Wednesday, November 4, 2026

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I have been, and continue to be busy this week (including some doctor appointments for my chronic migraines, not just serious liver issues . . . ) and speaking at a YSA event in Dublin. As I have shared previously about the serious liver issues (some personal friends know how serious it is), while it looks positive so far, the biggest fear I have will be paying for the (private, not public) medical bills and other losses due to being out of work during (1) this six-month treatment period and (2) the recovery period beginning around December until ~April 2027. The “goal” figure reflects that.



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Prayers that the talk (and also Q&A session) I have scheduled this Saturday will go well.

Photius (810-891) on Romans 5:12

  

Question 84

What does the word of the Apostle mean, “in this all sinned”?

 

The saying, “in this all sinned,” which the divine Paul said and you asked to know its meaning, some interpret as “in the person of Adam,” and others “with respect to death itself.” But I accept neither the one nor the other. We must not understand anything else, since the phrase has in itself its own completeness. That is, the phrase “in this all sinned” here does not point to a person, nor indicate a person in any way, but rather signifies a cause; that is “εφ’ ω παντες ημαρτον” means “because all sinned.” This usage occurs countless times even in non-Chrisitan writers, but the divine Paul is sufficient, who interprets his own words. For he says elsewhere, “as long as we are still in the body, we groan under its weight”; and then, “Not that we wish to put it off, but to put on over it.” From this it becomes entirely clear that “εφ’ ω” was used to signify cause. That is, “for this we groan, not because we wish to be unclothed, but because we wish to be clothed upon.” To speak more freely, the sense of the phrase is as follows: “We groan while we are in this tabernacle, feeling the burden of our body.” What then? Do you wish to put off the body which the hands of God formed and joined with the soul by divine breath? “no,” he says, “far be such a thought. For surely I do not groan because I am stripped of it, but because I have not put on the clothing over it.” And by clothing he means being clothed with incorruption, and making it as it had been formed in the beginning. For this reason he immediately adds, “so that mortality may be swallowed up by life.” I do not groan therefore because I lay aside the body, but because I have not clothed it with incorruption and eternal life.

 

And it is not only here evident that “εφ’ ω” (“in this”) signifies cause, but also from the very sense of the saying under consideration. For he says, since Adam sinned and was afterwards condemned to death, therefore also the race that sprang from him received death. And not simply, he says, and without judgment, but “because all sinned,” that is, “because all sinned as the one who begot them.” For this made them also sharers of the punishment. That is, participation in the act led them also to participation in the condemnation. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 2:273)

 

Photius (810-891) Favoring γενομενον vs. γεννωμενον in the Amphilochia

  

Question 227

Should we say “God sent His Son being begotten” (γεννωμενον) or “having become”(γενομενον)—with one n or with two?

 

We must say γενομενον (“having become”) of a woman, just as we say γενομενον (“being made subject”) under the law—with one immutable n. First, because of the continuous sequence of meanings and words. Second, because Christ was indeed born of the Virgin with the unchangeable spelling of the double n in the second syllable (γεννηθεντα), yet He is not being born. For he was born once of the Virgin. Let no one, therefore, be led astray by the saying of Gregory the Theologian. For when he said, “Christ is born,” he did not mean that He is forever being born of the Virgin, but that the feast then being celebrated concerned the day of the Lord’s birth. For this reason, we must take every care neither to write nor to pronounce “γενομενον απο γυναικα” with the double n. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:517)

 

Johannes Crell (1590-1633) (Socinian) On Jesus Being Ignorant of the Second Coming

  

Ninth Argument: that Christ Was Once Ignorant of the Day of the Last Judgement

 

Up to this point we have brought forward testimonies from John in which something is denied of Christ that could not be denied of him if he were that supreme God. It remains that we bring forward similar testimonies from the other sacred writers as well, and indeed such as attribute a prerogative to the Father above Christ. The first of these we shall make that saying of Christ which we touched on above when treating of the Father (Mark 13:32): “But of that day or hour” (namely, of the last judgement) “no one knows, not the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father”, or, as Matthew puts it (Matt 24:36), “but the Father alone”. How it is proved from this that the Father alone is the supreme God, we have shown earlier. Now we must see how it is proved from it that the Son is not that supreme God: although, once the former is proved, this latter necessarily follows. But here we proceed the opposite way, and do not demonstrate from the fact that the Father alone is the supreme God that Christ is not the supreme God, but from this latter the former. The matter, however, is easy and plain to anyone: for that supreme God is ignorant of nothing and never was. But the Son of God was once ignorant of the day and hour of the last judgement. Therefore the Son of God is not that supreme God.

 

Defence of the Argument

 

How greatly the opponents have tormented themselves in untying this knot, and what diverse interpretations different men, indeed even the same men, have devised, may be seen both in others and especially in Maldonatus. He reports that Jerome and Augustine, hard pressed by the difficulty of the testimony, took refuge in declaring the passage corrupt and saying that one should not read “nor the Son” but “the Father”: against the witness of all the manuscripts. If it is permitted to call this into doubt, nothing in Holy Scripture will be certain, nothing firm, nothing that one may not deny; and one will have to strike out not only the words of Mark but also the corresponding words of Matthew. The same interpreter says further that the greater part of the ancient authors held that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgement, not because he was really ignorant of it, but because he did not wish to reveal it to us, because his body, that is, the Church, was ignorant of it, or because he concealed that he knew it; and for this opinion he cites Origen, Chrysostom, Gregory, Jerome, Bede and Theophylact. This interpretation (if indeed it deserves the name) the same writer rightly refutes with the argument that in this way the Father too would be ignorant of the day of judgement, since he has not revealed it to us. But then, what sort of reply would this have been from Christ? The disciples wished to learn the day of judgement from him. Christ answers, on the view of those men: “The Son causes you to be ignorant of the day of judgement; he does not wish to reveal it; he conceals that he knows it.” Yet this was the very thing the disciples asked, that he should make it known to them. A reason should have been given why he would not make it known, why, as they say, he concealed it. And finally, what sort of interpretation is this: “I do not know”, that is, “I conceal that I know”? Did Christ deal thus with his disciples, and deceive those with whom it was both permitted and fitting for him to deal openly? Such speech would not be worthy even of a sensible man, much less of Christ. Others again, he says, such as Origen, Epiphanius and Chrysostom, interpreted it to mean that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgement, that is, had not yet experienced it. This opinion he refutes on the same ground as the previous one: because in this way the Father too would be ignorant of it, since he has not experienced it either. Others, he says, gave the sense as: “Nor does the Son of Man know, unless the Father knows”; but because the Father knows, the Son of Man knows too; so Euthymius. This interpretation is quite frivolous. First, because in this way he would have given no reason why he did not make the day of judgement known to the disciples, and would not have lessened but increased their desire to know it and to inquire of him about it: for in this way he would have indicated that the Son of Man knows that day. Secondly, the word “Son”, used of Christ absolutely, denotes not the Son of Man but the Son of God as such; especially since the word “Father”, by which God is understood, is at once set over against it. And the little word “but” in the words “but the Father” is in truth connected not with the immediately preceding words “nor the Son”, but with the words “no one knows”; or at least it stands for the adversative “but rather”. Finally, this interpretation contradicts the words of Matthew, who says that “the Father alone” knows. For how ridiculous would it be to say that the Son of Man does not know the day of judgement unless the Father alone knows it? For that is a contradiction in the adjunct, and the condition added overturns the very thing to which it is added. The same interpreter says further that many ancient and weighty authors, whose names he lists in order, interpreted it thus: that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgement in so far as he is man. This he holds to be true only to the extent that it is understood that Christ knew the day of judgement not under this title, or not for this reason, that he was man, but because he was God. Otherwise he holds it false, indeed dreadful to hear, that the human nature of Christ was ignorant of anything. For the Papists, and some others as well, think that the human nature of Christ knew all things straight from the beginning of his conception or birth. But he refutes that interpretation too, because Christ not only denies that the Son of Man (he ought rather to have said “the Son of God” here) knows the day of judgement, but also affirms that the Father alone knows it: by which word he seems to exclude not only the Son but also the holy spirit.

 

But since today the very interpretation which that interpreter rejects, namely that Christ is said to have been truly ignorant of the day of judgement not according to the divine but according to the human nature, is very widely and commonly received, even among those who otherwise maintain that at the very moment of conception the properties of the divine nature were communicated to the human, or that the knowledge of all things was infused into his soul, we must briefly refute it here; and once it has been disposed of, that man’s own interpretation is also to be refuted in a few words.

