It is important to read Heb 4:12–13, not as a separate discussion, but
as part of the author’s argument, indicated by the explanatory connective gar (“for”): this is the reason why we should be eager and avoid
disobedience of the past generation, namely, the word of God that summons us is
of such a character. The rhetorical evocation of this “word of God” (logos tou theou) is both powerful and
ambiguous. It begins with what appears as a straightforward description of
God’s word as speech. But in verse 13
the use of the personal pronoun autou,
although hypothetically translatable as “its,” seems to demand the translation
“his,” especially since the penultimate clause speaks of “his eyes.”
The Word of God, by this point, appears as personified, so that the
subject is not God’s speech but God, and perhaps God’s Son, who has been the
major topic of the first and second chapters of this composition. The final
ambiguous element occurs in the final clause, where “the word” (ho logos) appears again, but this time
in apparently quite a different sense than in verse 11. The best way to deal
with this rich yet puzzling passage is to walk through it step by step.
By using the expression logos
tou theou, Hebrews taps into a deep and vital biblical tradition. Although
in the lxx the actual term is
seldom used (see only Judg 3:20; 1 Chr 15:5), the concept of God’s word as
creating (Gen 1:3; Pss 32:9; 55:11; Wis 9:1) and acting in history—above all
through the prophetic “word of the Lord”
(logos kyriou; see 1 Sam 15:24; 2 Sam
12:9; 1 Kgs 12:24; 2 Kgs 9:36; 1 Chr 10:13; 2 Chr 11:2; Amos 5:1; Mic 1:1; Joel
1:1; Hag 2:20; Zech 1:7; Isa 1:10; 28:4; Jer 1:4)—is at the heart of the prophetic
understanding of revelation. The connection between God’s speech and God’s
being and identity, furthermore, is close, leading to the sort of
personification we find in Ps 146:10 and Prov 8:1–9:6.
In the New Testament, logos tou
theou is used for Scripture (Matt 15:6; John 10:35), for the preaching of
Jesus (Luke 5:1; 8:21; see Heb 2:2), for Christian preaching (Acts 4:31; 6:2,
7; 8:14; 11:1; 13:5, 7; 13:44–48; 18:11; 2 Cor 2:17; 4:2; Phil 1:14; Col 1:28;
1 Thess 2:13; 2 Tim 2:9; Titus 2:5; 1 Pet 1:23; 1 John 2:14), as equivalent to
the witness of Jesus (Rev 1:2, 9; 20:4), and even Jesus himself (Rev 19:13; cf.
John 1:1–2). Hebrews, in turn, uses the term for the message delivered to its
readers by their leaders (13:7). But Hebrews’ use of logos by itself is even richer in association. The author has
already spoken of the logos that was
brought by angels (2:2) and of the “logos
that was heard” by the desert generation (4:2); and after this passage, he will
speak of those who have partaken of the logos
of righteousness (5:13), of the logos
concerning the Messiah (6:1), of the logos
of God’s oath (7:28), and of the logos
presented at Mount Sinai (12:19). In each of these instances, logos refers to a speech or a reality
that in some fashion takes its origin in God. Quite another sense of logos (found in 5:11; 13:17; and 13:22)
will be discussed below in connection with 4:13.
The author begins in verse 12 by calling the word of God “living” (zōn), and thereby immediately introduces
the ambiguity of reference: is this merely speech, or a living being, or the
living being? In Scripture the Lord God of Israel declares himself as the one
who preeminently lives: “As I live, says the Lord”
(Num 14:21, 28; Zech 2:9; Isa 49:15; Jer 22:24). The Lord is called “the living
God” (Deut 4:33; Ps 83:2; Hos 1:10; Isa 37:4, 17). This is also Hebrews’
favorite designation (see Heb 3:12; 9:14; 10:31; 12:22). But Scripture also
connects God’s life to the capacity of God’s words to give life: the people
hear the voice of the living God (Deut 5:26), and the psalmist prays to receive
“life by your word” (Ps 118:25, 50, 54). Elsewhere in the New Testament, we
find “the living God” (Matt 26:63; Acts 14:15; Rom 9:26; 2 Cor 3:3; 6:16; 1
Thess 1:9; 1 Tim 3:15; 4:10) and Jesus as “the living one” (Luke 24:5), but
again, there is also the characterization of the word as “living” in 1 Pet
1:23. The passage in 1 Peter contains the same ambiguity as we find here, since
the verse can be read either as “you have been reborn not through a perishable
seed but through an imperishable, through the living and enduring word of God,”
or as “through the enduring word of the living God.” In short, Hebrews applies
the same quality of life that is
normally associated with God’s being to God’s word.
The author also describes God’s word as energēs. This adjective does not appear in the lxx, but in ordinary Greek usage
suggests both strength and effectiveness, as with a medicine (see P.Oxy.
