Consensus-based ecclesiology and
epistemology were necessarily intertwined. This is why Saint Augustine on the
same question argues that the canonicity of the Wisdom of Solomon (which
was questioned due to it not being written by Solomon) was established:
since for so long a course of years that book
has deserved to be read in the Church of Christ from the station of the readers
of the Church of Christ, and to be heard by all Christians, from bishops
downwards, even to the lowest lay believers, penitents, and catechumens, with
the veneration paid to divine authority. (Augustine, On the
Predestination of the Saints, Book 1, Chapter 27)
Augustine did not solely point to
bishops (or councils like the one held in Carthage in recent years). The
universality of Wisdom’s acceptance (“heard by all Christians”) from both
clergy and laity beforehand, consensus was seen to derive from the Holy
Spirit—it made apparent the origin of a given mindset behind both
ecclesiastical and doctrinal questions. (Patrick Craig Truglia, The Rise and
Fall of the Papacy [Uncut Mountain Press, 2023], 17-18)
The Donatists understood the process
of appeals in the church. They evidently did not ascribe final authority to the
Pope of Rome. However, one may rightly point out that being schismatics, their
ecclesiastical presumptions would be highly suspect. Nevertheless, the Catholic
party likewise did not view the Pope of Rome as above dispute. This is
evidenced by Augustine’s reflection on these course of events:
They [the
Donatists] chose, therefore, as it is reported, to bring their dispute with
Caecilianus [of Carthage] before the foreign churches [in Rome] . . . the
common outcry of all worthless litigants, though they have been defeated by
the clearest light of truth—as if it might not have been said, and most justly
said, to them: “Well, let us suppose that those bishops who decided the case at
Rome were not good judges; there still remained a plenary Council of the
universal Church, in which these judges themselves might be put on their
defence; so that, if they were convicted of mistake, their decisions might
be reversed.” Whether they have done this or not, let them prove: for we
easily prove that it was not done, by the fact that the whole world does not
communicate with them; or if it was done, they were defeated there [Arles]
also, of which their state of separation from the Church is a proof. (Augustine, Letter 43, Par 19)
Augustine matter-of-factly observes
that the Church of Rome’s decisions can be appealed to a “plenary council of
the universal Church.” What he means specifically is an Ecumenical Council.
(Ibid, 116)
. . . perhaps the most important
statement for the student of the pre-Great Schism Papacy is found in the
minutes of the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea II. The council, in Session 6,
explicitly defines what an Ecumenical Council is by contrasting itself with a
pseudo-Ecumenical Council that of Hiera:
It [the Council
of Hiera] did not enjoy the cooperation [lit. συνεργεια] of the then Pope of Rome or his priests,
neither by means of his representatives or an encyclical letter, as is the rule
for councils; nor did it win the assent [lit. συμφρονουντας] of the [P]atriarchs of the [E]ast of
Alexandria, Antioch, and the holy city, or of their priests and bishops. . . .
Nor did ‘their voice’, like that of the apostles, ‘go out into the whole earth
and their words to the end of the world’, as did those of the six holy
[E]cumenical [C]ouncils. (Richard Price, The
Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (787). Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 2020, 442)
As one can see, an Ecumenical Council
is not an exercise of the Pope of Rome decreeing one to be so. Rather, the Pope
of Rome cooperates with his synod while the Patriarchs of the East
“assent” (the Greek implies conviction and activity), as well as the rest of
the Church worldwide. In short, consensus decided the ultimate authority of a
council. After all, the consensus was always understood as the evidence of
God’s cooperation with the Church’s work. (Patrick Craig Truglia, The Rise
and Fall of the Papacy [Uncut Mountain Press, 2023], 20-21)
“Canon 138” of the council [of
Carthage], actually written by a follow-up council in 424 to Pope Saint
Celestine, is even more harshly worded. The case surrounding Apiarius was
re-opened and Celestine personally entered into communion with him. Unlike
Zosimus, who had referred the matter back to a Carthaginian council, Celestine
acted unilaterally. This sent the African bishops into a frenzy:
we earnestly conjure you [Pope Celestine],
that for the future you do not readily admit to a hearing persons coming hence
nor choose to receive to your communion those who have been excommunicated by
us . . . whosoever thinks himself wronged by any judgment may appeal to the
council of his [p]rovince, or even to a General Council unless it be imagined
that God can inspire a single individual [i.e. the Pope] with justice, and
refuse it to an innumerable multitude of bishops (sacerdotum) assembled in
council. And how shall we be able to rely on a sentence passed beyond the sea,
since it will not be possible to send there the necessary witnesses . . . ? (Canon
138 ascribed to the Council of Carthage [419])
This stern rebuke contains several
interesting points. First, the use of the term “readily” implies that Rome
ought not to take appeals from African clerics, but they can. At this
point, the Africans have acknowledged the evidence that the canons earlier
disputed were not Nicene. Either due to acknowledging they were canons from
somewhere (such as Sardica) or simply traditional precedent, appeals to Rome
were interestingly dissuaded yet allowed. Second, the synod rebukes the Pope of
Rome, here Celestine, for acting unilaterally. They asserted that a
council should have decided the matter. The epistemic presumption behind the
critique is that God’s Spirit inspires only a consensus of bishops—not
individuals acting in a solitary manner. With no comprehension of future
doctrines such as Papal Infallibility (or direct jurisdiction for that matter),
the council simply presumed that the Pope of Rome lacked the capacity to act
because the binding and loosing of the Church is through the act of the Spirit.
