The following is a review I wrote back in 2010. As it brings up a few important theological ideas (nature of creation; whether or not God interacts with the world and can have a justifiable change of mind, etc), I have decided to reproduce it here on this blog.
For this review, I will focus upon Thomas Oord’s essay, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation and Solution to the Problem of Evil,” pp. 28-52. Here, I will offer some comments from Oord and interact with this essay with my own comments, exegesis of related texts and perspectives.
In the interest of full disclosure, let me state that I am a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Mormon”) and hold to Open Theism (though such is a minority view within the LDS Church). Furthermore, due to my being a Latter-day Saint, a priori, I reject creation ex nihilo (“out of nothing”)--this is something I will come back to, as it is an important point of agreement between myself and Oord, and one that leads to a consistent approach to Open Theism.
Oord writes that: “[within Traditional expressions of God’s foreknowledge] creatures cannot freely respond to God’s call to love in a future eternally settled. The problem with conceiving of divine power in such a way to regard God as controlling all things is that God must be regarded a source and cause of evil. The list of conventional theological beliefs that undermine love goes on” (pp. 28-29).
This is true. Indeed, if God knows the future exhaustively, one must explain away why God does indeed change his mind in the Bible, and why prophecies (e.g., the angel’s promises to Samson’s mother in Judges 13--all of which failed, notwithstanding there being no contingencies attached to such prophecies in how they were presented by the angel of the Lord) if God has exhaustive, not contingent, foreknowledge.
Examples of God’s contingent foreknowledge are part and parcel of the biblical text. For instance, 1 Samuel 23:1-14 records one of the clearest instances: David’s free-will decision, based on the contingencies that God gives him, prevents the occurrence of a harmful event foreseen by God.
Many critics will appeal to texts such as Mal 3:6 to the effect that God does not change his mind, and, furthermore, such texts that speak of God changing His mind (e.g., Gen 6:6) are to be relegated as mere “anthropomorphisms.” Notwithstanding, such an approach is based on eisegesis. The context of Mal 3:6 specifies that God’s unchangeability refers only to His unchanging character to forgive if the sinner repents, not that God cannot change His mind about previous decisions or about contingencies that arise in accordance with man’s free-will decisions (cf. Jeremiah 18:7-10).
Other passages which indicate that God “does not change” (e.g., Numbers 23:19; 1 Samuel 15:29; Psalm 110:4; James 1:17) refer only to God’s inability to lie, take back an oath He made, tempt one to sin, or reverse decisions based on a capricious whim, since these would be adverse to His divine character (see passages where God promises to change His mind if the future free-will actions of man resulting in their repentance--Zechariah 1:3; Mal 3:7; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9).
Exodus 32-33 is a very potent example of (1) God changing his mind and (2) God’s personal nature. Let us look at it in point by point format:
1. God determines to destroy all of Israel for worshipping the golden calf.
2. Moses pleads with God to relent, reiterating the promise to Abraham and the potential mockery from Egypt.
3. God rescinds His threat to destroy all of Israel, yet punishes the leading perpetrators.
4. Moses spends 40 days prostrate and fasting to appease God for Israel’s sin.
5. Although temporarily appeased, God refuses to go with the Israelites through the desert, because they are so “stiff-necked” he “might destroy them on the way.”
6. Moses pleads again with God to change His mind.
7. God changes His mind and decides to go with them.
8. God then remarks on the intimate relationship He has with Moses as the basis of His decision to change His mind.
9. God confirms this intimate relationship by showing Moses part of His actual appearance.
Many may protest, stating that God can allow for free-will and exhaustive foreknowledge. However, such a view overlooks the overwhelming logical problems of such. Blake T. Ostler, in his “The Attributes of God” (Greg Kofford, 2001), outlines the problems in this well-thought out example:
In the interest of full disclosure, let me state that I am a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Mormon”) and hold to Open Theism (though such is a minority view within the LDS Church). Furthermore, due to my being a Latter-day Saint, a priori, I reject creation ex nihilo (“out of nothing”)--this is something I will come back to, as it is an important point of agreement between myself and Oord, and one that leads to a consistent approach to Open Theism.
