Friday, June 2, 2023

David Bentley Hart on the Christology of Clement of Alexandria and Origen

  

For Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-c. 215 CE), for instance, the Logos is truly the divine Son and is unique—in fact is the divine “monad” (Stromateis V.ii.14.21; V.xiv.136.1-4; VII.ii.5.5.)—but the Father alone is God in the absolutely proper and transcendent sense, incomprehensible, a unity beyond the mere singularity of any monad, ineffable and inaccessible and yet embracing the whole of reality. (Stromateis II.ii.6.1; V.i.1.3; V.x.65.2; V.xii.78.3; V.xii.81.3; Paidagogos I.viii.71.1.) Thus the Father is known to creation only through his Logos, who is his inseparable image, his mind or reason, his power and counsel and activity, at once containing the divine ideas or thoughts in himself and animating creation with them; the Logos is the teacher of wisdom to creatures and the high priest of creation; he is the governor and origin of all subordinate realities. (Protreptikos X.xcviii.3; XII.c.xx.1-5; Stromateis V.i.8.18; V.ix.56.3; VII.i.2.2; VII.ii.5.5.) Origen (c. 184-c. 253 CE), too, accorded to Father alone a fully transcendent divine unity, and the status of being “God himself” (αυτοθεος), and that of being alone “ingenerate” (αγεννητος). (De principiis I.i.6; Contra Celsum VII.xxxviii; In Iohannem II.ii.16; II.x.75) Between the transcendent oneness of the Father and the diversity of created things, the Logos stands as a mediator, the Father’s express image, and indeed a δευτερος θεος. (Contra Celsum II.lxiv; V.xxxix; In Iohannem I.xx.119; VI.xxxix.202.) The Son and the Spirit (the latter being the greatest of those being that have their existence through the Son) (In Johannem II.x.75.) transcend all inferior realities; but the Father in turn transcends them to at least as great a degree. (In Iohannem XIII.xxv.151.) Hence, while the Son may be called θεος, he is not properly called ο θεος, and is necessarily accorded lesser honor than is the father. (In Isaiam II.ii.13ff.; Contra Celsum VII.lvii.) (David Bentley Hart, Tradition and Apocalypse: An Essay on the Future of Christian Belief [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2022], 115-16)

 

David Bentley Hart on Jesus as θεος and the Father as ο θεος

  

The first verse of John’s Gospel seems to honor the traditional distinction between God Most High—God as identified in Greek by the definite article: “the God,” ο θεος-and “God” (or “god”) in a secondary, subordinate, and perhaps only honorific sense: θεος sans article. And certainly there are verses in the New Testament that seem to suggest that the Son of God is, in a sense, an adoptee, or appointed heir: Acts 2:36; 5:31; 13:33; Romans 1:1-3; 1 Corinthians 8:6; Philippians 2:9; Hebrews 5:5. (David Bentley Hart, Tradition and Apocalypse: An Essay on the Future of Christian Belief [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2022], 113-14)

 

Thursday, June 1, 2023

The Belief in Justification being Transformative among Tyndale and other English Reformers in the Early 16th century

  

. . . William Tyndale, although making extensive use of Luther in his early polemical works, still tends to interpret justification as ‘making righteous’. In his 1526 English translation of the New Testament, Tyndale consistently translates both the verb dikaioun and the noun dikaiosis as ‘to justify’. (E.g., Romans 4:25: ‘[Christ] was delivered for our sins, and rose again for to justify us’; Romans 5:1: ‘Because therefore that we are justified by faith we are at peace with God thorow our Lord Jesus Christ’; Romans 5:18: ‘Likewise then as by the sin of one, condemnation came on all men: even so by the justifying of one cometh the righteousness that bringeth life, upon all men.’) The word ‘justify’ had been used earlier in the Wycliffe translation of the New Testament, despite the fact that this Latinate term might not be familiar to many of his readers. By using such a Latin term, Tyndale avoids having to offer an English interpretation of the concept of ‘justification’, perhaps sidestepping the debate about whether it was to be understood as becoming righteous, of being deemed to be righteous in God’s sight. Tyndale’s language here often focusses on the idea of justification as being ‘coupled to God through Christ’s blood.’

