Of these two methods, the literal and
the allegorical, the allegorical is made use of by Philo without any
reservation. Everything in Scripture, from names, dates, and numbers to the
narration of historical events or the prescription of rules for human conduct,
is to him subject to allegorical interpretation. But as for the literal method,
it is to be used, according to him, with certain reservations. One general rule
laid down by Philo is that no anthropomorphic expression about God is to be
taken literally. As a proof-text for this general rule he quotes the verse “God
is not as man,” (Num. 23:19) which is taken by him to contain the general
principle that God is not to be likened to anything perceptible by the senses.
(Immut. 13, 62) And so, for instance, he says, the verse “and Cain went
out from the face of God” (Gen. 4:16) is to be taken “in a figurative sense,”
since, if taken literally, it is “greatly at variance with truth.” (Post.
I, I) If the question is raised by Scripture makes use of such anthropomorphic
expressions, the answer given by him is that such expressions “are introduced
for the instruction of the many” (Immut. II, 54) and out of regard
"for the ways of the thinking of the duller folk,” (Somn. I, 40,
237) so that “it is for training and admonition, not because god’s nature is
such, that these words are used.” (Immut. II, 54)
This general rule, however, opens up
some new questions. Suppose God is described in an anthropomorphic way as
having said something or as having done something. This anthropomorphic manner
of expression, to be sure, is not to be taken literally. But what about the
thing said by God or done by God? Should that be taken literally as a fact,
communicated or performed by God in a manner not anthropomorphic, or should
that, too, be rejected in its literal sense? Then, also, how about all the
statements in Scripture which do not involve anthropomorphisms? Should they all
be taken literally, without any restriction, or is there any restriction to
their literal sense?
No general answer is given by Philo to
these questions. (Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious
Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2 vols. [Structure and
Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza 2; Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1947], 1:116-17)
[Philo’s] insistence upon the
existence of ideas reflects his adherence to Plato and his opposition to
Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. While there is no definite statement
in Scripture as to the existence of ideas, Philo quotes three verses in which he
finds references to this theory: (1) the verse stating that man was made “after
the image of God,” (Gen. 1:27) in which he takes the term “image of God” to
refer to the idea of man; (Opif. 6, 25) (2) the verse which in the
Septuagint reads: “And thou shalt make everything for me according to what I
show thee on this mount, according to the pattern (παραδειγμα) of the tabernacle and the pattern of all the
vessels thereof, even so shalt thou make it,” (Exod. 25:9 (8); cf. Num. 8:4) in
which he takes “patterns” to refer to the ideas of the tabernacle and its
vessels; (Qu. in Ex. II, 52; cf. Mos. II, 15, 74; Congr.
2, 8; the archetypal pattern of the candlestick) (3) the verse “Show me, I pray
Thee, Thy glory,” (Exod. 33:180 in which the term “glory” is taken by him to
refer to the ideas. (Spec. I, 8, 45-48) Of these three scriptural
proof-texts for the existence of ideas, the first and third may be dismissed as
attempts on his part to import into scriptural texts the external theory of
ideas, as he does indeed interpret many other verses in terms of ideas. Not so,
however, is the second proof-text, that of the preexistent idea of the
tabernacle and its vessels. Here Philo does not import into the scriptural
verse something altogether new; he only combined an old Jewish tradition with
the Platonic theory of ideas. According to this Jewish tradition there has been
in existence an ideal tabernacle, or, as it is usually called, sanctuary, prior
to the building of the visible tabernacle in the wilderness; and it was that
ideal tabernacle which God showed to Moses as a pattern for the visible
tabernacle. This tradition is expressed in two ways. Sometimes it is said that
the ideal sanctuary was created by God prior to the creation of the world. (Pesaḥim
54a; Nedarim 39b; Tanḥuma ed. Buber, Num. Naso, § 19) But
sometimes it is said that its creation was only planned by God, or, more
literally, came into the thought of God, before the creation of the world. (Genesis
Rabbah I, 4; ‘alu be-maḥashabah; cf. Midrash Tehillim, on Ps.
