What is required for accepting truth from a
divine teaching authority? This is deduced from the
two things required for accepting truth from a teaching authority in general. A
divine teacher can propose a truth in two manners: (1) with evidence of the
truth, as he manifests his essence immediately to the blessed; (2) without
evidence of the proposed truth, which must be believed on account of the
authority of him who reveals, as he reveals supernatural mysteries to
wayfarers. However, based on what we have said heretofore, it is already
obvious to some degree that two things are essentially [per se] required
for accepting truth from a teaching authority [magisterium] on account
of its authority, namely: (A) something on the part of the object—that
is, the supernatural proposing of the truth to be believed—and (B) something
on the part of the subject—namely, the light proportioned [to that truth].
. . .
A. The supernatural proposal of the truth to be
believed, by which such truth is manifested, is objectively required.
{{149}} However, this involves three [lit. duo]
things: (a) that something that was previously hidden is proposed by God, (b)
to be accepted in a determinate sense, and (c) that the divine origin of the
revelation is most certainly made manifest.
(a) That something that was previously hidden is
proposed by God. In this way, revelation is distinguished from mere
inspiration, which does not, of its very essence, involve the supernatural
acceptance of an object but, rather, only an infallible judgment concerning
something to be narrated or written—that is, concerning something “which man
apprehends in the ordinary source of nature.”
. . .
(b) It is also necessary that that was previously hidden
be proposed to be accepted in a determinate sense. Otherwise, if the
prophet in no way understood the sense in which this teaching is to be
believed, he could not believe anything determinately, nor propose revelation
to other men fittingly so that it may be believed. Nevertheless, in the
prophetic instinct by itself, which is something imperfect in the genus of
prophetic revelation, “sometimes he whose mind is moved to express certain
words does not understand what the Holy Spirit intends through these words, as
is obvious in the case of Caiaphas when ‘he prophesized that Jesus was to be
killed for the people’ as is read in John 11:51.”
. . .
(c) It is necessary that the divine origin of
revelation be manifested in a most certain manner. Otherwise, the proposed
truth could not be believed most firmly and formally on account of the
authority of God who reveals but would be only an object of religious opinion,
which Protestants often call faith—confidence or religious experience. Indeed,
[without such certitude,] the prophet could not distinguish that is said by God
from those things that proceed either from the inspiration of a demon or from
his own imagination or subconscious; not, hence, could be divinely believed the
revealed mystery, nor propose the divine word, properly so called, to others,
not affirm the connection of an invisible and interior revelation with a
miracle to be performed in confirmation of it. However, this manifestation of
the divine origin of revelation is brought about from the prophet under the
prophetic light, . . . (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation:
The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd;
Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:282, 283)
RE. “Revelation of
Supernatural Mysteries is hypothetically, but strictly, necessary”:
It is suitable that this revelation at first
is obscure. Rationalists object that if this revelation
remains obscure, it is not suitable, because it proposes to us mysteries that
are unintelligible and useless for directing our life.
We must respond to this objection: If God were to reveal
his essence to us in full clarity, as he does to the blessed in heaven, we
would not meritoriously incline ourselves toward the supernatural end by our
own exertion. Now, man must meritoriously incline himself to this end,
for by his nature he is rational and free, and grace is conformed to nature.
Moreover, even if supernatural mysteries are obscure,
they nonetheless are in some way analogically intelligible, not as seen but as
believed.
This argument is proposed by St. Thomas in ST II-II,
q. 2, a. 3, when he says:
{{388}} Man’s ultimate beatitude consists in a kind of
supernatural vision of God. Now, man cannot reach such vision except by being
taught by God, according to those words of St. John (John 6:45, DR): “Everyone
that hath heard of the Father and that learned cometh to me.” However, man
does not become a participant in such learning all at once but, rather, does so
gradually and over time, in accord with the mode of his nature. Now,
everyone learning in this way must believe in order to arrive at perfect knowledge,
as the Philosopher says, “he who is to learn must believe.”