 

This interpretation, then, and this reply to our argument, which is commonly offered, is not to be admitted, chiefly for three reasons. First, because Christ simply and without any limitation denies that the Son knows the day and hour of judgement. From this it follows that he spoke of himself as a whole, in his whole person, as we showed in examining the second reply on the passage John 5:19. Secondly, to pass over other things said in the same place: both from the simple word “Son”, set over against God the Father, and from the gradation Christ uses, ascending from the angels to the Son and from the Son to the Father, it is evident that he spoke precisely of that nature according to which he is the Son of God. Thirdly, because in Matthew it is expressly said that “the Father alone” knows the day or hour of judgement. And this is also the sense of the words of Mark when he says: “No one knows”, etc., “but the Father”, thereby setting the Father against the Son, too. But if Christ had known the day of judgement according to the divine nature, then not the Father alone would have known it, but the Son as well, and besides, if we believe the opponents, the holy spirit.

 

As for that saying of Paul which they press so hard here (Col 2:3): “In whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge”, they do not notice, first, that those words can be referred no less, indeed even more correctly, to the term “mystery of God and of Christ”, which had been mentioned immediately before, than to the name of Christ; for it is chiefly the knowledge of that mystery which is treated there, so that the sense is: in the mystery of God and of Christ all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden. That mystery, however, is the doctrine of the Gospel (cf. Col 1:25–27). Secondly, the words “knowledge” and “wisdom” are to be understood of the knowledge of things pertaining to human salvation, which have also been revealed to us through Christ and are to be diligently learned by us. But that the day of judgement is not among these things is evident from the very words of Christ about which we are disputing. Not to mention that, even if the same kind of things were otherwise in question, this special saying about the day of judgement would nevertheless have to restrict the general one, and the special would have to be interpreted not from the general, but the general from the special.

 

It remains to say something about the interpretation and reply which that interpreter of the Papists devised after refuting the opinions of all the others; though he puts it forward in such a way that he himself seems not quite to trust it. For he says: But, unless I am mistaken, Christ speaks in the same way as he said above: “But to sit at my right hand and at my left is not mine to give to you, but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father” (Matt 20:23). He therefore indicates, which is saying more, that not only as man but also as God he is in a certain way ignorant of the day of judgement: not that he is ignorant of it, but that it is not his office to know it; just as he did not say “for whom it has been prepared by me”, but “by my Father”, not because it had not also been prepared by him, but because to prepare the kingdom, that is, to predestine, is not his office but the Father’s.

 

So too it is the Father’s part to determine when the world is to be dissolved and when the day of judgement is to be. This is what he says to the Apostles: “It is not yours to know times or seasons which the Father has put in his own power” (Acts 1:7). Therefore he alone is signified to know it. And this, unless I am mistaken, is the true sense. He rightly added that “unless I am mistaken” twice; for he was afraid of being mistaken, and the ingenious man did not satisfy himself while he wished to satisfy others. But he has neither explained the passage correctly, indeed he has perverted it, nor removed the difficulty, but in part even increased it. For, first, without any example and without any just reason he departs from the proper and customary meaning of the words “he does not know”, and interprets them as “it is not someone’s office to know”; unless perhaps he offers as his reason the very thing that is in dispute, namely that it cannot be said that the Son does not know the day of judgement, because, as he has always known everything else, so he has always known that day too. Secondly, however he interprets the words “it is not the Son’s office to know that day”, he still does not escape the difficulty. For either it is not Christ’s office because he is not bound to know that day, or is under no obligation to know that day; or because he is bound not to know that day, or because he is not even permitted to know it; and the passages he cites seem to require this latter. If he means the latter, he increases the difficulty rather than lessening it, and even says more than is needed. For he says not only that the Son did not then know the day of judgement, but that he was not even permitted to know it. But how can he be that supreme God who not only is ignorant of something, but cannot even know it; or who is not even permitted to know something, and that in so far as he is God? And yet the passages he cites, duly compared with this sense, seem altogether to require this sense. For when Christ says, “To sit at my right hand and at my left is not mine to give”, he signifies that this does not lie within his power and discretion, or that it is not permitted to him. The passage in Acts, moreover, makes express mention of power, and signifies that the Father has reserved to his own (for in the Greek it is ἰδίᾳ, that is, “own”) power and discretion the determination of the times and seasons, and, further, the knowledge of them as well. But if he means the former, I ask, first, what does this contribute to the matter? For the sense will be that no one is obliged to know the day of judgement, neither the angels nor the Son, but the Father alone. What follows from that? Even if neither men nor angels nor the Son are obliged to know it, yet both the former and the latter will be able to know it; “and we”, the disciples could have said, “though we are not bound to, nevertheless desire to know it, since we can know it without prejudice to the truth of that saying”. For the man against whom we are disputing believes that Christ did know the day of judgement, even though it was not his office to know it. In this way, then, Christ would not have checked the Apostles’ desire and their eagerness to learn that day, and would have left room for the thought that it might come about that both men and angels know that day. Secondly, how can it be said that it is the Father’s office, or that the Father is obliged, to know the day of judgement, but not the Son, if the Son too is supreme and thus one God with the Father? For neither of them can be obliged to know anything without the other being obliged as well, since both have numerically the same intellect and altogether the same knowledge. And moreover, whatever reason you may adduce why the Father is obliged to know the day of judgement, it will be common to the Son, if he is the supreme God together with the Father. Indeed, if it could come about that one of them were obliged to it and the other not, or less so, one would have to hold that Christ is the more obliged; for he holds the office of judge, and in it, if he is the supreme God, depends on no one, so that he both fixes and determines the day of judgement at his own discretion. I say nothing of the fact that it is not correctly said that it is the Father’s office, or that he is bound, to know the day of judgement, since he cannot fail to know it; or, if you say it is his office because he is bound to define and fix that day, one must consider how correctly it is said that he is bound to do what lies within his own discretion. But enough of this. (Johannes Crell, On the One God, the Father: Two Books, in Which Much is Also Discussed Concerning the Nature of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit [trans. Marcin Poholski; 2026], 87-93)

 

Photius (810-891) on the Obscurity of Scripture

  

Question 152

What is the obscurity of Scripture.

 

The obscurity of the divine Scriptures has many causes. First, because every language that is translated into another loses its flow. Second, because the similar words of the Hebrews caused confusion for the interpreters. For example, the word “kalos” can mean different things depending in accent: one way it means beautiful, proper, noble, and fitting for virtue; another way it means the rope of a ship. Likewise, the word “oros” can mean the definition of a thing, or a hill and high place; another way it means the watery residue of milk.

 

Third, there are Hebrew words which cannot be explained in Greek with the meaning they carry, and so they were left as they are, such as in Jeremiah, “the prison Sinōch.” Fourth, often punctuation itself produces obscurity, as in “the good shall be the inhabitants of the earth,” if a punctuation mark is not placed after “good.” Fifth, also the difference of accent, as in “Beginning of wisdom, seek wisdom,” if we do not read “beginning” as a noun but instead as a verb.

 

Sixth, there are many words which have one form in both singular and plural, such as “god” and “gods.” Seventh, many verbs change person, as in the word to Abraham, “Now I know that you fear God,” which was spoken instead of “you have known.” Eighth, they also use genders in the opposite way; the moon and the sea for them are the masculine gender.

 

Ninth, many times certain words are missing, as in “Mountains are lifted up and plains are lowered”; the word “like” is missing, so that it would be “They are lifted up like mountains” (for the meaning is of the waves), and “they are lowered like plains.” Tenth, during the captivity the sacred books had been burned, and afterwards, as those who dwelt in Jerusalem sent them to those who had been carried off to Babylon, some lay in wait and stole the books, and others again wrote with symbols with foreigners could not understand, and for these reasons obscurity arose, until Ezra was inspired, and after recalling all the books, recorded them.

 

Question 153

On the same subject, more clearly.

 

One cause of the obscurity of the Old Testament is the rough and beastlike character of its hearers, a fact confirmed by Paul when he says, “The same veil remains during the reading of the Old Testament, and it is not taken away, because it is done away in Christ.”

 

A second cause: Since Moses the lawgiver wore a veil on his face, in a similar way he expressed his legislation as through with a veil, by obscurity—not that any of this was worthy of blame, but the reason was the spiritual weakness of the hearers. Moses wore the veil because they could not endure the brightness of his face unless it was covered, and the law, in place of that veil, for this reason was clothed with obscurity. For he entrusted to them, as though they were treasuries, the most perfect and lofty doctrines, which foreshadowed Christ and His Covenant. But to them, their incomplete and diseased understanding stood as a barrier to their benefit from it. Yet it was kept as a hidden treasure for us, so that, when Christ should come, with the return to Him, the treasure might be revealed.

