Demonic Corporeality
Justin does
not (in his extant writings, at least) provide detailed information regarding
the essence or composition of demonic corporeality. Yet it is not true, as is
sometimes claimed, that Justin is “completely silent” on this issue. At several
points, Justin emphasizes the demons’ intervention in the lower cosmic realm by
their making themselves visible to and interacting with humans. Justin claims
that demons inspired fear among humans, for example, “in apparitions (ἐπιφανείᾳ)”
(1 Apol. 9.1). Justin writes, moreover, that demons “made people see
horrifying things,” again implying the demons’ visible appearance before human
onlookers (1 Apol. 5.2). , Demons often take on anthropomorphic forms as
part of such appearances. He argues that wicked deeds performed by demons, for
example, were mistakenly attributed to Christians (1 Apol. 23.3);
presumably this accusation occurred because demons performed such tasks in
human guises. Justin also asserts that Greco-Roman cult statues of the gods are
in fact the “shapes” of demons; thus, for Justin, the anthropomorphic forms of
the Greco-Roman statues of gods were in fact reflective of the way demons
appeared to their human victims (1 Apol. 9.1).
It could be
supposed at first glance that Justin imagines these demonic apparitions as
incorporeal illusions. After all, Justin does claim that Jesus, prior to his
incarnation, sometimes appeared “in an incorporeal image (ἐν εἰκόνι ἀσωμάτῳ)” (1
Apol. 63.10). That Justin views demons as purely incorporeal is unlikely,
however. First, Justin reserves language of pure incorporeality for the highest
divine entities, such as the Platonic “Forms” (Dial. 2.6), God the
Father (Dial. 4.1), or, as noted previously, the pre-incarnate Christ (1
Apol. 63.10). As semi-divine entities that reside permanently in the lower
cosmos, demons are unlikely to have been considered incorporeal, and indeed,
Justin never uses such terminology for demonic appearances. Second, Justin at
several points emphasizes that demons are able to experience suffering and pain
(1 Apol. 28.1, 52.3; 2 Apol. 6.5, 8.3), a quality that Justin
elsewhere reserves for corporeal entities (Dial. 1.5). (In a discussion
of the immortality of the soul, Justin implies that the quality of suffering is
reserved for corporeal entities: “if the soul is incorporeal, it cannot suffer”
[Dial. 1.5]. This comment occurs as part of an initial discussion of
philosophical positions between Justin and Trypho. While the context implies
that Justin rejects the position of some Platonists [that the souls is indeed
incorporeal], it suggests that Justin agrees with the underlying logic [that
corporeal things can suffer, incorporeal things cannot]) Justin’s assertion
that demons are susceptible to pain, therefore, implies that he viewed demons
as embodied.
Demons use
their corporeal nature to initiate contact with human victims, frequently to
disastrous effect. (In addition to the examples examined here, one might also
add the witness from Tatian’s Address to the Greeks: “The most admirable
Justin was right in pronouncing that demons are like bandits, for just as
bandits in the habit of taking men prisoner and releasing them to their
families on payment, so too those supposed gods visit men’s bodies, and then in
dreams create an impression of their presence . . . When they have enjoyed the
eulogies they fly away from the sick, terminate the disease they have
contrived, and restore the men to their previous state” [18.2-3, translation
form Molly Whittaker, Tatian: “Oratio ad Graecos” and Fragments [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 182]. It is unclear if Tatian’s example of demonic “banditry”
here—that demons take human bodies as prisoner—is his own or Justin’s. if it
does go back to Justin, it would provide another example of demons using their
bodies to have physical interactions with humans) As noted already, demons
commonly appear in terrifying forms or make people see fearful sights (1
Apol. 5.2, 9.1). Carly Daniel-Hughes points out that ancient Greco-Roman
writers typically “figured seeing and being seen as tactile encounters, either
transferring the image through the medium of pneuma that then strikes the eye,
or through little films that skim off the object seen and stream into the eyes
of the viewer.” Or, as A.M. Smith puts it, “ancient theories of vision all
found common ground in the assumption that sight cannot occur without some
physical mediation between the eye and visible objects . . . action at a
distance is impossible.” Justin’s construal of the demonic form as a corporeal
entity that can be made visible, therefore, implicates it in a material
interchange with human onlookers.
According
to Justin, moreover, demons “committed adultery with women and seduced boys” (1
Apol. 9.1). Justin is not forthcoming about exactly how demons might have
committed such acts, but they presumably did so by taking on human guises,
which were then used to seduce their human victims. Justin elsewhere similarly
associates demons with anthropomorphic features. Justin claims that the demons
“heard through the prophets,” seemingly implying that demons were eavesdropping
on Jewish prophetic teaching (1 Apol. 54.2). Justin likewise asserts
that demons “hear” the words of the prophet, again implying that their bodies
have some kind of auditory ability (1 Apol. 54.3–4, 8). His notion could
be read as mere metaphor, or the case of a writer exercising some poetic
license. Yet, for part of his explanation for demonic mimicry, Justin states
that demons “did not accurately understand the things they heard said through
the prophets” (1 Apol. 54.3–4). The limitations of demonic understanding
are an important argument for the uniqueness of Jesus’s mission; Justin argues
that simulations of Jesus’s mode of suffering and death (crucifixion) are
absent from non-Christian cultures because demons failed to understand the
symbolic predictions of the cross (1 Apol. 55.1). Justin’s repeated
emphasis on the fallibility of the demons’ prophetic snooping suggests that the
prying ears of the wicked demons engage in auditory processes much as their
human counterparts do, and thus are subject to corporeal constraints and
shortcomings.
In sum,
Justin claims that demons can take on a multitude of (mostly anthropomorphic)
“shapes,” which are made visible to human senses, capable of experiencing pain,
and constrained by physical limitations. This collection of attributes suggests
that demons have some kind of “physical” or “material” form that extends
through space and is capable of acting and being acted upon. In other words,
according to most ancient standards of corporeality, Justin implies that demons
have bodies. In the section to follow, I explore how one aspect of the demonic
body, its polymorphic and unstable nature, contributes to Justin’s broader
construction of the Christian cosmos. (Travis
W. Proctor, Demonic Bodies and the Dark Ecologies of Early Christian Church [New
York: Oxford University Press, 2022], 89-91)
