William Chillingworth (1602-1644) was a revert to the Church of England from Catholicism. While studying in a Catholic institution, he was requested to write his reasons for leaving Protestantism—as a result, he concluded he made an error and went back to his former Protestantism (in many respects, a Newman in reverse). His magnum opus is The Religion of the Protestants: A Safe Way to Salvation (1633), undertaken to defend Christopher Potter against the arguments of Jesuit Edward Knott.
As one with an interest in historical theology, as well as Reformed theology, and as the book attempts to defend, in part, Sola Scriptura (for more on this doctrine, see my book Not by Scripture Alone: A Latter-day Saint Refutation of Sola Scriptura [online version]), I decided to get a copy. As with many works defending Sola Scriptura, in attempting to defend the impossible, the Protestant apologist inevitably contradicts both himself and the doctrine.
The following excerpts are from:
William Chillingworth, The Religion of the Protestants (London: Bell and Daldy, 1870; repr., Forgotten Books, 2015)
11. Ad § 2—6. In your second paragraph, you sum up those arguments wherewith you intend to prove that “Scripture alone cannot be judge in controversies:” wherein I profess unto you beforehand, that you will fight without an adversary . . . 12. Your first is this: “A judge must be a person fit to end controversies; but the Scripture is not a person, nor fit to end controversies, no more than the law would be without the judges; therefore, though it may be a rule, it cannot be a judge.” Which conclusion I have already granted . . . 24. “But the Scripture stands in need of some watchful and unerring eye to guard it, by means of whose assured vigilancy we may undoubtedly receive it sincere and pure.” Very true; but this is no other than the watchful eye of Divine Providence (pp. 95, 96, 99)
On the topic of the canon, Chillingworth appeals to the authority of the “church,” albeit, not the Catholic Church of his era (17th century), the church of his interlocutor, but the ancient church:
35. You proceed: “and whereas the protestants of England in the sixth Article have these words: ‘In the name of the Holy Scripture we do understand those books, of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church;’” you demand, “what they mean by them? Whether that by the church’s consent they are assured what Scriptures be canonical?” I answer or them, Yes, they are so. And whereas you infer from hence, “This is to make the church judge,” I have told you already that of this controversy we make the church the judge: but not the present church, much less the present Roman church, but the consent and testimony of the ancient and primitive church . . .(p. 105)
Elsewhere, he contradicts himself with respect to the perspicuity of Scripture, arguing that only to the regenerate can the “perspicuity” thereof be made manifest, and yet, a knowledge of the Bible is essential to salvation:
If the pope decrees (you will say) be obscure, he can explain himself, and so the Scripture cannot. But the Holy Ghost, that speaks in Scripture, can do so if he please; and when he is pleased, will do so. In the mean time, it will be fit for you to wait his leisure, and to be content that those things of Scripture which are plain should be so, and those which are obscure, should remain obscure, until he please to declare them. (p. 97)
And yet, elsewhere, Chillingworth writes:
110. Ad § 20. If by a “private spirit” you mean a particular persuasion that a doctrine is true, which some men pretend, but cannot prove to come from the Spirit of God; I say, to refer controversies to Scripture, is not to refer them to this kind of private spirit. For is there not a manifest difference between saying, “The Spirit of God tells me that this is the meaning of such a text” (which no man can possibly know to be true, it being a secret thing), and between saying, “These and these reasons I have to show that this or that is true doctrine, or that this or that is the meaning of such a scripture?” Reason being a public and certain thing, and exposed to all men’s trial and examination. But now, if by “private spirit” you understand every man’s particular reason, then your first and second inconvenience will presently be reduced to one, and shortly to none at all. (p. 132)
Furthermore, he would write the following, which shows he had (fallible) “assurance” of the more “plain” texts of the Bible, and never once appealed to the Holy Spirit and His guidance as an aid:
150. either in saying thus have I only cried quittance with you; but that you may see how much you are in my debt, will show unto you, that for your sophism against our way I have given you a demonstration against yours. First, I say, your argument against us is a transparent fallacy. The first part of it lies thus: Protestants have no means to interpret, without error, obscure and ambiguous places of Scripture; therefore plain places of Scripture cannot be to them a sufficient ground of faith. But though we pretend not to certain means of not erring in interpreting all Scripture, particularly such places as are obscure and ambiguous, yet this methinks should be no impediment, but that we may have certain means of not erring in and about the sense of those places which are to plain and clear that they need no interpreters; and in such we say our faith is contained. If you ask me, how I can be sure that I know the true meaning of these places? I ask you again, can you be sure that you understand what I or any man else says? They that heard our Saviour and the apostles preach, could they have sufficient assurance that they understood at any time what they would have them do? If not, to what end did they hear them? If they could, why may we not be as well assured that we understand sufficiently what we conceive plain in their writings? (p. 148)