 

And consider to that a high dignity the presence of the Lord has raised us: He has established us in the place of Moses. Moreover, the prophecy of future things, even if it had no other cause of difficulty, is not as clear as the narration of present things. But when the things prophesied were fulfilled, their obscurity was changed into clarity. Indeed, what the Saviour foretold, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up,” not only did the disobedient and foolish among the Jews not understand, nor grasp its deeper meaning, btu even the more knowledge of them, who delighted in the Lord’s teaching—the company of disciples—even they did not understanding, but needed its fulfillment in order to comprehend the prophecy.

 

For this reason, the Jew is not guilty of blame who did not understand the prophecies concerning Christ before His coming. That is why the Saviour said: “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin.” That is, even though Scripture foretold these things about Christ, they remained dark on account of the absence of the One whom they proclaimed. But when He came, nothing else obscured them any longer, except the wickedness and malice of those who did not wish to acknowledge them.

 

Apart from these, another cause of obscurity is that the Old Testament was not written in the Greek language, but was translated into it from the Hebrew, and it is natural that every language, when carried into another, brings with it some difficulty of understanding. The Mosaic laws were first written in the Hebrew tongue, because only the Jews at that time were devoted to the knowledge of God, while the other nations had been brutalized, given over to idolatrous frenzy. But when the time drew near for Christ to come and to call the world to Himself, and the Greek language prevailed among the nations more than the others, then also the Hebrew tongue was translated into Greek, not more than one hundred years before the presence of the Savior, when Ptolemy reigned in Egypt. It was necessary, therefore, that with the language by which the nations would be guided into the knowledge of God, with that same language the prophecies should also be announced, which foretold the common Saviour.

 

Languages, however, were divided into many dialects because, although man had received one language in the beginning, through arrogance he reached into folly and godlessness. Since he used the one language to his harm, it was just that the multitude of tongues should take its place. Yet the gain and usefulness of the one language, after its division and scattering for so long a time, were restored when the disciples, proclaiming with tongues of fire in their mouths, then made known and fulfilled the mighty works of God. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:419-21)

 

Johannes Crell (1590-1633) (Socinian) on Jesus Being Tempted in the Wilderness and Belief in Personal, Supernatural Demons, Fallen Angels, and Satan

  

Thirty-fourth Argument: That Christ Was Tempted by the Devil

 

The fourth argument of this kind is that Christ, as the gospel history relates, was tempted by the devil and even solicited to worship him (Matt 4:1ff.; Luke 4:1ff.), and that for this very purpose, that he might be tempted, he was driven by the divine spirit into the wilderness. For this would by no means have happened if he were the supreme God. For, first, what would be more unworthy of God than to expose himself to an impious and wicked enemy, whom he had thrust out of heaven for contempt of his majesty, once most clearly beheld, to be tempted and solicited to worship that enemy himself, and of his own accord to offer himself so that his majesty might be mocked?

 

Secondly, to what end would this have been done? Was it so that it might be established that the supreme God can withstand and overcome the temptations of the devil? Could anyone have doubted that, so that a trial was needed? Furthermore, how would the devil have dared to undertake so great a thing? I will not now mention that the demons too tremble at the sight of the divine majesty, and indeed shudder at the very remembrance of him (Jas 2:19), since they have been cast down from heaven by him and thrust into Tartarus. For suppose now that in this malicious spirit, who is very well aware both of the wrath and of the invincible powers of God, and who well remembers the chains with which he is held bound by him, there dwells as much impudence and audacity as you please: yet you will at the same time admit that he is supremely cunning. Would that one did not have to admit it! But how can it come about that the most cunning spirit should tempt the supreme God, try to seduce him, and finally bring himself to solicit him to the most unworthy and detestable thing, namely to the worship of himself? Can it be that he either undertakes a thing which he well knows to be impossible, or does not perceive that this thing is most plainly impossible? Neither applies to anyone who has even a crumb of wit, let alone to a most subtle and cunning spirit. Add that when he says, “If you are the Son of God, command that these stones become bread”, and again, “If you are the Son of God, cast yourself down”, he shows clearly enough that he is working to make Christ in some way begin to doubt whether he is really the Son of God, as he had shortly before heard himself declared from heaven to be (cf. Matt 3:17), and further to seek fuller proofs, as of a matter in some way doubtful. But how could he in any way hope to achieve this with that Son of God who is supposed to have been begotten from the divine essence? Do we perhaps think that the enemy so practised in this kind of fighting, whom people commonly even call the architect of a thousand deceits, here used a kind of temptation which would be the most inept of all for deceiving, and brought out such futile and ridiculous weapons for attacking the bravest and wisest of commanders? What would Satan achieve if he tried by some reasonings to bring even an ordinary man, provided only he is of sound mind, to doubt about himself whether he was a man and not rather a substance inferior to man? Would this not be play rather than temptation? But it would have been far more laughable to try to persuade by reasonings the Son of God, who is supposed to have been begotten from the divine essence, to doubt whether he is the Son of God or not.

 

But you will see that the matter stands quite otherwise if you observe that Christ had been declared the Son of God by God in a manner that did not pertain to his essence, but in truth rested on divine love and consisted chiefly in this, that by designation he was already the Messiah, that is, the heavenly and eternal King of the people of God, which he afterwards actually became. For then you will easily see that the most crafty enemy did not fight so ineptly when he called this into doubt, and that the shield of faith was needed to catch his darts. I pass over now other things which occur in that history of the temptation of Christ: for instance, that Satan, having led him up onto a very high mountain, showed him all the kingdoms of this world and their splendour, as if this were not sufficiently known to him or not sufficiently before his eyes, in order to entice him the more easily to worship him; and that for the same purpose he dared to say in his presence: “To you I will give all this power and their glory; for it has been delivered to me, and I give it to whom I will” (Luke 4:6). For it is evident that Satan had well understood that he was dealing not with the supreme God, but with one who was a man in respect of substance, but by the singular love of God his Son. Because God had of his own accord offered him to Satan to be tempted, so that he might give proof of his virtue and piety, Satan did not think it wholly impossible to draw him away from God by his arts. But this and certain other things the discerning reader will notice for himself.

 

Defence of the Argument

 

But there is no ground for anyone to say that what we have deduced from that history does not follow, on the ground that Christ was tempted only according to the human nature, not according to the divine. For, not to repeat now other things said above more than once, the same absurdities follow none the less, even if you suppose that Satan tempted only the human nature, which was nevertheless personally united with the supreme God and joined to him by an indissoluble bond, and that God willed that it should be tempted. For it would have been unworthy of the supreme God to offer himself, in the nature personally united with him, to an impious and most foul enemy, to be held up to mockery and solicited to worship him. For the human nature could do nothing without the consent of the divine. Therefore Satan, in soliciting the human nature of Christ to worship him, would at the same time have solicited the divine nature to consent to so horrible a crime and to permit it to the human nature.

 

It would also have been superfluous to show that a nature personally united with the supreme God can withstand and overcome the temptations of Satan. For who could have doubted that? Hence it is also clear that Satan could not conceive even the slightest hope of overcoming it. For what? Could Satan believe it possible that the divine nature would so far forsake the human, personally united with it, that the latter would succumb to him, commit the most atrocious crime, and moreover become liable to eternal damnation? Did Satan not see that he would have to deal not with the human nature alone, but at the same time with the divine as well, and that this too would have to be seduced and persuaded to crime, if the former were to be overcome? What remains, then, but to say that Satan knew nothing of that union of the human nature with the divine? But what? Did Satan, who had taken as the very object of his attack this, that Jesus was the Son of God, not understand what those words signified? Yet, if the opponents’ view is true, they signify that that man Jesus is one person with that Son of God who is supposed to have been begotten from eternity out of the substance of God. Who would believe that Satan knew nothing of this matter, if, as the opponents hold, that incarnation of the Son begotten from eternity out of the essence of God was foretold in Holy Scripture, announced to the Virgin Mary, and afterwards actually accomplished, acknowledged both by Mary herself and by others, and declared at the baptism of Christ by a heavenly voice? Especially if he once in heaven beheld God, and in him all his decrees (for these are, for the opponents, in reality the same as God or his essence), and consequently understood that the second person of the Trinity would become incarnate in those times. But in a clear matter more words are not needed. We add only this: since Satan wished to bring Christ to doubt whether he was the Son of God — namely that Son which he had shortly before heard himself declared to be by the divine voice —, it would not be consistent that in tempting him he passed over that nature according to which he was the Son of God. This, however, the opponents hold to be the divine. Therefore they must renounce either this view or the limitation by which they restrict that temptation to the human nature.