93:2, § 3, p. 207b) (Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious
Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2 vols. [Structure and
Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza 2; Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1947], 1:181-82)
In adopting Plato’s view on the
creation of the world on account of its agreement with the story of creation in
the Book of Genesis, Philo also interprets the scriptural story of creation in
Genesis in the light of Plato’s story of creation in the Timaeus. The
creation of the world was out of what he calls by the Aristotelian term matter
(υλη) or by the Stoic term substance (ουσια), (Opif. 5, 21; Plant. I, 3; Heres 27, 134;
Somn, II, 6, 45) and describes by the Platonic term mother (μητηρ) or foster-mother (τροφος) or nurse (τιθηνη). (Ebr. 14, 61; Qu. in Gen. IV,
160) But with regard to that matter, it is not clear whether he considers it as
created by God, or whether he considers it as coeternal with God. Interpreters
of Philo differ on that point. Those who say that he considered matter as
created find support for their interpretation in such passages as those in
which God is said to have brought into being “things that were non-existent” (τα μη
οντα) (Opif. 26, 81; Mut. 5, 46; Mos.
II, 20, 100; cf. Somn. I, 13, 76) or in which He is said to be “not only
a Demurge, but also a Creator (κτιστης)” (Somn.
I, 13, 76; Spec. I, 5, 30) and in which to create (creare) matter
is said to be a property of Providence or in which matter is spoken of as
having been created (γεγονε). (Eusebius, Praeparatio
Evangelica VII, 21, 336b) Those who say that Philo considered matter as
eternal argue that the term “non-existent” is used by Philo in a relative and
not an absolute sense; that the statement that God is not only a Demiurge but
also a Creator mean that God is not only a Demiurge of the perceptible world
but also the Creator of the intelligible world; that the passages in which the
term creation is used in connection with matter are not statements of Philo’s
own belief; that the terms which he most often applies to God are Craftsman (δημιουργος), World-molder (κοσμοπλαστης), and Artificer (τεχνιτης), all of which imply the making of the world
out of something. On the basis of all these considerations and from “his
failure to speak of matter as created,” Drummond concludes his survey of the
problem with the following words: “On a survey, then, of the whole evidence, I
think we must conclude that Philo believed in the eternity of matter.” The same
conclusion is also arrived at by Neumark and Bréhier. (Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo:
Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2
vols. [Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza 2;
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947], 1:300-1)
From our own survey of the whole
evidence, however, we have come to the conclusion that no light can be thrown
on Philo’s position of this question from the use of such terms as
“non-existent” or “creator” or “create” on the one hand, and “craftsman” or “world-molder”
or “artificer” on the other. (Ibid., 302)
In [intertestamental] literature, two
conflicting statements are to be found. In the Wisdom of Solomon, on the one
hand, it is said that God “created the world out of formless matter” (Wisdom of
Solomon 11:17) in the Second Book of Maccabees on the other hand, it is said
that God made heaven and earth and all that is therein “not out of things
existent” (ουκεξ οντων). (II Macc. 7:28) But here, again, the
question may be raised whether the “formless matter” was itself created or not,
and also whether or not the “not out of things existent” refers to formless
matter. Similarly inconclusive is the position of Aristeas on this question.
His argument that the deified heroes are not true gods because the useful
things which they invented are only combinations of things already created out
“they themselves did not make the apparatus (κατακευνη) of the things” (Aristeas, 136) does not
necessarily imply that God’s creation of the world was ex nihilo; it
means no more than what it says, namely, that the heroes merely took things
which were already a constructed apparatus and made new useful combinations of
them, whereas the Jewish God, being a true God, made each apparatus itself, but
each apparatus itself may have been made out of a formless matter and not
necessarily ex nihilo. (Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of
Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2 vols.
[Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza 2;
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947], 1:302-3)
Let us first examine the text of this
second prayer. In the original Hebrew it reads: “Show us Thy glory.” Now the
expression “glory of God” or “glory of the Lord” in Scripture may mean two
things. It may mean God himself and it may also mean something produced by God
and distinct from Him. These two meanings of the term glory in the verse in
question are to be found in the two Greek translations of that verse. One translation
of this verse reads “Reveal thyself to me.” It is this verse and in this
translation that Philo, as we have tried to show above, always quotes when he
interprets it to be a prayer for God’s essence. The other translation of the
verse reads, literally, as in the Hebrew, “show me Thy glory.”
Let us now assume that in those three
of the first four passages in which the powers are explicitly said by him to be
knowable in their essence, Philo took the second prayer of Moses to read
“Reveal thyself to me.” When therefore God in His answer said to him, again
according to the Greek reading, “I will go before thee with My glory and I will
call by My name the Lord before thee, and I will have mercy upon whom I please
to have mercy . . . but, said He, thou canst not see My face . . . and when My
glory is passing by, I will place thee in a cleft of the rock and over thee
with My hand over thee, until I pass by, then I will withdraw My hand and then
thou shalt see what are behind Me but My fact cannot be seen by thee,” (Exod.
33:19-23) he too this answer to mean that while My “face,” that is, my essence,
cannot be known, my “glory” and “what are behind Me,” that is, My powers, can
be known in their essence.
Then let us assume that in the fifth
passage, where the powers are said to be unknown in their essence. Philo had
before him the two Greek readings of this second prayer of Moses, one “Reveal
thyself to me” and the other “show me Thy glory.” Let us also assume that he
knew that these two Greek translations represented the two possible meanings of
the underlying Hebrew word “glory.” Assuming all this, we can readily see how
Philo, having before him a verse which in the original Hebrew lends itself to
two interpretations, interpreted the verse actually to contain two distinct
prayers, one for a knowledge of God’s essence and the other for a knowledge of
God’s glory, that is, His powers. This is an exegetical method which is quite
common in traditional Jewish interpretation of scripture. (As, for instance,
the exegetical uses made in many places of the differences between the kere
and the ketib of the al tikre; cf. e.g. Baba Kamma 10b)
Since, therefore, Philo took the second prayer of Moses in verse 18 to contain
two distinct prayers, God’s answer to this double prayer was also taken by him
to contain two distinct answers to the two prayers. The answer to the first
prayer was taken by him to be contained in the verses “I will go before thee
with My glory and I will call by My name the Lord before three, and I will have
mercy upon whom I please to have mercy . . . but, said He, thou canst not see
My face.” (Exod. 33:19-20) This part of the answer was interpreted by Philo to
mean: “To him that is worthy of My grace (The term χαρις used here by Philo and the term ελεηοω used in the Septuagint are translations of
the same Hebrew word) I extend all the boons which he is capable of receiving;
but the apprehension of Me is something more than human nature, yea even the
whole heaven and universe, will be able to contain.” (Spec. I, 8, 43-44)
The answer to the second prayer was taken by him to be contained in the verses,
“When My glory is passing by, I will place thee in a cleft of the rock and over
thee with My hand over thee, until I pass by, then I will withdraw My hand and
then thou shalt see what are behind Me but My face cannot be seen by thee.”
(Exod. 33:21-23) This part of the answer was interpreted by Philo to mean: “The
powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even
as I. . . but while in their essence they are beyond your comprehension, they
nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress and copy of their active
working.” (Spec. I, 8, 45-46) According to this interpretation, the
expression “thou shalt see what are behind Me but My face cannot be seen by
thee” is taken by Philo to mean that the powers themselves cannot be known;
only their copies can be known.
