Pearson, (On the Creed, art. 2)
thus explains the difference between eternal and temporal generation: “In human
generation the son is begotten in the same nature with the father, which is
performed by derivation or decision of part of the substance of the parent; but
this decision includes imperfection, because it supposes a substance divisible
and consequently corporeal; whereas, the essence of God is incorporeal,
spiritual, and indivisible, and therefore his nature is really communicated,
not by derivation or decision, but by a total and plenary communication. The
divine essence being by reason of its simplicity not subject to division and in
respect to its infinity incapable of multiplication is so communicated as not
to be multiplied; insomuch that he which proceeds by that communication has not
only the same nature, but is also the same God. The father God and the Word God;
Abraham man and Isaac man; but Abraham one man, Isaac another man; not so the
Father one God, and the Word another, but the Father and the Word both the same
God.” Pearson, from his creationist position, understands by “human nature”
only physical human nature and does not distinguish with the traducianist
between physical and phychical division. By division he means human division of
ponderable substance, which, as he says, would imply that the substance is
corporeal. (William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Complete and Unabridged,
Volumes 1-3 [Reformed Retrieval, 2021], 421; note: Shedd was a proponent of
Traducianism)