 

We do not, however, think that any sensible man will say that this argument is derived from the testimony of the devil, who is a lying spirit. For we, on the contrary, against what the devil’s words aim at, insist that that very man whom the devil was tempting was and is the Son of God, who not long before had been commended at his baptism by a heavenly voice. The argument, therefore, is not derived from the testimony of the devil, as though he had said exactly what we maintain, but partly from the act of God, who willed that Christ should be tempted and exposed to the snares of Satan, partly from the mind, words and deeds of Satan, as effects which could not have come about unless our view were true. (Johannes Crell, On the One God, the Father: Two Books, in Which Much is Also Discussed Concerning the Nature of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit [trans. Marcin Poholski; 2026], 202-5)

 

 

Photius (810-891) on the Obscurity of Prophecy

  

Question 204

Why was prophecy veiled with obscurity?

 

Since you ask and wish to know why, after all, prophecy has been veiled with obscurities. I will answer you briefly. It is because prophecy is not history. For more than anything else, the virtue of history is to speak clearly and without intricate expressions, since it teaches events that happened in the world and were known to all alike—great and common people—at the time they occurred, and even now can be readily known.

 

Prophecy, on the other hand, whose task is to reveal the unknown to the worthy and to make it inaccessible to the profane, is fittingly expressed in a veiled, enigmatic, and symbolic manner. From this, I think, your question is also resolved: for if we were not meant to learn certain things, they should not have been told to us at all; but if it was judged that we should learn them, prophecy should not be obscure—and perhaps they ought hardly to have been spoken.

 

For from what has been said it is clear that men both needed to learn them, and it was necessary that they not be expressed in a profane or common way, but that they be spoken clearly to the initiated, while to the uninitiated they should remain hidden and inaccessible. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:481)

 

Leland H. Monson on Mosiah 27-29 and God Favoring the Democratic Form of Government

 Context: In “Chapter 24: America A Cradle of Democracy” (a discussion of Mosiah 27-29):

 

Commentary:

 

Hundreds of years before God directed the establishment of the Constitution of the United States, he raised up a man to found a democratic form of government among the Nephites. What greater evidence can we ask for that God looks with favor upon the democratic way of life?

 

And why should that be the case? Democracy is firmly rooted in the spiritual concept of free agency. It is planted in the rich soil of a belief in the dignity of the human soul.

 

The Church thrives best in democratic countries. You will recall that God spent hundreds of years preparing for the establishment of a democratic government in our America. He developed in the old world a freedom-loving people, inspired Columbus to unveil this land, put a n urge behind the freedom-loving people whom he had developed, and directed them to this land, where, under His direction, they established the Constitution of the United States. Only after all this preparation did God restore the gospel in its fulness. In the fertile soul of democracy God’s work can flourish, provided the people are righteously inclined.

 

It is interesting to observe that Mosiah provided his people with a code of laws, with a monetary system, and with religious liberty. We must remember that religious liberty was guaranteed the people of America at a time when bigotry and intolerance were the rule the world over.

 

Despite the fact that God favors democracy, He revealed the following to Joseph Smith: “We believe that all men are bound to sustain and uphold the respective governments in which they reside, while protected in their inherent and inalienable rights by the laws of such governments.” (Doctrine and Covenants 134:5.) (Leland H. Monson, Life in Ancient America: A Study of the Book of Mormon—For the Sunday Schools of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints [Salt Lake City: Deseret Sunday School Union, 1946; repr. Salt Lake City: Deseret New Press, 1967], 71)

 

 

George Enyedi (1555-1597) (Socinian) on John 1:15

  

The opinion of those who refer both εμποσθεν μου and πρωτος μου to time cannot stand.

 

First, because, as Beza notes, the word εμποσθεν is nowhere in the New Testament used of time. Secondly, it is certain that with the latter formula, namely πρωτος μου, the reason for the preceding statement is given; this is indicated by the little word GK, that is, “because”. But if we say both εμποσθεν μου and πρωτος μου signify time, then the same thing will be proved by the same thing, and there will be manifest idle talk in the Baptist’s words. For what kind of inference, I ask, is this: “He was before me in time, because he was prior to me in time”? That is, just as if someone were to say: “Aristotle lived before me, because he existed prior to me in time.”

 

By the same arguments those can be refuted who interpret εμποσθεν of time, but the following πρωτος μου of dignity. Of this opinion Bucer seems to have been, who interprets these words in this way: “Has been made before me”: for he was in the beginning and all things were made through him; “he is prior to me”, that is, he is my first and prince.

 

But the burden lies on them to prove that εμποσθεν anywhere in Scripture signifies time.

 

Next, it does not follow that someone is prior in time because he is prince and lord. For many princes are young and later in time than their subjects. But here the Baptist says that Christ is before him for this reason, and he is prior to time. (George Enyedi, Explanations of the Trinitarian Proof-Texts: Enyedi’s Critique of the Scriptural Proofs for the Trinity [trans. Marcin Poholski; 2026], 412)

 

Photius (810-891) on the Meaning of Genesis 1:26 and "Image" and "Likeness"

  

Question 252

To whom did God say, “Let us make man according to our image and likeness”?

 

Obviously, He said it to His consubstantial and coessential Son. For of Them an image can indeed be made. But the heretics, who in their foolish chatter said that it was spoken to the angels, or (even worse) to the demons, are very senseless. For what likeness can there be between the image of God and that of angels or demons? Of those whose essence differs to an immeasurable degree, what deceitful imagination could presume that they share the same image? Someone might even laugh at the folly of the Jews, for they say that God said this to Himself as if in imitation of human speech. Yet though “let us make” and “we command” or “we write,” though plural in form, does not at all imply a call to cooperation. Moreover, “we write” and “we command” clearly have an addressee—it is evident that they are directed toward a subordinate—whereas in the case, the phrase “let us make<” especially with the addition of “in our image,” does not at all allow us to understand any other person than the Son and the All-Holy Spirit, to whom have been entrusted the great powers, and who are accustomed to say, “We give command,” “We write,” “We order,” and the like. Yet for the most part, divine Scripture represents God, the Lord of all, as speaking in the singular: “The time for every purpose is in my power,” “I regret that I made man,” “I will destroy man,” “There shall be no other gods besides me,” and countless others. Only occasionally does it present Him as speaking in the plural, indicating thereby the number of persons in the Trinity, as in “Come, let us go down and confuse their language,” and in the very phrase now under discussion.

 

Here then, when God was forming the rational being, which after many generations was to be renewed through the invocations of the Holy Trinity in the all-holy baptism, being about to create that nature which would partake of those mysteries, He declared in a veiled way both the identity of essence and the number of persons. By saying, “God said,” He indicated the common divine nature; and by adding, “Let us make,” He revealed the number of persons. Again, by saying in the singular “image,” He showed the unity of nature; and by adding “our,” He showed the number of hypostases. Thus, foreseeing all things—even the Incarnation of the Only Begotten and that He would take human nature from the Virgin—the God of all very fittingly deemed this foundation of our race worthy of the highest honour.

 

First, therefore, He set forth the thought of creation, to show beforehand the rationality of His creature. Then He declared at the same time the number of the divine persons, so that the man being created might grasp the mysteries of theology, and he who is found worthy of the all-holy baptism might clearly know that his Maker is also his Saviour, and his Saviour also his Maker. Furthermore, since in a certain sense He Himself is the immediate author of this creation, He thus showed His particular love for His work. But we do not say that the Deity has hands, nor what He needs reflection or prior contemplation to create—as Plato’s myths say, that He fashioned the creature according to the image retained in His memory—but each of these expressions simply declares God’s great care for His creation.

 

Question 253

What does “according to the image” mean?

 

Some say that “according to the image” refers to the invisibility of the soul; but if that were the case, then much more “in the image” would the angels have been made. Others, very foolishly, say that the human body was made according to the divine image, because they were deceived by the fact that divine Scripture often mentions for God eyes and hands and the like, not perceiving that God, speaking in human manner through men, shapes His words according to the weakness of His hearers. Since we see by the eyes, He calls His seeing power “eyes”; and in like manner His hearing power “ears,” and His command “mouth.” Yet the fact that God is impossible to describe can be seen from many passages of Scripture.

