1.21. Goods and evil, those
which are considered to be without necessity, some of them are found inside the
soul, and others among them outside it. But those which are said to be evils by
nature, it is impossible that they come into existence outside it. (Evagrius’s
Kephalaia Gnostika: A New Translation of the Unreformed Text from the
Syriac [trans. Ilaria L. E. Ramelli; Writings from the Greco-Roman World
38; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015], 22)
Evil by nature, in its proper
sense, is sin, which can originate and be found only in a soul, since it is the
product of one’s wrong will. In its proper sense, evil does not even exist
outside the soul’s wrong choices, and therefore it is considered by Origen and
Evagrius to have no ontological subsistence. (Ibid., 22)
5.18. Demons only resemble
colors, shapes, and size, whereas the holy powers also can [lit. “know”] change
the nature of the (immortal) body, while they prepare it for the functions that
are necessary. And this occurs among composite beings, whereas of the
incorporeal nature there are no intellections like these, as has been said.
(Evagrius’s Kephalaia Gnostika: A New Translation of the Unreformed
Text from the Syriac [trans. Ilaria L. E. Ramelli; Writings from the Greco-Roman
World 38; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015], 261)
Guillaumont has proposed here an
emendation (185): to read ܘܦܠܚܬܫܡܠ
instead of ܘܦܠܚܫܡܠ
and to understand, “savent se transformer aussi en la nature,” “they also can
transform themselves into the nature,” which is closer to the nonexpurgated
version S1. Now, I think that Guillaumont’s emendation is possible but
unnecessary: angels alter and transform their own immortal and spiritual bodies
(which indeed here are called gwšm’) into the bodies they need to assume, even
changing the nature of their bodies, for instance, into diastematic bodies, and
not simply transforming their qualities (color, shape, size), as demons do.
Both Dysinger and Fr. Theophanes are right not to follow the emendation and to
render, respectively: “the holy powers also know how to transform the nature of
the body” and “the holy powers know (how) to transform also the nature of the
body.”
Both demons and angels are
composite beings, corporeal in their (immortal) bodies and incorporeal in their
nous. Incorporeal realities, like noes and Ideas, do not admit of intellections
concerning bodies and transformations of bodies and of bodily qualities. (Ibid.,
261)
6.69. Angels see human beings
and demons; human beings, on the contrary, are deprived of the sight of angels
and demons, while demons see only human beings. (Evagrius’s Kephalaia
Gnostika: A New Translation of the Unreformed Text from the Syriac [trans.
Ilaria L. E. Ramelli; Writings from the Greco-Roman World 38; Atlanta: SBL
Press, 2015], 358)
Humans cannot see either angels
or demons, because they live in a sense-perceptible and mortal body, while
angels and demons live in bodies that are immortal and not sense perceptible
(even though the spiritual bodies of angels are very different from the
“ridiculous” and “dark” bodies of demons). This is also why angels, conversely,
are said to be able to see both humans and demons, and why demons—who obviously
rank lower than angels—can see humans. Indeed, in KG 1.22 Evagrius has declared
that the bodies of demons have a color and a shape—so they are less spiritual
than the bodies of angels—but they escape our sense perception, in that their
quality is not similar to the quality of the bodies that fall under our senses.
So, whenever they want to appear to humans, they turn themselves into a
resemblance of a human body, without showing us their own bodies. Demons,
however, as Evagrius declares in the present kephalaion, cannot see
angels, arguably because the bodies of angels are subtler than their own. The
bodies of demons are not fleshly, but they are different from the spiritual and
luminous bodies of angels: as Origen maintains, they are such as to arouse the
angels’ laughter. Evagrius, in fact, deemed the bodies of angels fiery
(ethereal), those of humans earthy, and those of demons pneumatic. See Stewart,
“Imageless Prayer,” 176. See KG 1.22 and the relevant commentary. (Ibid.,
358-59)
