How is prophecy distinguished
from conjecture, which is verified fortuitously (that is, by chance
happenings)? Chance is the
per se accidens cause of those things that rarely take place, either happily or
unhappily, outside of the order of intention, as though it were intended.
For example, someone digging a grave may accidentally find a treasure chest, or
an arrow may accidentally kill a man as though it had been intentionally
launched toward him.
Five things follow from this, by which
the order of the world proves the existence of a Supreme Orderer of all things.
(a) Many things cannot concur by chance in order to bring about
something that is essentially structured and unified (aliquid per se et
unum), like the various conditions needed in the eye so that the act of
vision may be possible. Otherwise, something unified, like vision, would be produced
by a being that is per se accidens and the perfect by the imperfect, thus
meaning that the unity of an effect would lack a raison d’être. {{118}}
(b) Form one per se principle, there cannot arise by chance many
things that are connected in an essential and most excellent way, as the
various parts of the oak come forth from the acorn; chance (or the accidental
conjunction of many things) is excluded by the simplicity of the terminus a
quo. (c) A fortiori, from one per se principle, something that is per se
unified cannot proceed by way of chance, like intellection from the intellective
faculty or vision from the visual faculty. Chance (or the accidental conjunction
of many things) is ruled out here on account of the simplicity of the terminus
a quo and the terminus ad quem involved. And it is utterly manifest,
in this last example, that the faculty is ordered to its correlative action,
for potency is designated in relation to act, and every agent acts on
account in its end. This is the principle of finality. (d) Similar things that
always or frequently take place do not take place on account of chance, for
otherwise their constancy would lack a raison d’être. (e) Chance
cannot be the first cause of the ordering of things, for a per accidens
cause presupposes the per se cause to which it befalls [accidit].
For otherwise, being per accidens (e.g., a musician-doctor) would be
prior to the per se, and the order of things would come from the
privation of order as well as the more would be produced from the less. (Nay,
nothing is chance in relation to God but instead only in relation to other
causes. [See ST I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1])
These various principles which make
manifest the fact that the order of the world cannot come from chance, proportionally
also manifest the distinction between the fulfillment of true prophecies and
the fortuitous fulfillment of natural conjecture.
Indeed, (a) many things cannot concur,
by chance, to bring about a unified determinate thing, for otherwise the unity
of the effect would lack a raison d’être. Now, in the fulfillment of
many prophecies, man things concur in order to bring about the determinately
foretold thing, which is contingent and unified. Therefore, this
fulfillment is not fortuitous. For example, Christ announced his Passion and
Resurrection, along with its principal circumstances. For example, in Mark 10:33-34
(DR): “Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be betrayed to
the chief priests and to the scribes and ancients. And they shall condemn him
to death and shall deliver him to the Gentiles. And they shall mock him and
spit on him and scourge him and kill him: and the third day he shall rise
again.” Likewise, he foretold Peter’s threefold denial, the indefectibility of
the Church, and the circumstance of the destruction of Jerusalem. Similarly,
the Old Testament prophets announced the various virtues of the of the Messiah,
as well as the principal facts of his life.
(b) From one per se principle,
there cannot arise by chance many things that are connected in an essential
and most excellent way. Now, from the primitive and simple promise of the
Redeemer there have followed many things that are connected in an essential
and most excellent way—namely, the series of messianic prophecies and the
whole of Judeo-Chrisitan religion, as we will show below. Therefore, this
process cannot be chance in nature but, rather, is something ordered by God.
(c) The unity of an ultimate consummation
[unitas consummationis], along with that of the perfection of countless souls,
cannot proceed in a chance manner from one principle. Now, as we will discuss
below, from the primitive promise of the Redeemer (which represents the commencement
of all future prophecies), there proceeded the consummation of the whole of
Judeo-Christian religion, which in Christ has some to restore to unity
countless souls of good will. Therefore, this process is not chance in nature
but, rather, is ordered by God.
(d) Similar things that frequently or
always take place do not take place on account of chance. Now, the various Old
Testament prophecies announce similar things, especially the Messiah / Christ
and his works. Therefore, these prophecies are not fulfilled by chance.
{{119}} (e) The whole of
Judeo-Christian religion, cannot be from chance and unintended by God. Now,
the whole of Jewish religion exists as a prophecy that is fulfilled in
Christianity. Therefore, the fulfillment of this general prophecy is not a chance
occurrence. Nay, nothing is chance in relation to God but, rather, only in relation
to other causes.
Hence, for the most part, true prophecies
can be distinguished with the greatest certitude from conjectures that are
fortuitously fulfilled. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation:
The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd;
Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:171-73)