 

Some of the teachers, therefore, have understood “according to our image and likeness” in this way: that when God, the Maker of all, created both the visible and the intelligible creation, He fashioned man last of all, setting, as it were, His image midway between the inanimate and sensible and the intelligible, so that the lifeless and living things should offer to him, as a kind of tribute, their use, while the spiritual beings should show their live for the Creator through their case for him.

 

Others again have said that “in the image of God” means that men was made according to God’s ruling power; for, they say, He added, “and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea,” and so on. Just as He has authority over all, so HE granted to man dominion over the irrational animals.

 

But we may also find other imitations of the archetype. For man took creates, following the example of his Maker, building houses and walls, and cities and harbours, and countless other things—representations of the heavens and images of the sun, the moon, the stars, and of irrational animals—though the diversity of creation is indescribable. Yet in every way that man creates, he imitates his own Creator, as the image does the archetype. For the image bears the marks of the archetype, though it possesses the shape of the parts, it does not possess their energies, being without the soul by which the body moves.

 

So too man rules and judges after the pattern of God, but man needs witnesses, accusers, and countless others in the act of judgment, whereas God needs none, for He knows all things before they come to be. Thus man is also called “god,” because he is called the image of God. And indeed Paul says, “A man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God.” And moreover, God is, by His nature, truly what He is called, whereas man, as His image, bears only the name. And again, God is truly and actually infinite, yet the human intellect also, in a certain way, imitates that infinity, for it ranges instantaneously to east and west, north and south, to the things of heaven and those beneath the earth—tough only by the power of imagination, whereas God possess infinity in His essence, wisdom, and power.

 

One many find also another, more exact imitation within the human soul itself, for it contains both the rational and vital powers. And indeed the nous begets the word, and with the word proceeds the spirit—yet the spirit is not begotten as the word is, but ever accompanies it. These things, however, exist in man as in an image; therefore both the word and the spirit are without hypostasis. But in the Holy Trinity we understand the three hypostases, who are united without confusion, and exist each in themselves. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:540-42)

 

On the Latter-day Saint understanding of Gen 1:26 and other texts (e.g., Heb 1:3), see:

 

Lynn Wilder vs. Latter-day Saint (and Biblical) Theology on Divine Embodiment

George Enyedi (1555-1597) (Socinian) on Hebrews 1:10

  

Heb 1:10: “And you, Lord, in the beginning founded the earth, etc.”

 

With great agreement the Trinitarians interpret this passage, adduced from Psalm 101, of Christ, and contend that he is here plainly affirmed to be the creator of heaven and earth.

 

But before we answer them, let us consider the connection of the sentences and the course of the words. It is certain, then, that from verse 5 — namely from the words: “For to which of the angels did he ever say”, etc. — up to this passage, namely the tenth verse, various sayings and testimonies of the Old Testament are gathered together by which the excellence of Christ is to be shown.

 

Further, this too is clear: that these testimonies are recited in such a way that at the beginning of each the expression is elliptical and must be filled out from what precedes. For example, when it is written in verse 5: “For to which did he say”, “God the Father”, who had been mentioned before, is to be understood. And when there it is added: “And again”, it is to be understood: “to whom God said”. Likewise in the third place, where we read: “And when he again brings in”, it is to be understood: “God says”. The same holds for the following clauses and testimonies, namely that the name of God the Father is always to be understood. From this it follows that in this testimony also, which stands in verse 10, if it is adduced to show the dignity of Christ, after the conjunction “And” there is to be understood: “God the Father said”, so that God the Father would have spoken these words to Christ: “You in the beginning, Lord”, etc.

But if anyone prefers to supply this ellipsis from what precedes in such a way that not “to whom he said”, but what is found in verse 7: “To the angels indeed he says” — which some interpret thus: “of the angels indeed he says” — is to be repeated ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ, and so contends that after the conjunction “And” these words are to be understood: “of the Son he says”, I do not much object.

 

Only let this be granted, which cannot be denied: that these words, “You in the beginning”, if they are to be understood of Christ, are words of God the Father speaking of Christ. For if the conjunction “And” is separated from the words “You in the beginning” — which all do who interpret this passage of Christ — the expression will necessarily be elliptical and must be filled out from what precedes in one or the other of the two ways we have mentioned.

 

This being laid down, let us now proceed to the explanation of the passage, which different interpreters are wont to offer not in one single way.

 

For, first, there are those who deny that these words, “You in the beginning”, etc., were said of Christ and are to be taken so, but hold that they were said of God the Father. This view of theirs they confirm with the following arguments. First: if these words are understood of Christ, the writer of the epistle will contradict himself, who said above, in verse 2, that God the Father created the world through the Son. But by these words the creation of the world would be expressly attributed to the Son. Yet to make the principal cause out of the instrument, and to attribute the creation of one and the same thing in the same place to different authors, is the mark of one who is inconsistent and at odds with himself.

 

This reason is confirmed by the constant agreement of Scripture: for nowhere is creation ascribed to Christ, but everywhere to God, who created all things through the Son. Therefore this testimony, too, ought not to be taken and understood otherwise.

 

Furthermore, this very thing is proved from the purpose of the Apostle. For he wishes to exalt Christ above other men and above the angels, and to prove this he carefully gathers various testimonies from every side. But if he here ascribed the creation of the world to Christ, he would be comparing the Creator with the creature, which would surely be foolish and absurd. For who does not know that the Creator is infinitely more excellent than his creatures? And yet we see that the Apostle is exceedingly diligent and careful in confirming his purpose; from which it appears that he wishes to confirm, and to persuade men of, a matter that was doubtful among some and not believed. But no one ever doubted that the Creator is more excellent than the creature; hence that matter stood in no need of proof. And it is a fault to do by many means what can be done by fewer. Since, then, he could have demonstrated by a single argument that Christ is more excellent than the angels and men, by saying that he is the Creator and they creatures — what need would there have been to heap up so many arguments and testimonies?

 

Next, we have already shown that if that conjunction “And” is separated from the following words, the defect of the sentence must necessarily be supplied in such a way that God the Father speaks those words to the Son: “You, Lord, in the beginning founded the earth,” etc.

 

But it is not only unheard of, but even impious, to affirm that God the Father calls his Son “Lord” and ascribes to him the creation of the world. Not even the doctrine of the Trinitarians permits this. For if the persons of the Trinity are wholly equal and alike, then surely one person neither ought to nor can call another “Lord.” For if anyone objects that Christ often called the Father his Lord and God, they are accustomed to excuse this by saying that Christ had become incarnate and been made lowly. Therefore, with respect to his office and the flesh, or, as they themselves put it, the human nature, he was less than the Father, and could therefore call the Father his Lord and God.

 

But of the Father they can invent nothing of the kind, because he was never incarnate and never humbled, so that in some respect he could at some time be called less than the Son. Therefore it is not only absurd, but even blasphemous, to assert that God the Father calls the Son his Lord and the creator of heaven and earth. Yet if the opinion of the opponents is true, this absurdity and impiety cannot be avoided, as has been demonstrated.

 

If this interpretation of the words is admitted — namely, that here, too, just as in the Psalm it is certain that it is ascribed to him, the creation of the world is ascribed to God the Father — the question arises what the sense will be, and what the connection of the words and sentences. The authors of this explanation resolve it thus. In the first place, they say, that conjunction “And” is not to be separated, as the Trinitarians do, but joined with the following words, so that the sentence is not elliptical but complete. This they confirm not only from what has already been said, but also by the following argument: when the Apostle cites testimonies of the kind that he applies to Christ, he uses several words in distinguishing them from one another, not the bare conjunction “And,” as can be seen in the preceding ones. For thus we read: “And again”; “And once more”; “But to the Son.” Therefore, had he wished to separate this saying from the preceding ones and to make it a new testimony for showing the dignity of Christ, he would not have put the simple conjunction “And,” but would have added something more, after his usual manner. Since he did not do so, this is proof that he wished to connect this testimony with the preceding one and to continue it, so that the latter should be understood of the same one of whom the former was understood. But what precedes pertains to God the Father; therefore this does also. The sentence, then, is continued in this way: “God,” namely the Father, “has anointed you,” O Christ, “with the oil of gladness”; “and you, Lord,” namely you who anointed Christ, “in the beginning founded the earth.”

 

Thus the address is turned to the Father: the Apostle, as if carried out of himself by a kind of wonder, considering to what exceedingly great honor God the Father had raised Christ, a lowly and despised man, cries out and proves that this was easy for him to do, since he was able to found heaven and earth; as if he were saying: You anointed Christ, and you are the same who founded the earth. This is one interpretation of these words.

