deeds (ποιήσις,
hapax legomenon in the NT) are the doing
of the law of freedom, the teaching of Jesus. (Peter H. Davids, The Epistle of James:
A Commentary on the Greek Text [New International Greek Testament
Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1982], 99-100)
With
respect to the use of τελιος, while Langfield believes this supports his thesis, it
actually serves to refute him even further. How so? Consider Jas 1:4:
And let endurance have its perfect result, so that
you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing. (NASB)
The Greek terms
"perfect" and "complete" are τελειος and ολοκληρος. These
are very strong adjectives to be used to describe something. The problem here
is that they are used to describe, not Scripture (or just the New Testament,
per Langfield’s interpretation of Jas 1:25), but endurance.
Absolutising Jas 1:4 in the way that Sola Scriptura apologists like Langfield
absolutise 2 Tim 3:16-17 and Jas 1:24, endurance/patience is all that is needed
to live a Christian life to the exclusion of Scripture, which, of course, is
absurd, but is a strong warning against the eisegesis apologists like Webster,
King, White, and others engage in, as I document in my essay.
On this topic, Catholic
apologist Trent Horn wrote the following in his The Case for
Catholicism:
In 2 Timothy 2:21 Paul says that if Timothy keeps
himself from bad influences, “he will be a vessel for noble use, consecrated
and useful to the master of the house, ready for any good work.” The Greek
phrase “every good work” (pan ergon agathon) is identical to what
is used in 2 Timothy 3:17, but not Protestant would claim that a Christian only
needs to stay away from bad influences in order to live the Christian life.
James 1:4 uses stronger language to describe how endurance makes one “perfect”
(teleioi) and “complete” (holokeroi) rather than “equips”
believers but of course our faith does not rest on the virtue of patience
alone. (Trent Horn, The Case for Catholicism: Answers to Classic and
Contemporary Protestant Objections [San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
2017], 27)
In a footnote (Ibid.,
27 n. 42), Horn refutes an attempted “counter” to an appeal to Jas 1:4 by Eric
Svendsen (a
4 1/2-point Calvinist) in his hit-and-miss book Evangelical Answers:
Svendsen objects, saying, “The Greek word used
here is different than that found in [2] Tim 3:17 ([teleos] is used, not
[artios]” (Ibid., 138), but this is actually worse for the Protestant
apologist because teleos communicates a stronger sense of
completeness than artios (which the New American Standard
Bible renders in 2 Timothy 3:17 as “adequate”). Svendsen then comments that
James 1:4 only says that patience perfects a man of God in relation to “the
‘testing of your faith’ whereas Scripture makes the man of God ‘fully equipped’
to ‘teach, rebuke, correct, and train’” (Ibid. 139). But a person’s faith can
certainly be tested by someone who challenges it and requires correction or
proper teaching in response Therefore, this does not change the fact that
Protestant arguments for sola scriptura based on 2 Timothy
3:16-17 can also be applied, in the style of argumentum ad absurdum,
to James 1:4 and show that if patience is not a rule of faith despite its
ability to perfect us in the ace of trials, then Scripture is not a sole rule
of faith despite its ability to equip us to teach and correct others.
It should be obvious that Jas
1:25 is not talking about the New Testament texts, nor does it support the
formal sufficiency of the Bible. Langfield is guilty of eisegesis.
Further Reading
Not By Scripture Alone: A Latter-day Saint Refutation of Sola Scriptura