 

Tyndale’s translation of Romans 3:28 is significant: ‘For we suppose that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.’ Although Tyndale is widely regarded as having based his New Testament translation to some extent on Luther’s German translation, it is significant that Tyndale does not follow Luther in adding the critically important word ‘alone’ to this passage. Following Luther, Tyndale also makes it clear that justifying faith is not to be confused with a historical or ‘story-book’ faith, but with an active trust that our sins have been forgiven through the blood of Christ.

 

Tyndale’s emphasis upon the renewing and transforming work of the Holy Spirit within humans is quite distinct from Luther’s emphasis upon faith, and clearly echoes Augustine’s transformational concept of justification. (For example, see the Prologue to Romans, which emphasizes that faith ‘altereth a man, and changeth him into a new spiritual nature’ [Works, 493-4). See further the comments in The Wicked Mammon; Works, 53-5. In his later works, such as his Exposition of Matthew V VI VII, he appears to reproduce the basic features of the concept of the imputatio iustitiae.)

 

In his ‘Pathway to the Holy Scripture’, Tyndale describes the gospel—which he glosses as ‘good, merry, glad and joyful tidings’—in terms which are devoid of any reference to or acknowledgement of an exclusively or even primarily juridical context for divine acceptation: Works, 8-9)

 

[The gospel declares that those] that were in bondage to sin, wounded with death, overcome of the devil, are without their own merits or deserving’s, loosed, justified, restored to life, and saved, brought to liberty, and reconciled unto the favor of God, and set at one with him again: which tidings as many as believe, laud praise and thank God; are glad, sing and dance for joy.

 

These understandings of justification were widespread in England during the late 1520s and early 1530s. In 1531, George Joye defined justification thus, glossing the word ‘justification’ in factitive terms, and interpreting it in terms of the non-imputation of sin. ‘To be justified, or to be made righteous before God by this faith, is nothing else but to be absolved from sin of God, to be forgiven, or to have no sin imputed of him by God.’ (Answer to Ashwell, B3) John Frith also sets out a transformative concept of justification, which is clearly Augustinian in its structure. Frith’s most characteristic definition of justification is that it consists of the non-imputation of sin, omitting any references to the imputation of righteousness. (See Knox, The Doctrine of Faith, 43-51, esp. 44. There is one isolated passage in which Frith refers to Christ’s righteousness being ‘reputed unto us for our own’; Workes, 49. The parallelism between Adam’s sin and Christ’s righteousness is evidently constructed on the basis of Augustinian presuppositions, rather than on those of later Lutheranism. Frith’s statement that, although believers are righteous in Christ, they continue to be sinners in fact, seems to be based upon a proleptic understanding of justification associated with Augustine, and reproduced by Luther in his 1515-16 Romans lectures: See ‘Bulwark against Rastell’, Workes, 72) The assertion that justification is the forgiveness or non-imputation of sin without the simultaneous assertion that righteousness is imputed to the believer, or with the assertion that justification is to be understood as making righteous, appears to be characteristic of the English Reformation until the late 1530s. (Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification [4th ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 228-30, emphasis in original)

 

 

Alister E. McGrath on the Lack of Patristic Attestation to Luther's Understanding of "the Righteousness of God" in Romans 1:17

  

One of the most important sources for our understanding of this radical alteration in Luther’s doctrine of justification is the 1545 autobiographical fragment in which Luther records the intense personal difficulties he experienced at an early stage in his career over the concept of the ‘righteousness of God’. (WA 54.185.12-186.21)

 

I had certainly been overcome with a great desire to understand St Paul in his letter to the Romans, but what had hindered me thus far was not any ‘coldness of the blood’ so much as that one phrase is the first chapter: ‘the righteousness of God (iustitia Dei) is revealed in it.’ For I had hated that phrase ‘the righteousness of God’, which, according to the use and custom of all the doctors, I had been taught to understand philosophically, in the sense of the formal or active (as they termed it) righteousness by which God is righteous, and punishes unrighteous sinners.