 

Others, however, explain it thus. It is certain that the Apostle in this place speaks of the royal dignity and of the excellence of the kingdom of Christ, which, as he testified in verse 2, Christ received from the Father by right of inheritance. That this kingdom is not this world, nor of this world, Christ himself confesses elsewhere, and the Apostle also indicates it here, in Heb 2:5, when he says that he is speaking of the world to come. Now concerning this world to come, over which Christ was to be set, and of which he was Father and Prince, there is a remarkable prophecy in this passage of the Psalm, as those words show: “They will perish, but you will remain; and they will all grow old like a garment, and like a cloak you will change them.”

 

The Apostle, then, wishing to bring forward these words and to show that in them the new kingdom of Christ and the abolition of the old world are described, wrote out the passage of the Psalm whole and entire — not because those words, “You, Lord, in the beginning”, etc., contributed anything to his purpose, but because the later words, which he wished to adduce, depended on them and were joined to them; therefore he quoted those as well, yet in the meantime had regard only to the words by which the change and renewal of the world was signified.

 

That sacred as well as other writers are accustomed to adduce whole and sometimes even rather long sentences for the sake of a single little sentence, or even of a single little word, is generally admitted. And so that the Papists especially may doubt it the less, I will set down the judgment of two men who are of great name and authority, chiefly among them.

 

Jerome, then, when he wished to solve the question how Christ on the cross could have said that he was forsaken by his God, since the Godhead had been hypostatically united to the humanity and they could never afterwards have been separated, answered — as Galatinus also reports in book 8, chapter 18 — that Christ on the cross sang Psalm 21 and all the following ones up to the sixth verse of the thirtieth Psalm, where these words stand: “Into your hands I commend my spirit.”

 

And because among other things this too is contained in Psalm 21: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”, he sang this as well — not in order to show that he was forsaken by God, but because it came to his mind to be spoken together with the other words of the same Psalms.

 

Robert Bellarmine, the Jesuit, also writes as follows in the first volume, in the sixth controversy, which concerns Purgatory, book 2, chapter 5: “Therefore the Church, for the sake of one or another sentence that bears on the matter at hand, is accustomed to read some passage of Scripture in its entirety, even if the greater part of that passage does not bear on the matter at hand.” Thus far he.

 

There he also confirms what he says with examples brought forward. It is therefore neither strange nor unusual to adduce a whole passage for the sake of a single sentence. This the author of this epistle also did.

 

The sense of these words, then, according to this interpretation, will be this: “And,” namely “to the Son,” that is, concerning the Son, (just as a little before it is said “And to the angels” instead of “concerning the angels”), that is: something pertaining to the Son is said in that passage of the Psalm.

 

“You, Lord, in the beginning” etc. There it is affirmed that the earth and the heavens are to be changed and renewed. And this not on account of the angels, but through Christ and for Christ’s sake. For God has not subjected the world to come to the angels, but to Christ. Therefore Christ is more excellent than the angels, since he himself is the king and prince of the new world; the angels, however, are ministering spirits. This is the aim of the Apostle in that passage.

 

The third interpretation, which seems to me the most fitting of all, is this: we have already said that the author of this epistle applies all the sayings and deeds of the Old Testament allegorically to the New, in order to show that the old things were a figure of the new, and that the New Testament is the fulfillment of the Old. Therefore he adduces a great many things from the Old Testament which, among the Prophets, are said of a quite different matter and in a different sense. But on account of a certain likeness, whether of words or of things, he himself applies them to the New Testament.

 

Not to wander far, let us consider this first chapter: in verse 6 he says: “I will be to him a Father.” That this applies to Christ that saying was said of Solomon (2 Sam 7) is shown most clearly even by what follows: “If he commits any iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod” etc.

 

And again, not to touch on the rest, that saying: “Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever” etc. is applied to Christ, although it is certain that in the Psalmist it was said of Solomon, as all learned interpreters, and indeed the title of the Psalm itself, teach.

 

Thus, then, I argue: in whatever sense the Apostle cited the aforesaid passages, in that same sense he also cited this one: “You in the beginning” etc.

 

But the aforesaid he cited in such a way that he had regard to the spiritual sense, not to the historical and literal.

 

Therefore he also cited this one, “You, Lord, in the beginning” etc., in that way.

 

This being laid down, we say that the Apostle is here treating of the new, or renewed, world, as he himself testifies in Heb 2:5; whose prince and father, as Isaiah testifies, was Christ, and, as Paul says in Eph 2:14, he himself made (ἐποίησε) the two into one.

 

What, therefore, the Psalmist had said of God the Father and of the old world, that the Apostle applies in a mystical sense to Christ and the new world.(George Enyedi, Explanations of the Trinitarian Proof-Texts: Enyedi’s Critique of the Scriptural Proofs for the Trinity [trans. Marcin Poholski; 2026], 411-17)

 

 

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

Johann Gerhard (1634) Providing Roman Catholic Exegetes Interpreting Malachi 1:11 as a Prophecy of Spiritual Sacrifices and Prayers

  

Argument IV. Malachi 1:11: “In every place an oblation is offered to my name, a pure offering.” He responded, 1. Benedict Arias Montanus annotates on this message: “Although the meaning of this passage is clear from the words themselves, yet the secret reason of its signification is to be observed from the construction of the words, which the ancient interpreters carefully considered but certainly did not sufficiently explain. God had severely rebuked the priests for having so despised and diminished his name that they judged it to make no difference by what manner and with what victim he was worshipped.” And afterward: “But the other nations, led not by the open norm of the Law and the divine oracles, but only by the contemplation of the works of Nature, earnestly and attentively worshipped God, whom they believed to be the Lord and Ruler. By what name they undertook this, God himself explains: ‘Great is my name among the nations.’ By reason of greatness and as a matter of definition, he testifies that he is worshipped by them; and by that right he even strongly surpasses the Jews, to whom his name was a matter of contempt. Therefore, although the proper name of God was unknown to the nations, yet certainly the surname of the great, which God had by nature had earned for itself a place among all nations through the alternating sequences of day and night and the constant fourfold change of the seasons.” And afterward: “We said at the outset that this discourse is recondite, inasmuch as with the same simple utterance of words it embraces simultaneously a double meaning: that the name of God is great from the rising of the sun to its setting, and that the very rising and setting of the sun is regarded as the greatness of the divine name. IT was fitting, moreover, that by the same name of greatness, God should be known and also worshipped among the nations” (Benedict Arias Montanus, Commentary on Malachi, p. 935). This explanation of Benedict Arias is contained in that volume concerning which Antwerp censure pronounced that it not only presents piety and the true meaning of prophecy, but also contributes greatly to the extirpation of heretical dogmas and to be promotion of piety among all preachers. Although Bellarmine truly (Robert Bellarmine, On the Mass, book 1, ch. 10) and Suárez (Franciso Suárez, Disputations, part 3, disp. 74, art. 1, sect. 1) judge is inadmissible in any way, they do not refute it with suitable and compelling arguments.

 

2. Antonius Possevinus does not dare disapprove this explanation of Benedict Arias, for he writes thus: “Nevertheless there are not lacking most learned men who, in this royal work prepared by Arias, have desired that certain things drawn from the Rabbis should be referred to the sense of the Catholic Church, such as those concerning the continual and bloodless sacrifice, which has been foretold by the testimony of Malachi as yet to come, which Arias seems to have referred to the sacrifice of the gentiles, But since it is not for us in this place to pass judgment on that work, we advise the reader to compare the Greek edition of the Septuagint, the Latin translation of this edition published at Rome by order of Pope Sixtus V, that which appeared at Antwerp. From which also the Spanish Index Expurgatorius, while noting other things in it, does not touch upon the passage” (Antonius Possevinus, Select Library, book 2, ch. 21, vol. 1, p. 63).

 

3. Isidorus Clarius likewise does not take this passage of the Mass sacrifice, but of the interior and spiritual sacrifices of the New Testament, for he annotates on this passage: “It is clear from this that the ceremonies of the Law were to be abolished at the time of Christ, and that all the faithful throughout the whole world were to sacrifice the pure offering of prayer” (Isidorus Clarius, Commentary on Malachi, p. 386, Venice edition).