Oord writes that: “[within Traditional expressions of God’s foreknowledge] creatures cannot freely respond to God’s call to love in a future eternally settled. The problem with conceiving of divine power in such a way to regard God as controlling all things is that God must be regarded a source and cause of evil. The list of conventional theological beliefs that undermine love goes on” (pp. 28-29).
This is true. Indeed, if God knows the future exhaustively, one must explain away why God does indeed change his mind in the Bible, and why prophecies (e.g., the angel’s promises to Samson’s mother in Judges 13--all of which failed, notwithstanding there being no contingencies attached to such prophecies in how they were presented by the angel of the Lord) if God has exhaustive, not contingent, foreknowledge.
Examples of God’s contingent foreknowledge are part and parcel of the biblical text. For instance, 1 Samuel 23:1-14 records one of the clearest instances: David’s free-will decision, based on the contingencies that God gives him, prevents the occurrence of a harmful event foreseen by God.
Many critics will appeal to texts such as Mal 3:6 to the effect that God does not change his mind, and, furthermore, such texts that speak of God changing His mind (e.g., Gen 6:6) are to be relegated as mere “anthropomorphisms.” Notwithstanding, such an approach is based on eisegesis. The context of Mal 3:6 specifies that God’s unchangeability refers only to His unchanging character to forgive if the sinner repents, not that God cannot change His mind about previous decisions or about contingencies that arise in accordance with man’s free-will decisions (cf. Jeremiah 18:7-10).
Other passages which indicate that God “does not change” (e.g., Numbers 23:19; 1 Samuel 15:29; Psalm 110:4; James 1:17) refer only to God’s inability to lie, take back an oath He made, tempt one to sin, or reverse decisions based on a capricious whim, since these would be adverse to His divine character (see passages where God promises to change His mind if the future free-will actions of man resulting in their repentance--Zechariah 1:3; Mal 3:7; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9).
Exodus 32-33 is a very potent example of (1) God changing his mind and (2) God’s personal nature. Let us look at it in point by point format:
1. God determines to destroy all of Israel for worshipping the golden calf.
2. Moses pleads with God to relent, reiterating the promise to Abraham and the potential mockery from Egypt.
3. God rescinds His threat to destroy all of Israel, yet punishes the leading perpetrators.
4. Moses spends 40 days prostrate and fasting to appease God for Israel’s sin.
5. Although temporarily appeased, God refuses to go with the Israelites through the desert, because they are so “stiff-necked” he “might destroy them on the way.”
6. Moses pleads again with God to change His mind.
7. God changes His mind and decides to go with them.
8. God then remarks on the intimate relationship He has with Moses as the basis of His decision to change His mind.
9. God confirms this intimate relationship by showing Moses part of His actual appearance.
Many may protest, stating that God can allow for free-will and exhaustive foreknowledge. However, such a view overlooks the overwhelming logical problems of such. Blake T. Ostler, in his “The Attributes of God” (Greg Kofford, 2001), outlines the problems in this well-thought out example:
(B1) It has always been true that Rock will sin tomorrow and it is possible to know this truth now (assumption omnitemporality of truth)
(B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false or fail to believe any truth (assumption infallible omniscience).
(B3) God has always believed that Rock will sin tomorrow (from B1 and B2)
(B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone’s power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing (assumption past necessity)
(B5) It is not in Rock’s power to act in a way that entails that God has not always believed that Rock will sin tomorrow (from B3 and B4).
(B6) That Rocks refrains from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that Rock will sin tomorrow (from B2--semantically necessary truth)
(B7) Therefore, it is not in Rock’s power to refrain from sinning tomorrow (B5 and B6)
(B8) If Rock acts freely when he sins tomorrow, then he also has it within his power to refrain from sinning tomorrow (assumption libertarian free will)
(B9) Therefore, Rock does not act freely when he sins tomorrow (B7 and B8) (taken from p. 192-3 of Ostler).
On page 49, Oord, while discussing “essential kenosis,” states that “God never coerces.” While some might skip pass this statement as unobjectionable, those of us who interact with Reformed theology and its proponents realise that this is a dividing line between those who hold to libertarian free-will and those who are monergists. However, Oord’s approach to the issue, I argue, is sound.