 

The modern preoccupation of scholars with this autobiographical fragment dates from 1904, when the historian Henrich Denifle argued that Luther’s discussion of the term iustitia Dei indicated an ignorance of its use in the western theological tradition. (Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung, especially 392-5, 404-15. See also Denifle, Die abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther über Iustitia Dei) Denifle produced a detailed analysis of the exposition of Romans 1:16-17 by some sixty doctors of the western church, indicating that not one of them, from Ambrosiaster onwards, understood iustitita Dei in the sense Luther notes in the above citation. However, the conclusion which Denifle drew from this demonstration—that Luther was either ignorant of the Catholic tradition, or else deliberately perverted it—was clearly unjustified. With the benefit of hindsight, Denifle’s contribution to the discussion lay largely in having precipitated more detailed scholarly discussion of the issue.

 

It is quite clear that Luther intended to make no global reference to the western tradition of interpretation of Romans 1:16-17 but was referring specifically to the doctors who taught him—an unequivocal reference to the moderni at Erfurt, under whom he received his initial theological education. Luther here refers to the specific concept of iustitita Dei associated with the via moderna: God is righteous in the sense that God rewards the person who does quod in se est [“to do what lies within you”] with grace, and punishes the person who does not. In view of Gabriel Biel’s unambiguous assertion that individuals cannot know for certain whether they have, in fact, done quod in se est, there is clearly every reason to state that Luther’s early concept of iustitia Dei was that of the righteousness of an utterly scrupulous and impartial judge, who rewarded or punished humans on the basis of an ultimate unknown quality. (Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification [4th ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 194-95, emphasis in bold added, comment in square brackets added for clarification)

 

Alister E. McGrath on Justification in the Fourth Century Latin West

  

The Fourth Century in the Latin West

 

But what of the Latin West? Some early western writers—such as Tertullian in the third century—engaged extensively with the Pauline corpus, although their writings engage questions which clearly have a Pauline provenance. It is not, however, until the second half of the fourth century that a sudden and intense more general interest developed in the letters of Paul. The earliest known Latin commentary upon the Pauline epistles, dating from the late fourth century, was once ascribed to Ambrose, but is now attributed to the author (thought to have been a Roman presbyter) who has been known since the sixteenth century as ‘Ambrosiaster’. In this commentary on Romans, Ambrosiaster insists that Christians are justified, like Abraham, sola fide sine operibus legis—in other words, solely on the basis of faith, and not with reference to the ‘works of the law’, which Ambrosiaster—like other commentators of this period—understands in terms of the cultic requirements of Judaism.

 

Ambrosiaster affirms that we are justified sola fide—in other words, by faith, and not by fulfilling the prescriptions of the Mosaic law, such as circumcision or new moon festivals or reverence for the Sabbath. Ambrosiaster thus does not criticize boasting of good works in general, but rather a specifically Jewish boasting based on obedience to the Mosiac law. In his commentary on Romans 4:5, Ambrosiaster appeals to the example of Abraham, whose faith in God predated the giving of the cultic law. (CESL 81/1, 131) ‘How then do the Jews believe themselves to be justified through works of the law (per opera legis) in accordance with Abraham, when they see that Abraham was justified not by the works of the law but by faith alone (non opera legis sed sola fide iustifacatur)?’ Ambrosiaster, like many Christian theologians of this period, sees faith as a free human response to God’s promises of salvation. While Augustine embraced such a traditional view of human freedom in his early writings, his later anti-Pelagian writings advocated the idea that humans were unable to believe until God graciously gives grace, thus creating such a capacity to believe.

 

Ambrosiaster notes an exegetical issue which does not appear to have been regarded as troublesome by earlier writers in the Latin West—the apparent tension between Romans 2:13, which affirms that ‘it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law who will be justified’; and the rather different point made in Romans 3:20, which insists that ‘no one will be justified by the works of the law’. Although Ambrosiaster’s comments on this issue are brief, they nevertheless highlight a potential Christological solution to this issue: since Christ is the fulfilment of the Mosaic law, faith in Christ on the part of the believer can be said to fulfil the law. For this reason, Ambrosiaster glosses Romans 2:13 as follows: ‘Paul says this because those who hear the Law are not justified unless they believe in Christ, whom the Law itself has promised. That is what it means to keep the law.’ (Ambrosiaster, Commentary on the Pauline Epistles: Romans, 18)

 

There is no hint in Ambrosiaster’s commentary of a supposed Pauline contrast between human achievements and faith; rather a faith in Christ is being opposed to a dependence upon Jewish cultic observances. A rejection of justification by the ‘works of the law’ is understood to refer specifically to the Jewish cult, and not to some de-historicised and generalized ethos of human achievement. If any perspective on Paul can be characterised as ‘classic’ or an ‘old perspective’, it is what has been set out in this section, not those which emerged during the sixteenth century.