 

4. Franciscus Vatablus expounds on the passage in the same manner in his notes (p. 47): “There will be, at the time, namely, of grace, a great thing, that is, it will be held in great esteem among the nations, which is said, ‘I will accept the offering of the nations which they shall offer to me.’ The calling of the nations is proclaimed.” (p. 48): “It will be offered and pure. Understand: and not impure. By the worship of the old law he understands the worship of the new.” This exposition of the prophetic prediction concerning the calling of the nations agrees with the apostolic sayings (Romans 15:16; 2 Corinthians 2:14; Philippians 2:17). (Johann Gerhard, Confessio Catholica: On the Sacrifice of the Mass—Article XV [trans. Koden A. Green [2026], 45-47)

 

Monday, November 2, 2026

Lutheran Theologian Johann Gerhard (1634) vs. Roman Catholic Appeals to Melchizedek's Sacrifice being a Type of the Mass

  

If the sacrifice of bread and wine by Melchizedek and been offered to prefigure the sacrifice of the Mass, it would follow: Alpha. That Christ would also have to be offered under the species of the Aaronic sacrifices. For since he is said to be offered under the species of bread and wine because Melchizedek, on the hypothesis, offered bread and wine, why should it not also be said that Christ must today be offered under the species of animals, since those same things were offered by the Aaronic priests to represent Christ? Beta. That Christ is a priest not only according to the order of Melchizedek, but also according to the order of Aaron. For since he is called a priest according to the order of Melchizedek because he offered bread and wine according to the type of Melchizedek’s sacrifice, why should he not also be called a priest according to the order of Aaron, since in the Aaronic sacrifices as well there was use of bread and wine? Gamma. That there is no transubstantiation in the Eucharist, because Melchizedek did not transubstantiate bread and wine into something else to be offered under the species of bread and wine. Delta. That the use of Eucharistic wine is not to be denied to the laity, because Melchizedek distributed not only bread abut also wine to each and every one of Abraham’s soldiers. Epsilon. That the Roman Pontiff, whom they wish to be supreme priest on earth, is not the Vicar of Christ, because there is not a single iota in Scripture about a Vicar of Melchizedek. Zeta. That the sacrifice of the Mass pertains to the sacrifice of the Mass pertains to the sacrifices and figures of the Old Testament, because Christ, offering himself to the heavenly Father on the cross and testifying that all things were now consummated, at last brought fulfillment and end to the sacrifices of the Old Testament. Eta. That the sacrifice of the Mass is neither propitiatory nor impetratory, because the sacrifice of Melchizedek was not eucharistic. Theta. That it is not necessary for the body of the Lord, offered under the species of bread in the Mass, to be received by those fasting, since Melchizedek distributed his sacrifice to those whom he knew had been refreshed from the spoils of the enemies. Iota. That the mixing of water with wine is not necessary in the sacrifice of the Mass, since Melchizedek brought forth undiluted wine, not a mixture. Kappa. That Christ sacrificed the body and blood of his own person alone under the species of bread and wine, and has no ministers in this bloodless sacrifice, because he alone is the priest according to the order of Melchizedek not together with the Mass-priests, and it is annexed to the order of Melchizedek that no one other than Melchizedek brought forth bread and wine thus for the living. Mu. That the consecrated bread is not to be reserved and adored, because the bread and wine of Melchizedek none of these things is read. But the Pontificans will never admit these consequences; therefore neither should they posit the antecedent. (Johann Gerhard, Confessio Catholica: On the Sacrifice of the Mass—Article XV [trans. Koden A. Green [2026], 35-36)

 

Geoffrey Clarke on the Problem Posed to Trinitarianism by Passages Speaking of Jesus Having a God of His Own

  

The third group is the smallest and, for its size, the most pointed: the texts in which Jesus, including the risen and glorified Jesus, has a God of his own. On the morning of the resurrection he tells Mary that he is ascending to the Father and her Father, to his Son and her God (John 20:17), ranging his own relation to God alongside hers and naming God as his. Paul speaks of the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory (Ephesians 1:17). God is the God of the Lord Jesus. And the exalted Christ of the Revelation, speaking from heaven in glory, refers four times in a single verse to “My God,” promising to write upon the faithful the name of his God and the name of the city of his God (Revelation 3:12). The inference the Unitarian draws is blunt and not easily blunted. The one who has a God is not that God. Distinction might be borne, and even rank; but worship is owed to God, and one who himself worships, who names another his God after his exaltation and in the height of heaven, stands among the worshippers and not among the worshipped.

 

These texts do not merely undercut the high Christology; the Unitarian offers them a positive home, and the home is the framework the Old Testament had already supplied and the Second Temple period elaborated—the framework of the supreme agent. A king’s plenipotentiary may bear the king’s own authority, act and speak in the king’s name, and receive honours that in another mouth would be treason, and none of it makes him the king. So, the Unitarian argues, with Jesus, God has made him both Lord and Christ (Acts 2:36); the authority he wields is given to him, the name above every name is bestowed on him, the judgment is committed to him, the kingdom is handed over and will be handed back. Wherever the exalted language is examined, a giver stands behind the gift, and the giver is God. On this reason the worship of Jesus is the honour rightly paid to the one whom God has raised to his right hand and through who God not acts and will judge—worship that terminates, as the Philippian hymn says in so many words, in the glory of God the Father. Jesus is the unique image and agent of the one God, the main in whom God’s purpose is accomplished and through whom God’s reign is exercised, exalted above every creature and worthy of the homage due to God’s appointed Lord, and a creature still, the highest of God’s work and not the uncreated God himself Tuggy, 2025). The strength of the construal is that it accounts for the evidence of the previous chapter without straining against the evidence of this one. It can grant the exaltation, the authority, and even the worship, and still hold the line the whole New Testament appears to hold: that the one God is the Father, and that Jesus is his Christ. (Geoffrey Clarke, Christian Concepts of the Godhead: The Unitarian-Trinitarian Distinction [2026], 35-36)

 

 

Peter Schäfer on Genesis Rabbah 1:5 Teaching Creation Ex Materia

  

רַב הוּנָא בְּשֵׁם בַּר קַפָּרָא פָּתַח (תהלים לא, יט): תֵּאָלַמְנָה שִׂפְתֵי שָׁקֶר וגו', אִתְפַּרְכָן, אִתְחַרְשָׁן, אִשְׁתַּתְּקָן. אִתְפַּרְכָן אִתְחַרְשָׁן, הֵיךְ מָה דְאַתְּ אָמַר (שמות ד, יא): אוֹ מִי יָשׂוּם אִלֵּם אוֹ חֵרֵשׁ אוֹ פִקֵּחַ אוֹ עִוֵּר הֲלֹא אָנֹכִי ה', וְאוֹמֵר (בראשית לז, ז): וְהִנֵּה אֲנַחְנוּ מְאַלְּמִים אֲלֻמִּים בְּתוֹךְ הַשָּׂדֶה וְהִנֵּה קָמָּה אֲלֻמָּתִי. אִשְׁתַּתְּקָן, כְּמַשְׁמָעוֹ (תהלים לא, יט): הַדֹּבְרוֹת עַל צַדִּיק, חַי הָעוֹלָמִים. (תהלים לא, יט): עָתָק, שֶׁהֶעְתִּיק בִּבְרִיּוֹתָיו. (תהלים לא, יט): בְּגַאֲוָה, אֶתְמְהָה בִּשְׁבִיל לְהִתְגָּאוֹת וְלוֹמַר אֲנִי דוֹרֵשׁ בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית. (תהלים לא, יט): וָבוּז, אֶתְמְהָה מְבַזֶּה עַל כְּבוֹדִי, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא כָּל הַמִּתְכַּבֵּד בִּקְלוֹן חֲבֵרוֹ אֵין לוֹ חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא, בִּכְבוֹדוֹ שֶׁל מָקוֹם עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה, וּמַה כְּתִיב אַחֲרָיו (תהלים לא, כ): מָה רַב טוּבְךָ אֲשֶׁר צָפַנְתָּ לִירֵאֶיךָ, לִירֵאֶיךָ וְלֹא לַבּוֹזִים אֶת מוֹרָאֲךָ [הרב] אַל יְהִי בְּמָה רַב טוּבְךָ, בְּנֹהַג שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם מֶלֶךְ בָּשָׂר וָדָם בּוֹנֶה פָּלָטִין בִּמְקוֹם הַבִּיבִים, וּבִמְקוֹם הָאַשְׁפָּה, וּבִמְקוֹם הַסָּרִיּוֹת, כָּל מִי שֶׁהוּא בָּא לוֹמַר פָּלָטִין זוֹ בְּנוּיָה בִּמְקוֹם הַבִּיבִים וּבִמְקוֹם הָאַשְׁפָּה וּבִמְקוֹם הַסָּרִיּוֹת, אֵינוֹ פּוֹגֵם. כָּךְ כָּל מִי שֶׁהוּא בָּא לוֹמַר הָעוֹלָם הַזֶּה נִבְרָא מִתּוֹךְ תֹּהוּ וָבֹהוּ, אֵינוֹ פּוֹגֵם, אֶתְמְהָה. רַב הוּנָא בְּשֵׁם בַּר קַפָּרָא אָמַר, אִילוּלֵי שֶׁהַדָּבָר כָּתוּב אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְאָמְרוֹ, בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים, מִנַּיִן הֵן, וְהָאָרֶץ הָיְתָה תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ.