1088.56). The term occurs in the New Testament only here and in Paul (see 1 Cor
16:9; Phlm 6), but the cognates energein
and energeia appear frequently (for energeia see Eph 1:19; 3:7; Phil 3:21;
Col 2:12; for energein see 1 Cor
12:6, 11; Gal 2:8; 3:5; Eph 1:11, 20; 3:2; Phil 2:13; Col 1:29; 1 Thess 2:13),
most often with reference to the working of God in the community. The
translation “active” (see rsv) is
certainly possible, but while it captures well the sense of “energy,” it fails
to capture the nuance of “power.”
Hebrews next speaks of God’s word as “sharper than any two-edged
sword” (tomōteros hyper pasan machairan
distomon). The image of the sword as a literal instrument of God’s justice
is frequent in Scripture, with the lxx
using either rhomphaia (Gen 3:24; Pss
16:13; 62:10; 77:64; Amos 4:10; 7:9; Hag 1:11) or, as here, machaira (Gen 15:9; Num 21:24; Isa 3:25;
Jer 4:10). The “mouth of a sword” is its edge (see “mouth of the sword” in Josh
6:20; 8:24; Judg 1:25; 4:15; Sir 28:18), and a “two-edged sword” (machaira distomos) is literally
“two-mouthed.” Such imagery moves easily to the sword as a tongue (with two
edges) and the tongue as a sword (see Ps 56:4). In Isa 49:2 the prophet’s
mission is described in this manner: “and he has placed my mouth as a two-edged
sword (machaira oxeia).”
In Wis 18:14–16 the divine word (logos)
is personified as a fierce warrior, “bearing the sharp sword of your inexorable
decree.” Philo likewise identifies instances of the sword in Scripture with the
word of God (see Cherubim 28 and 31).
This image continues in the New Testament. In Eph 6:17 Paul tells his readers
to “take up the helmet of salvation and the sword of the spirit, which is the
word of God” (tēn machairan tou pneumatos
ho estin rhēma theou). Even more dramatically, Rev 1:19 describes the Son
of Man in this fashion: “He has seven stars in his right hand, and coming out
of his mouth is a sharp two-edged sword” (rhomphaia
distomos oxeia; see also Rev 2:12).
As a sword, the word is “sharper” (tomōteros)
than any two-edged sword because of its capacity to cut precisely and deeply to
the interior of things. The verb diikneomai
is relatively rare, used on one side for the way a missile could “penetrate”
walls (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War
7.79; Josephus, Ant. 13.96), or the
way a reputation could “reach” hearers (Plutarch, Demosthenes 20.4; Dio Chrysostom, Oration 12.35). Used with a sword, it must mean to “cut to.” The
sharpness of the blade is revealed by its ability to cut to “the division
between soul and spirit, joints and marrow.” The sequence may seem a bit odd:
we might expect the progression from the more obviously material to spiritual,
unless, in some fashion, the bones of the body are regarded by the author as
deeper and less accessible than the soul. Philo similarly interprets Abraham’s
dividing the animals in Gen 15:10–11 allegorically with reference to “God’s
word,” which is “the severer of all things material and immaterial whose
natures appear to us to be knitted together and united. That severing word
whetted to an edge of utmost sharpness never ceases to divide. For when it has
dealt with all sensible objects down to the atoms and what we call
‘indivisibles,’ it passes on from them to the realm of reason’s observation and
proceeds to divide it into a vast and infinite number of parts” (Who Is the Heir? 130–31).
The noun merismos comes from
merizein, “to divide,” and is used
only twice in the New Testament, both times in this composition and each time
with a different sense. In Heb 2:4 it refers to the diverse works of the Holy
Spirit; here it refers to the distinction between elements in the human person.
The distinction between soul (psychē)
and spirit (pneuma) surprises
slightly, because otherwise Hebrews speaks of pneuma only with regard to supernatural realities (see 1:7, 14;
2:4; 3:7; 6:4; 9:8, 14; 10:15, 29; 12:9, 23), and uses psychē by itself for the inner human person (6:19; 10:38, 39; 12:3;
13:17). The usage here seems to reflect the tripartite psychology familiar in
Platonism (see Timaeus 43A–45E,
69A–90E), and alluded to by Paul in 1 Thess 5:23. The noun harmos is not common, appearing mainly with reference to the
joining of stones by mortar (Sir 27:2) and to the connection between bones (4
Macc 10:5). The noun myelos refers
specifically to the inmost part of the bone or even of the self (Euripides, Hippolytus 255). In each pair of terms,
the contrast suggests that which is interior and difficult to observe or locate
precisely with any human instrument. The rhetorical point, then, is that God’s
word can penetrate precisely to those places where human knowledge cannot—what
human can accurately distinguish between soul and spirit?
The next characterization extends the discriminating ability of God’s
word. It is able to “discern (kritikos)
the thoughts (enthymēseōn) and
conceptions (ennoiōn) of the heart.”