Many Calvinists are fond of using John 6:37ff as “proof” of God coercing His elect to come to him without fail (irresistible grace), focusing upon the word, “draw.” The word used is the Greek ελκυση. While it does mean “drag” in James 2:6 and Acts 16:19, in the majority of instances in the LXX and Greek NT, it does not mean what Reformed authors (e.g., R.C. Sproul; James R. White; Eric Svendsen) read into it.
The New Testament uses ελκυω in 6 places and its cognate ελκω in two places. Of the former, John 18:10; 20:6, 11 and Acts 16:19 in the sense of “dragging” a person or object. Other verses use it in a different sense. In John 12:32, Jesus says that he will draw all men to him, not that he will drag all men to him. Rather, a universal drawing it denoted by the use of “all” (Greek: παντας), and this is reinforced by the previous verse as Jesus twice refers to the whole “world.” The implication is that as the whole world is judged and its prince, Satan, driven out, Jesus will then draw all men to him. Since it is well-known that not all men in the world come to Jesus, then the “drawing” in John 12:32 certainly cannot be viewed as “irresistible” or God “coercing” men to come to him. Similarly, according to lexical sources, such as Bauer, Liddel and Scott, and other sources, ελκυω can mean “to drag” or “to draw.”
The LXX frequently uses the Greek word ελκυω. The uses include Deuteronomy 21:3-4 in which an animal is led, not dragged, to a certain location; Nehemiah 9:30 as “to bear long”; Job 20:38 as “to bring”; Ecclesiastes 2:3 as “to excite”; Song of Solomon as “to entice”; Jeremiah 38:3 as “to draw out of love.” the cognate ελκυω can mean “a movement to” as used in Ecclesiastes 1:5; “to lift up” as in Isaiah 10:15 or “to rush forth” as in Daniel 7:10, showing that the word does not have the connotation that Reformed theologians want to read into ελκυω.
I choose John 6, as many modern Calvinists, such as James R. White in his debates against John Sanders (Arminian Open Theist) and Denis Potter (LDS philosopher) cite it as “proof” of their theology; as we have seen, it is not the case. In v. 40, we read of God’s desire for all people to come to faith in Christ, revealing the dynamic relationship between God’s drawing and our free-will. One cannot separate one from another as many theologians want to do (such results in one having their proof-texts to support their position, ignoring other texts that, exegetically, are just as convincing as their own “favourite passages.”) One must avoid such an approach, as it only leads to eisegesis as best; a distorted gospel at worse.
Finally, Oord offers a discussion on the nature of creation that LDS readers will appreciate.
In LDS theology, God did not create ex nihilo, meaning “out of nothing.” Indeed, LDS theology states that God created from pre-existing matter, and that all people, not just Christ, actually pre-existed. One can read explicit statements on this matter in texts such as section 93 of the Doctrine and Covenants and Abraham 3 in the Pearl of Great Price.
Oord (pp.37-49) discusses in some detail the Genesis account of creation and how creation out of nothing slowly crept into Christian thinking (something LDS scholars, such as Blake Ostler, have written about in great detail). Oord discusses the Hebrew of Gen 1:1-3, and how such does not support God creating out of nothing, instead, God, in the Priestly account of creation, creates from pre-existing material, with chaos pre-existing creation itself. Other texts could be discussed; for instance--
2 Peter 3:5 reflects ancient traditions of the Near East. In the NIV, we read, “But they deliberately forget that long ago by God’s word the heavens existed and the earth was formed out of water and with water,” showing that the author subscribed to creation ex materia.
In Job 38:3-11, Job argues against creation ex nihilo and in favour of creation from matter--from sea and cloud. It uses the analogy of building--marking the dimensions, stretching a measuring line, setting footings, laying the cornerstones--and reveals an ambivalence toward the sea and a concern that the waters be controlled; concepts that are also found in texts from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia.
Indeed, the closest text accepted by Christians as canonical would be 2 Maccabees 7:28, part of the Catholic canon: “I ask you, son, look to heaven and earth and, seeing all things in them, be aware that God made them from non-being and the race of men began in this matter.” But in the phrase, “God made them from non-being,” this “non-being” dos not express absolute non-existence, only the prior non-existence of the heavens and earth. They were made to exist after not existing. In Wisdom of Solomon 11:17, the author speaks of God’s “all-powerful hand which created the world out of formless matter” (Greek: amorfos hyle). This term does not mean the world was created out of nothing, as scholars, such as Jonathan Goldstein state that there is no pre-rabbinic Jewish text that can be proved to assert the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (see his “Creation Ex Nihilo: Recantations and Restatements,” in Journal of Jewish Studies 38/2 [1987]).