He is only evident in the work of a whole assembly of bishops where consensus
is reached. Third, the Africans make a practical critique, disqualifying
Celestine’s judgment. They reasoned in Rome (or vice versa) so that a consensus
(and thereby binding) judgment can be made. (Patrick Craig Truglia, The Rise
and Fall of the Papacy [Uncut Mountain Press, 2023], 149-50)
Ignatius makes several comments which
illustrate the lofty position of the Roman Church. He writes that Rome has
“never envied any one; you have taught others. Now I desire that those things
may be confirmed [by your conduct], which in your instructions you enjoin [on
others].” (Ignatius, Romans, Chap 3) Perhaps with the letters of Peter,
Paul, and 1 and 2 Clem in mind, Ignatius extols Rome for the fact that they
have sent teachings to the whole Church. This appears entirely consistent with
Christ’s admonishment to Peter to feed the sheep.
Yet, the motivation for this
ascription appears to be tastefully self-serving; Ignatius takes it upon
himself to teach Rome! “I write to the Churches, and impress on them all,”
Ignatius says in reference to his letters. (Ibid., Chap 4) Ignatius certainly
issues ecclesiastical commands and dogmatic teachings in these other letters.
They were arguably sent to jurisdictions (in Asia Minor) where Antioch was not de
jure the “senior” episcopate. After all, what of Ephesus (where Saint John
may have been still residing) or Rome itself (which had Peter’s relics)?
Ignatius respectfully obscures this
“conflict of interests” by immediately citing that he was writing these letters
to “that I shall willingly die for God, unless you hinder me. Allow me to
become food for the wild beasts. I do not, as Peter and Paul, issue commandments
unto you. They were [A]postles.” (Ibid.) Ignatius reveals that Rome in effect
can prevent his martyrdom and, allegedly, he would never take it upon himself
to command Rome (who has the authority of the chief Apostles) not to put a stay
on his execution (via bribes political favors, or some other means). Yet
Ignatius then goes ahead and does the exact opposite, pleading with Rome to let
him die, and reminding them that “[t]he prince of this world” can corrupt his
“deposition towards God” perchance Rome “help him” (the Devil!) by preventing
his martyrdom. (Ibid., Chap 7) Such a passing reference seems to lack even an
inkling of the later doctrine of Papal Infallibility. In any event, Ignatius’
words do not prove that the honorificis granted to Rome y himself were without
any ecclesiastical import, but it does show that the occasion for invoking them
had a specific purpose in mind.
Ignatius later makes an extremely
important request to Rome: “Remember in your prayers the Church in Syria, which
now has God for its shepherd, instead of me. Jesus Christ alone will oversee
it, and your love.” (Ibid., Chap 9) The Greek breaks down to: ‘Ιησους Χριστος [Jesus
Christ] επισκοπησει
[Oversee/”Bishop” as a verb] και [and] η [the] ημων [your] αγαπη [“agape,” Love Feast]. In other words, in his
absence, Jesus Christ and the Roman Church stands in as Antioch’s bishop. “Love
feast” in the Greek is not genitive and lacks a definitive article, which
implies the reference to “agapes” in Chap 1 is to a body of churches, while
“agape” here is the local Church of Rome.
This interpretation is buttressed by a
greeting he wrote to “Polycarp, bishop of the Church of the Smyrnaeans, or
rather, who has, as his own bishop, God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ.”
(Ignatius, Polycarp, Chap 1) As one can see, the local bishop is in fact
God, but the vicar of the man. In Smyrna, the vicar is Saint Polycarp. In
Antioch, in his own absence, it is the Roman Synod (or the Pope, who is
unnamed). (This does not necessarily indicate that either Rome had no bishop due
to the persecution or that he was unaware of who its bishop was. Perhaps, to
prevent the persecution of the Pope, he did not name him. More likely, bishops
were named in letters where internal schisms were an issue. There were perhaps
no local schisms in Rome and so an emphasis on the Roman Pope’s name may have
not been as important compared to the other letters) It is certainly justified
to infer a Patriarchal hierarchy, with Rome placed above Antioch. One may also
infer the superiority of Antioch over Smyrna, as Ignatius appears to dictate to
Polycarp acting as the “senior” bishop. (Ibid., Chap 2-4)
Thus, second century evidence of the
canonical order of the local churches found in the Council of Sardica,
Constantinople I, Chalcedon, and especially the one held in Trullo exists.
(107) yet, Rome was not the only one to have a “say” in Ignatius’ absence,
Polycarp was instructed to send an assistant (locum tenens?) to Antioch:
“O Polycarp, most blessed in God . . . assemble a very solemn council, and . .
. elect one whom you greatly love . . . bestow on him this honour that he may
go into Syria.” (Ignatius, Polycarp, Chap 7) (Patrick Craig Truglia, The
Rise and Fall of the Papacy [Uncut Mountain Press, 2023], 54-56)