 

In his comments on passages relating to justification in this commentary, Ambrosiaster does not appear to treat this soteriological metaphor as possessing special privilege or significance. Indeed, his comments on Romans 5:1 often display a subtle transposition of the metaphor of justification into other concepts—such as salvation or reconciliation which were perhaps more familiar to his readers. For the sake of clarity I shall quote the Pauline text itself in italics, followed by Ambrosiaster’s comments: (Ambrosiaster, Commentary on the Pauline Epistles: Romans, 89. Note that Ambrosiaster’s old Latin text of Romans 5:1 uses the verbal form habeamus [‘let us have’] rather than habemus [‘we have’])

 

Therefore, since we have been justified by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. Faith, not the law, makes it possible to have peace with God. Faith reconciles us to God, once the sins that have made us enemies of God have been taken away. Because the Lord Jesus is the agent of this grace, we are reconciled to God through him. Indeed, faith is greater than the law.

 

Other fourth-century western Pauline commentators picked up on the Pauline emphasis on faith being the sole means of justification, rather than works of the law. Hilary of Poitiers affirmed that ‘only faith justifies (fides sola iustificat)’, using this as a hermeneutical tool primarily to clarify the relation of Christianity to Judaism. Marius Victorinus likewise insisted that ‘it is faith alone that brings justification and sanctification’. (Victorinus, Commentarius ad Galatos ii.15-16) Victorinus is unclear about how justification and sanctification might be related; he is, however, quite clear about the fundamental detachment the Christian hope of salvation from a Jewish cultic milieu, and attending observances. In using phrases such as fides sola or sola fide, such early Latin-speaking Pauline commentators were not anticipating either Luther’s notion of faith, or his generalized interpretation of ‘law’; they were simply summarizing Paul’s core theme that Christians, like Abraham before them, are justified only on account of placing their trust in God.

 

By the end of the fourth century, some fundamental building-blocks of the western church’s view on justification had been set in place, including increasing sensitisation towards its vocabulary of justification, and a settled conviction that the concept of justification by faith—as opposed to opera legis—offered a firm foundation for clarifying the relation of the church to its Jewish origins. A ‘right’ relationship with God was the consequence of faith, not observance of Jewish cultic norms and conventions. Jerome can be seen as having solidified this latter point, particularly in his comments on the question posed in Galatians 3;2, ‘Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law’ with ‘observance of the Sabbath, the superstition of circumcision and new moons’. (Jerome, Commentary on Galatians 3:2) (Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification [4th ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 38-42, emphasis in bold added)

 

 

Alister E. McGrath on Transformative Justification in the Fourth Century Greek East

  

The Fourth Century in the Greek East

 

Early Christian reflection on the doctrine of justification in the Greek-speaking eastern church in the fourth century is of interest for many reasons. Yet perhaps the most important of these is the linguistic continuity between the Greek text of the New Testament and its Greek-speaking interpreters. An example will make this point clear: It has become a commonplace in some quarters to suggest that the dik group of terms—particularly the verb dikaioo, ‘to justify’—are naturally translated as being ‘treated as righteous’ or ‘reckoned as righteous’, and that Paul’s Greek-speaking readers would have understood him in this way. This may be true at the purely linguistic level; however, the Greek Christian preoccupation with the strongly transformative soteriological metaphor of deification appears to have led to justification being treated in a factitive sense. This is not, however, to be seen as a conceptual imposition on Pauline thought, but rather a discernment of this aspect of his soteriological narrative.