The double meaning of the term glory
of God in Scripture is reflected also in Philo’s interpretation of the verse
“And the glory of God descended on Mount Sinai.” (Exod. 24:16) Commenting upon
this verse, he says that the term glory (δοξα), has two
meanings: (1) “the presence of His powers (παρουσιαν . . . των
δυναμεων), since the power of an army is spoken of as
the glory of the king”; (2) “a mental image (δοκησις) of Him alone and a notion (υποληψις) of His divine glory,” (Qu. in Exod.
II, 45) that is to say, the term glory refers to God himself, of which the
people thought to have caught a glimpse. In this passage he quite obviously
plays upon the two meanings of the Greek term δοξα, that of “glory” and that of “notion.” But
undoubtedly behind the discussion there is the knowledge of the double meaning
of the expression glory of God in Scripture, which must have been known to
every intelligent reader of the Septuagint no less than to that of the original
Hebrew text.
The view that the powers are unknown
in their essence is also stated by Philo in his comment on the verse in which
Jaco exclaimed: “This is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate
of heaven.” (Gen. 28:17) What is meant by “house” and “gate” and “heaven”?
Philo asks, and in answer to this question he says that by “House” and “gate”
is meant this visible world of ours, and by “heaven” is meant the intelligible
world of the ideas or the powers. He then proceeds to say that the intelligible
world, and hence also the powers or ideas of which it consists, “cannot be
apprehended otherwise than by passing on to it form this world which we see and
perceive by our senses, for neither indeed is it possible to get an idea of any
other incorporeal thing among existences except by making material objects our
starting-point.” (Somn. I, 32, 185-187) The implication of this
statement is quite evident: purely incorporeal beings, which include the
powers, cannot be known, seeing that nothing can be known of them except
through the corporeal world.
Thus, according to the fifth passage
in Philo, Moses made three prayers. First, in verse 13, he prayed for a direct
knowledge of God. In verses 14 to 17, God granted him a direct knowledge of His
existence. Second, in verse 18, in accordance with the Greek version which
translated the Hebrew term “glory” by “thyself,” he prayed for a knowledge of
God’s essence. This is refused by God in verse 19 and 20. Third, again in verse
18, in accordance with that Greek version which translated the Hebrew term “gory”
literally, he prayed for a knowledge of the essence of the powers. This is also
refused by God in verses 21 to 23.
But though God, and, according to one
of Philo’s statements, also the powers, cannot be known in their essence, that
lack of knowledge is not of the same degree. Some people may have a great
knowledge of the essence of God than others, for the more one knows of God’s
works on the world the more one knows of God’s existence, and the more one
knows of His existence the more may also one know of His essence, even though
no complete knowledge of the divine essence is possible. When therefore God
denied Moses to have a knowledge of His own essence, and of the essence also of
His powers, and allowed him only to have a knowledge of the existence of both
Himself and His powers, as much as could be gained through a knowledge o the
world, He advised him to continue to have “a constant and profound longing for
wisdom, which fills its scholars and disciplines with glorious and most
beautiful doctrines.” (Spec. I, 8, 50) The implication of this advice is
that though the knowledge of the essence of God, and of the essence also of His
powers, can never be fully attained, by a continuous desire for that kind of
knowledge one will continuously learn more about the world, whereby one will
grow in the knowledge of the existence of God and thereby also in the knowledge
of His essence. Consequently, according to Philo, “when Moses heard this, he
did not cease from his desire but still kept the yearning for the invisible
things aflame in his heart,” (Ibid.) for although a complete knowledge
of their essence was unattainable, it was still possible for him to grow I the
knowledge thereof. When therefore in several places Philo speaks of a desire to
have a vision of God he only means to have a desire for a direct and greater
knowledge of the existence of God, which may lead to a greater knowledge of the
essence of God, even though never to complete knowledge of it. (Harry Austryn
Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, 2 vols. [Structure and Growth of Philosophic
Systems from Plato to Spinoza 2; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1947], 2:144-49)