The rejection of creation out of nothing is essential for a consistent approach to libertarian free-will and Open Theism. Why? Simply, if God created out of nothing, God, not the individual, is the ultimate source and determiner of one’s will. There is no way around this. I applaud Oord for rejecting such, and hope that Open Theists will realise that they cannot hold onto both creation out of nothing *and* Open Theism (of course, I am not saying that Oord accepts actual pre-existence of all people, not just Christ, as LDS theology states, though I would argue that such is necessitated by such, but that is for a discussion for another day]). Blake Ostler has a lengthy discussion in his book, “The Problems of Theism and the Love of God” (Greg Kofford, 2006) that I highly recommend. However, the following quote should add food for thought (taken from Ostler [2006], 410):
Many Calvinists are fond of using John 6:37ff as “proof” of God coercing His elect to come to him without fail (irresistible grace), focusing upon the word, “draw.” The word used is the Greek ελκυση. While it does mean “drag” in James 2:6 and Acts 16:19, in the majority of instances in the LXX and Greek NT, it does not mean what Reformed authors (e.g., R.C. Sproul; James R. White; Eric Svendsen) read into it.
The New Testament uses ελκυω in 6 places and its cognate ελκω in two places. Of the former, John 18:10; 20:6, 11 and Acts 16:19 in the sense of “dragging” a person or object. Other verses use it in a different sense. In John 12:32, Jesus says that he will draw all men to him, not that he will drag all men to him. Rather, a universal drawing it denoted by the use of “all” (Greek: παντας), and this is reinforced by the previous verse as Jesus twice refers to the whole “world.” The implication is that as the whole world is judged and its prince, Satan, driven out, Jesus will then draw all men to him. Since it is well-known that not all men in the world come to Jesus, then the “drawing” in John 12:32 certainly cannot be viewed as “irresistible” or God “coercing” men to come to him. Similarly, according to lexical sources, such as Bauer, Liddel and Scott, and other sources, ελκυω can mean “to drag” or “to draw.”
The LXX frequently uses the Greek word ελκυω. The uses include Deuteronomy 21:3-4 in which an animal is led, not dragged, to a certain location; Nehemiah 9:30 as “to bear long”; Job 20:38 as “to bring”; Ecclesiastes 2:3 as “to excite”; Song of Solomon as “to entice”; Jeremiah 38:3 as “to draw out of love.” the cognate ελκυω can mean “a movement to” as used in Ecclesiastes 1:5; “to lift up” as in Isaiah 10:15 or “to rush forth” as in Daniel 7:10, showing that the word does not have the connotation that Reformed theologians want to read into ελκυω.
I choose John 6, as many modern Calvinists, such as James R. White in his debates against John Sanders (Arminian Open Theist) and Denis Potter (LDS philosopher) cite it as “proof” of their theology; as we have seen, it is not the case. In v. 40, we read of God’s desire for all people to come to faith in Christ, revealing the dynamic relationship between God’s drawing and our free-will. One cannot separate one from another as many theologians want to do (such results in one having their proof-texts to support their position, ignoring other texts that, exegetically, are just as convincing as their own “favourite passages.”) One must avoid such an approach, as it only leads to eisegesis as best; a distorted gospel at worse.
Finally, Oord offers a discussion on the nature of creation that LDS readers will appreciate.
In LDS theology, God did not create ex nihilo, meaning “out of nothing.” Indeed, LDS theology states that God created from pre-existing matter, and that all people, not just Christ, actually pre-existed. One can read explicit statements on this matter in texts such as section 93 of the Doctrine and Covenants and Abraham 3 in the Pearl of Great Price.