 

Paul’s term ‘justification (Greek: dikaiōsis)’ appears to have been assimilated to this transformative narrative framework. John Chrysostom considers this theme in his commentary on Romans, noting that God’s righteousness is given to believers as a result of their faith. ‘For you do not achieve it by toiling and labor, but you receive it by a gift from above, contributing one thing only to your own resources—believing.’ (Chrysostom, Homilia ad Romanos, II.1.17; MPG 60.409) Chrysostom develops this further in his comments on Romans 3:25, picking up the idea of the declaration of God’s righteousness. So how are we to understand this ‘declaration’ of the righteousness of God? Chrysostom’s account affirms the declaration or manifestation (endeixeis) of God’s own righteousness with its actualization in the transformation of the nature of humanity. (Chrysostom, Homilia ad Romanos, VII.iii.26; MPG 60.444)

 

It is like the declaration of God’s riches, not only in that which God is rich, but also in that God makes others rich; or in the same way about [the declaration of God’s] life, not only in that God is living, but also in that God makes the dead to live; and of [the declaration of God’s] power, not only in that God is powerful, but also in that God makes the weak powerful. So the declaration of God’s righteousness is not only that God is righteous, but also that God makes those that are corrupted by sin immediately righteous.

 

Chrysostom clearly understands justification to be a factitive term, designating a transformation of the believer. This is not inconsistent with God announcing or proclaiming that the believer is righteous; that declaration, however, is understood to be based on an actual change within the believer.

 

The point here is that Pauline language about justification is interpreted within a theological framework that is pre-committed to a transformative understanding of the entire process of salvation. From Athanasius onwards, the Greek Christian tradition, particularly at Alexandria, tended to frame its soteriological convictions in terms of the believer’s incorporation into Christ, grounded in the incarnation. The Son of God became incarnate in order that we might be transformed our natures. (Athanasius, De incarnatione Verbi, 9; PG 25.112a) ‘Christ gave life to our flesh in the blood of his own body, and opens up for us a “new and living way through the veil”—that is, through his flesh.’ (Athanasius, Contra Arianos II, 65; PG 26.285a) Like Greek-speaking theological writers before and after him, Athanasius affirms the axiom quod est assumptum non est sanatum (what is not assumed is not healed). (60) These theological assumptions shape Athanasius’s reading of Paul, in effect acting as a filter which predisposes him to focus on certain Pauline themes, and overlook others. The eastern tradition after Athanasius placed an increased emphasis on the importance of the deification of humanity, not least because of work of the Holy Spirit came to become an important ground for affirming the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Although the language of justification is encountered, the Cappadocian fathers tend to emphasise Pauline metaphors which have a clear transformational element, such as sanctification, a ‘new creation’ and healing. These strongly factitive soteriological metaphors point towards a transformative understanding of justification—even though the Cappadocian fathers make relatively little use of this specific term. (Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification [4th ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 36-38)

 

 

Alister E. McGrath: The Protestant Understanding of the Relationship between Justification and Sanctification is a Theological Novelty of the 16th century

  

As a popular level, the Reformation is often portrayed as a rediscovery of the Bible, particularly of the Pauline corpus. Although there is some truth in this description, it is more accurate to see the Reformation as emphasizing a particular reading of Paul’s epistles, set in a context of a selective appropriation of Augustine’s theology of grace. This renewed interest in August is characteristic of the sixteenth-century. Renaissance as a whole; what is distinctive about the Reformers is their critical theological assessment of Augustine, which included explicit divergence from his views on three issues relating to the doctrine of justification. The most accurate description of the doctrines of justification associated with the Reformed and Lutheran churches from 1530 onwards is that they represent a radically new interpretation of the Pauline concept of ‘imputed righteousness’ set within an Augustinian soteriological framework.

 

It is clearly of importance to account for this new understanding of the nature of justifying righteousness, with its associated conceptual distinction between justification and sanctification. Attempts on the part of an earlier generation of Protestant apologists to defend this innovation of a recovery of the authentic teaching of Augustine, and of their Catholic opponents to demonstrate that it constituted a vestige of a discredited and ossified Ockhamism, can no longer be taken seriously. It is the task of the historian to account for this new development, which marks a significant breaks with the tradition up to this point. (Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification [4th ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 185)

 

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