 

Rav Huna began in the name of bar Kapara: “May they be silenced [te’alamna], those lying lips [that speak harsh words against the righteous one with arrogance and contempt]” (Psalms 31:19) – may they be bound up, may they become mute, may they be silenced. May they become mute – as it says: “Who gives a mouth to a person, or who renders one mute [ilem] or deaf, or sighted or blind? Is it not I, the Lord?” (Exodus 4:11). And [may they be bound up,] as it says: “Behold, we were binding [me’alemim] sheaves in the field and behold, my sheaf arose” (Genesis 37:7). May they be silenced – that is its plain sense. “That speak…against the Righteous One” (Psalms 31:19) – [this refers to] Him of eternal life. “Harsh words [atak]” (Psalms 31:19) – matters that He concealed [shehe’etik] from His creations. “With arrogance” (Psalms 31:19) – this is an expression of bewilderment: [Do they do this] in order to boast arrogantly: I am expounding the act of Creation? “And contempt” (Psalms 31:19) – this [too] is an expression of bewilderment: Is it in order to show contempt for My honor? As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Anyone who attains honor through the degradation of another person has no portion in the World to Come; how much more so is this so regarding the honor of the Omnipresent. What is written following this? “How great is the goodness You have in store for those who fear You” (Psalms 31:20) – for those who fear You, but not for those who demean the [awesome] fear of You. They will not be included in: “How great is the goodness.”


The way of the world is that when a flesh-and-blood king builds his palace in [a location that had been] a place of sewers, a place of refuse, and a malodorous place, anyone who comes and says: ‘This palace was built in a place of sewers, a place of refuse, and a malodorous place,’ is this not an insult? So, too, anyone who comes and says: ‘This world was created from emptiness and disorder,’ is this not an insult? This is a rhetorical question. Rav Huna said in the name of bar Kapara: Were the matter not written explicitly it would not have been possible to say it: “In the beginning, God created” (Genesis 1:1) – from what? “The earth was emptiness and disorder” (Genesis 1:2). (Genesis Rabbah [AKA Bereshit Rabbah] 1:5)

 

 

BeR 1:5

 

This is a petihah connecting Gen 1:1 with the petihah verse Ps 31:19, put in the mouth of Rav Huna in the name of Bar Qappara. Bar Qappara is a Tanna of the fifth and last generation that leads to the first generation of Amoraim (early third century). He was the teacher, among others, of R. Oshaya who opens the very first sub-section of BerR and founded an academy in the ‘South’, presumably in Lydda. Similar to the first sub-section, the petihah begins with interpreting a difficult word in the petihah verse, this time te’alamnah: ‘Let the lying lips be made dumb (te’alamnah)’, translating it into Aramaic and making clear that it indeed means ‘be bound’, ‘be made dumb’, ‘be silenced’. The lying lips that must be silenced, the petihah continues explaining the petihah verse Ps 31:19, are the lips ‘that speak arrogantly against the righteous’. ‘The righteous’ is understood as referring to God, and speaking arrogantly against him as revealing things that God wants to be kept away (kept secret) from his creatures. And finally, the continuation of the petihah verse ‘with pride and contempt’ (Ps 31:19) is interpreted as proudly expounding the ‘work of creation’ (ma’aseh bereshit) and contemptuously disgracing the honor of God.

 

The reference to the ‘work of creation’ alludes, of course, to the well-known mishnah in Ḥagiga 2:1: ‘Forbidden sexual relations may not be expounded (en doreshin ba-‘arayot) by/to three, nor the work of creation (ma’aseh bereshit) by/to two, nor the Merkabah by/to an individual, unless he is wise [a scholar] and understands on his own’. The ‘work of creation’—that is, the exegesis of Gen 1—belongs to the topics that the Mishnah wants to be restricted, taking a middle position between expounding forbidden sexual relations (least restricted) and expounding the Merkabah (that is, Ezek 1: most restricted). From this it becomes clear that it is the ‘work of creation’ that God wants to keep secret from his creatures: whoever expounds Gen 1, disgraces God’s honor.

 

As in the first petihah, a parable is added to explain what precisely this means—and to lead back from the petihah verse Ps 31:19 to the Seder verse Gen 1:1: If a human king builds his palace at a place of sewage, garbage, and rubbish—does not one of his subjects, who passes by and publicly points to this unpleasant fact, disgrace the king? Similarly, everyone who publicly points to the fact that ‘this world is created from tohu and bohu and darkness—does he not disgrace [God]?’ The petihah climaxes in another dictum by Rab Huna in the name of Bar Qappara which closes the circle and explicitly refers to Gen 1:1f.:

 

If the matter were not (explicitly) written [in Scripture], it would be impossible to state it: God created heaven and earth (Gen 1:1)—from what? From: and the earth was tohu and bohu etc. (Gen 1:2).

 

This is an exceptionally bold and clear statement, presumably the earliest one in rabbinic Judaism that refers to a doctrine of creation out of pre-existing matter (creatio ex hylis). Obviously, Bar Qappara reads Gen 1:1–3 in the same way as, much later, Rashi understood it (and the JPS English version translates it), namely: ‘(1) When God began to create (reading bereshit bero elohim instead of bereshit bara elohim) heaven and earth—(2) the earth being unformed (tohu) and void (bohu), with darkness (hoshekh) over the surface of the deep (tehom) and a wind (ruah) from Good sweeping over the water—(3) God said: Let there be light!’ According to this translation, the first thing that God created was light, and what is listed in the parenthesis was already there, as pre-existent matter, when God started his creation with the light. The philosophical or theological context of this statement is difficult to determine—whether, still untroubled by a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, it ‘innocently’ propagates a creatio ex hylis, or, on the contrary, whether it explicitly and aggressively argues against an already existing doctrine of creatio ex nihilo—but what seems to be clear is the fact that Bar Qappara draws his conclusion about God using pre-existing matter for his creation from the Bible: I would rather prefer to not make this point, he says, but unfortunately the biblical text compels me to make it. Moreover, Bar Qappara evidently does not contest the idea of the creatio ex hylis as such (it is unavoidable, he implies, if we read the Bible properly); rather, he speaks against those who ma God’s ‘secret’ public by proudly and spitefully advertising it and thereby putting God in a dubious and unfavorable light. What the Bible says is certainly correct, but one should not speak openly and publicly about this shameful case. Finally, despite Bar Qappara’s attempt to connect the creatio ex hylis with the Bible, it is obvious that this doctrine is well-grounded in Greek philosophy, following a literal reading of the cosmology in Plato’s Timaios.

 

If we now look at the first two sub-units of our parashah from the point of view of the editor, we observe a stark contrast between the two. Whereas 1:1 emphasizes that the world was created by means of the Torah, 1:5 claims that the world was created by means of pre-existing matter. The first option is the essence of what the rabbis of rabbinic Judaism have to offer; the second option is the essence of what pagan philosophy suggests. To be sure, according to Bar Qappara even pagan philosophy has its origin in the Hebrew Bible; but this (for the rabbis self-evident) insight cannot conceal the fact that 1:5 presents the antidote to 1:1, or, to put it differently, that the first two sub-sections produce an almost unbearable tension between a rabbinic-theological and a pagan-philosophical worldview. There can be no doubt that our editor favors 1:1, and one could therefore more precisely speak of the two sub-sections as the thesis (1:1) and the antithesis (1:5) of the parashah—the thesis and antithesis that define the subject that the editor sets out to unfold in what follows. (Peter Schäfer, “Bereshit Bara Elohim: Bershit Rabba, Parasha 1, Reconsidered,” in Empsychoi Logoi: Religious Innovations in Antiquity—Studies in Honour of Pieter Willem van der Horst, ed. Alberdina Houtman, Albert De Jong, and Magda Misset-Van De Weg [Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity 73; Leiden: Brill, 2008], 269-72)

 

 

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