Oord (pp.37-49) discusses in some detail the Genesis account of creation and how creation out of nothing slowly crept into Christian thinking (something LDS scholars, such as Blake Ostler, have written about in great detail). Oord discusses the Hebrew of Gen 1:1-3, and how such does not support God creating out of nothing, instead, God, in the Priestly account of creation, creates from pre-existing material, with chaos pre-existing creation itself. Other texts could be discussed; for instance--
2 Peter 3:5 reflects ancient traditions of the Near East. In the NIV, we read, “But they deliberately forget that long ago by God’s word the heavens existed and the earth was formed out of water and with water,” showing that the author subscribed to creation ex materia.
In Job 38:3-11, Job argues against creation ex nihilo and in favour of creation from matter--from sea and cloud. It uses the analogy of building--marking the dimensions, stretching a measuring line, setting footings, laying the cornerstones--and reveals an ambivalence toward the sea and a concern that the waters be controlled; concepts that are also found in texts from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia.
Indeed, the closest text accepted by Christians as canonical would be 2 Maccabees 7:28, part of the Catholic canon: “I ask you, son, look to heaven and earth and, seeing all things in them, be aware that God made them from non-being and the race of men began in this matter.” But in the phrase, “God made them from non-being,” this “non-being” dos not express absolute non-existence, only the prior non-existence of the heavens and earth. They were made to exist after not existing. In Wisdom of Solomon 11:17, the author speaks of God’s “all-powerful hand which created the world out of formless matter” (Greek: amorfos hyle). This term does not mean the world was created out of nothing, as scholars, such as Jonathan Goldstein state that there is no pre-rabbinic Jewish text that can be proved to assert the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (see his “Creation Ex Nihilo: Recantations and Restatements,” in Journal of Jewish Studies 38/2 [1987]).
The rejection of creation out of nothing is essential for a consistent approach to libertarian free-will and Open Theism. Why? Simply, if God created out of nothing, God, not the individual, is the ultimate source and determiner of one’s will. There is no way around this. I applaud Oord for rejecting such, and hope that Open Theists will realise that they cannot hold onto both creation out of nothing *and* Open Theism (of course, I am not saying that Oord accepts actual pre-existence of all people, not just Christ, as LDS theology states, though I would argue that such is necessitated by such, but that is for a discussion for another day]). Blake Ostler has a lengthy discussion in his book, “The Problems of Theism and the Love of God” (Greg Kofford, 2006) that I highly recommend. However, the following quote should add food for thought (taken from Ostler [2006], 410):
“If the causes of our acts originate from causes outside of our control, then we are not free and cannot be praised for blamed for what we do resulting from those causes. If the causes of our actions are outside out control, then our acts that result from such causes are not within our control either. Thus, a person must be an ultimate source of her acts to be free. By an ultimate source, I mean that some condition necessary for her actions originates within the agent herself. The source of action cannot be located in places and times prior to the agent’s freely willing her action. The source of the action is the agent’s own will that is not caused by events or acts outside of he agents but from the agent’s own acts of will. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo is contrary to such a view of agency on its face. Consider that: (1) If a person is created from nothing, then he is never the ultimate source or first cause of her choices. If we assume that (2) all persons are created from nothing, then it follows from (1) and (2) that (3) no person is the ultimate cause or source of anything. This argument does not require any particular concept that God acts in relation to humans or brings about their acts through cooperative grace. All it requires is the notion of creation ex nihilo. If the libertarian demand that we must be the ultimate source of our choices to be morally responsible for them it sound, then God cannot create morally responsible persons ex nihlo. In some sense, persons must be co-creators, first causes, unmoved movers of their own wills, and the source of their own choices.”
Conclusion
This book is rather enjoyable to read, as it contains many other articles by scholars who I consider to be brilliant (e.g., John Sanders). I choose Oord’s essay as an example of the content of this anthology of essays, as it was engaging, and gave me a lot of food for thought. I do recommend the book to those interested in Open Theism and/or related issues, such as science and the Bible. For the Latter-day Saint, there is also much of interest, as this sampling from Oord’s essay and my interaction with such reveals.
This book is rather enjoyable to read, as it contains many other articles by scholars who I consider to be brilliant (e.g., John Sanders). I choose Oord’s essay as an example of the content of this anthology of essays, as it was engaging, and gave me a lot of food for thought. I do recommend the book to those interested in Open Theism and/or related issues, such as science and the Bible. For the Latter-day Saint, there is also much of interest, as this sampling from Oord’s essay and my interaction with such reveals.