Once more Hebrews uses a term that is not found elsewhere in the New Testament
or even the lxx, but appears
frequently in secular Greek for the capacity to make mental judgments (Plato, Statesman 260C; Aristotle, Parts of Animals 432A). Here the
judgments are directed to the inmost and private movements of human
interiority, the heart (kardia; see
3:8, 10, 12, 15; 4:7; 8:10; 10:16, 22; 13:9). The difference between “thought”
(enthymēsis; see Matt 9:4; 12:5; Acts
17:29) and “conception” (ennoia; see
1 Pet 4:1) is slight; both terms are used primarily for mental states rather
than acts of will; for this reason the translation “intentions” (nrsv) tilts too much in the direction of
the volitional. As with “soul and spirit, joints and marrow,” the discernment
between thought and conception is the more impressive because the difference
between them is so slight and unavailable to human perception.
We have seen in the discussion of Heb 1:3 that the outlook and
language of the book of Wisdom came close to our author’s own. Here again, what
that Hellenistic Jewish composition has to say in praise of Wisdom (sophia) in 7:22–24 sounds very much like
Hebrews’ praise of the logos tou theou:
Wisdom is declared to have within her “a spirit (pneuma) most intelligent, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, agile,
clear, unstained, certain … all-powerful, all-seeing, and pervading all
spirits, through they be intelligent, pure, and very subtle. For Wisdom is
mobile beyond all motion, and she penetrates and pervades all things (diēkei de kai chōrei dia pantōn) by
reason of her purity” (nab).
The implicit personification of the word of God becomes explicit in
verse 13, where the personal pronoun autou
(“his”) applies much more naturally to God than to speech, and becomes
unavoidable in the prepositional phrase pros
hon (“to him”) in the final clause. When Hebrews declares “there is no
creature (ktisis) that is not visible
(aphanēs) to him. All things lie
naked (gymnos) and exposed (tetrachēlismena) to his eyes,” it is affirming
the common understanding of the relationship of God to creation: God has
“maker’s knowledge,” that is, as the maker, God knows things from within,
whereas other creatures can know them only from the outside, from surface
appearances.
Even pagan authors assert that God has a knowledge hidden from humans
(see Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
12.2; Epictetus, Discourses 2.14.11;
Seneca, Epistles 83.1–2), and in
Jewish literature the conviction is constant (Jer 11:20; Pss 37:9; 138:1–18; Let. Aris. 132–33; Philo, On Abraham 104; On Dreams 1.90; 1 En.
9.5). That God is the “knower of the heart” (kardiognōstēs) is axiomatic as well for the New Testament writers
(Acts 1:24; 15:8; cf. Matt 6:4, 6; 1 Cor 4:5; 8:1–3; 1 Thess 2:4; Gal 4:9; Rom
8:27; Col 3:22–4:1).
The utter visibility of all creation to the Creator (and Judge) is
emphasized by the choice of words that explicate “made visible.” The state of
being naked (gymnos) is, from the
start of the biblical tradition, an expression of vulnerability to the other
(Gen 2:25; 3:7, 10, 11; 1 Sam 19:24; Job 1:21; 26:6; Qoh 5:14; Hos 2:3; Isa
20:2; Ezek 16:7, 22; 23:29). The passive perfect participle tetrachēlismena derives from the verb trachēlizein, which itself has a range
of meanings, all involving the neck (trachēlos;
see Luke 15:20), and all involving some sort of vulnerability—Paul speaks in
Rom 16:4 of those who “put their necks at risk for my sake.” Thus one can twist
the neck of a sacrificial victim (like an oxen) to bring it down (Theophrastus,
Characters 27.5; Philo, Cherubim 78), or one can pin an opponent
in wrestling by seizing the neck (Plutarch, Antony
33), or, in the passive, one can be overpowered. If such nuances apply here,
then the perfect passive form of the verb suggests “being laid open” and
vulnerable to another’s gaze and power. It is clear that the author of Hebrews
has shifted from the word of God as God’s speech to the word of God as God, the
one before whom all beings are exposed and to whom all beings are accountable.
The passage anticipates 10:31, “Falling into the hands of the living God is a
fearful thing.”
If the word is personified, is there any reason for thinking that the
author intends the reader to regard the word christologically? The application
of “word of God” to Jesus is certainly possible, as the passages cited above
make clear. In my judgment, however, there is only one reason for thinking that
it might be, and stronger reasons for thinking it is not. If the final phrase
is taken in a purely rhetorical sense, “our discourse concerns him,” one could
make the case that Christ is meant, since the discourse turns immediately to
Jesus as high priest, and, in fact, Hebrews uses a similar expression in 5:11
with specific reference to Christ/Melchizedek: “concerning whom we have much to
say” (peri hou polys hēmin ho logos).
But nothing else in the passage suggests that the author has Jesus in mind
here, and when we understand this to be the conclusion of the argument begun in
3:1 concerning God’s ever-renewed call to fidelity among the people, it is more
probable that Hebrews is thinking here of the word as a dimension of God’s
creating and judging power. (Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: A
Commentary [The New Testament Library; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox
Press, 2012], 131-36)