Nay, in a befitting manner, this obscure revelation was
indeed gradually proposed in the Old Testament before being given in its
fullness through Christ. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation:
The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd;
Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:634)
As regards the exegesis of Sacred Scripture,
it follows that the rationalist or heretic can only materially know the latter
of Sacred Scripture, but not its supernatural spirit,
which is the formal principle of the literal sense. For in order to rightly
understand the literal sense of Sacred Scripture, it does not suffice that one
have knowledge of grammar, vocabulary, and merely rational rules of exegesis. Beyond this, one must bear in mind Christian
and Catholic rules of exegesis, which proceeds under the light of infused
faith in order to rightly understand the expression of the mysteries of faith
contained in Sacred Scripture. Just as the philologist does not correctly
understand the literal sense of Aristotle’s Metaphysis if he does not
have a philosophical spirit, so too the biblical critic who does not have the
Christian spirit does not understand the literal sense of the Gospel: “But the
sensual man perceiveth not these things that are the Spirit of God. . . . But
as we have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:14-16 DR).
Likewise, the Thomistic thesis [on the resolution of
faith] makes clear how Sacred Scripture is to be formally interpreted—namely
through a resolution of the First Truth who reveals to the intimate life of
God, and not according to a resolution to the psychological or religious
experience of the sacred author (that is, of Jeremiah, Isaiah, or St. Paul).
This psychological method, which is especially used by contemporary
Protestants, is indeed useful if kept within due bounds. However, it often
leads to relativism and naturalism, for gradually that which was only an
instrumental cause of Sacred Scripture [namely, this psychological experience]
becomes a kind of principal cause, leading one to no longer consider Scripture
as being God’s Book but, rather to think of it as being [merely] a collection
of human books. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The
Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd;
Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:774-75, italics in original)
As regards the history of the Church, on
the basis of our thesis, it is certain that the rationalist or heretic cannot
write Church history in an appropriate manner, for the Church is an essentially
supernatural society [institutio] that is ruled by the Holy Spirit. Of
itself, human reason can only materially gather together many facts about the
Church's life. However, in order to know the true relationship among these
facts, recourse must formally be had to the Church’s intimate life, to the
supernatural and special providence of God, and not only, as is done by
rationalists or heretics, to human causes the influence of Greek philosophy.
{{481}} Roman politics, the natural character of St. Paul, St. Athanasius, St.
Cyprian, or of their adversaries. These causes remain secondary.
All of these consequences are of the greatest importance
and proceed from the fact that our faith is essentially supernatural, not
only as regards the pious affects of belief but also as regards that which is
intellectual in it. Hence, in theology, exegesis, and Church history, one
must essentially proceed not only under the objective direction of
revealed doctrine but also under the subjective influence of the
internal light of faith, under the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Only in
this way are the words of the Lord confirmed: “He that followeth me walked not
in darkness, but shall have the light of life” (John 8:12, DR). This light of
life, already inchoately existing in believers like a seed of glory, is not
only necessary for [personal] piety but also for sacred science. Hence,
theology is called “sacred,” as being distinct from the sciences of the natural
order. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of
the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio:
Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:775, italics in original)
“It is not difficult for the first Master of souls to
exercise a secret, omnipotent, and irresistible magisterium within the intimate
depths of our intellects. As He never does anything unless, He can make use of
the religious knowledge of the pagan—all the while correcting and completing
them.
“Indeed, our apologists note, as an ordinary means
utilized by Providence, either forgotten evangelization which has nonetheless
left its traces or also primitive tradition [that such people have] . . .
“These hypotheses could be acceptable for the theologian
as for the apologist on the condition that one always makes appeal to the
supernatural action of an infinitely merciful Providence which, sincerely
wishing that all men be saved, owes to itself to illuminate each of them
according to this or her condition.
“Let us try to resolve the problem by using responses
that would be too satisfying to rationalist eyes. It is always God’s side of
the things that St. Thomas considers, only ever accepting solutions that are
worthy of God and of His grace.
“Since the faith required for salvation is essentially
supernatural, it is necessary, in any hypothesis, that the revelation on which
it is supported to be supernatural. God will know how to intervene, in His
sublime manner, to arrange the grace of illumination and inspiration, to take,
if necessary to correct, and to transform the elements of paganism that can be
used, placing them in the service of the conceiving of supernatural truths
needed for salvation.” (Édouard Hugon, Hors de l’eglise pas de salut [2d
ed; 1914], ch. 4 (The salvation of pagans), 105, in Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange,
On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols.
[trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:806 n.
80)
