At the same time [of Loisy], [ABBÉ
CLAUDE FRANÇOIS ALEXANDRE] HOUTTEVILLE, in his French work on the truth of the
Chrisitan religion, proposed a new definition for miracles, which he thought to
be necessary in order to resolve the objections raised by determinists. This
definition caused no small tumult among philosophers and theologians. {{36}] He
said that miracles are rare, stupendous, sensible effects exceeding human
powers, following in so hidden a manner from the laws of communication of motions
that we can in no way naturally know, whether through experience or through
reason, that they are consequences of the same sorts of laws. Thus, this
author made a distinction, saying that miracles are rightly said to be natural
inasmuch as they follow the order of nature (or the laws of motion), though
they are called supernatural inasmuch as they cannot be foreseen by man solely
trough his natural powers. Houtteville strove to prove this opinion by
appealing both to the fact that God acts through utterly simple and general
laws and to the fact that body knows all of the possible effects of the general
laws of the communication of motions. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine
Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K.
Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:52, first comment in
square brackets added for clarification)
Re.
the properties of miracles:
A miracle is not contrary to nature
(i.e., it does not violate nature), whatever those who hold to naturalism
might say. Rather, it accords with the obediential potency of nature—namely,
with its primary aptitude by which any given creature naturally obeys God in
order to accept whatever he may will, as our arm obeys our will. (See ST
1, a. 105, a. 7, ad 2; I-II, q. 113, a. 10; De potentia, q. 6, a. 2)
{{42}} Thus, a miracle is not contrary to the laws of nature, is not a
violation of the laws of nature, and indeed does not destroy them. Rather,
it presupposes and confirms them, as an exception confirms them, as an exception
confirms the rule. For example, the dead do not naturally rise again.
This law is so true that God alone can supernaturally raise the dead.
Indeed, as we will discuss below, the laws of nature are hypothetically
necessary—namely, on the supposition that all the various natural causes act in
the appropriate conditions. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine
Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K.
Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:60)
For example, it is necessary that a
dead person not rise so long as nature alone acts; however, this does not
exclude the possibility that the dead could rise through God’s supernatural intervention.
3. Pushing back more, however, the
laws of nature are absolute necessary.
The principle of causality, even
though it holds from the perspective of the efficient cause, is nonetheless
likewise absolute necessary, and God cannot act outside of the order that it
establishes. Now the laws of nature are laws of causality. Therefore, God
cannot act outside of them.
{{54}} Response: No parity
exists between the utterly universal principle of causality, on the one hand,
and the laws of nature, on the other. Indeed, the former principle extends even
to the divine causality, outside of which God cannot act, for he cannot bring
into existence an uncaused creature. By contrast, the laws of nature express a
manner of acting belonging to created nature, and God can modify this manner of
acting. The principle of efficient causality is hypothetical only in the sense
that it is possible that a contingent being not exist, through it is absolutely
necessary that contingency depends upon the most universal first cause.
4. Further insistence: Even if
the laws of nature are particular, nonetheless, they are absolutely necessary.
Indeed, even though mathematical laws
are particular, they are absolutely necessary, and God cannot act outside of
them. Now, the laws of nature are expressed mathematically, and, hence, are
likened unto mathematical laws. Therefore, the laws of nature are absolutely necessary,
and God cannot act outside of them.
Response: I concede the major premise. God cannot,
even extraordinarily, make a triable whose three angels would not be equal to
two right angels. However, I make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I
concede that the laws of nature are likened unto mathematical laws as regards
their quantitative (or numeric) expression. However, I deny that they are such
as regards their very nature. For mathematical laws are drawn from the formal
principle of figures or numbers and hence are absolutely necessary. By contrast,
the causal laws of nature are drawn from extrinsic causes—namely, from efficient
or final causality—and hence are hypothetically necessary. In other words,
something that is mathematically impossible is absolutely impossible, whereas
what is physically impossible is impossible for sensible nature, though not
absolutely for every possible cause. Spinoza erred when he reduced physics to
mathematics, for only mathematics abstracts from efficient and final causality.
5. Further insistence: Even if
they are distinguished from mathematical laws, the laws of nature are absolutely
necessary.
Indeed, natural things have a
determinate essence, whence flow determinate properties and a determinate
manner of acting. Now, God cannot change what is essential to some given thing
and simultaneously have that thing remain what it is. Therefore, God cannot
change the natural manner of action in natural things.
Response: I make a distinction regarding the major
premise. I concede that natural things have a determinate manner of acting as
regards the power of acting. However, I deny that this is so as
regards the exercise of their activity. I concede the minor premise. I
distinguish the conclusion along with the same lines as the major. Ss St.
Thomas says in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad. 20: “in the furnace’s fire,
an order to burning remains, even though it did not burn the three young men
therein.”
6. Further insistence: Not even
in relation to the exercise of a thing’s acidity can God act outside the laws
of nature.
Indeed, God cannot do something outside
the order of justice. Now, the order of justice is the rule of the very
exercise of moral action, for the omission of due action is a sin. Therefore, similarly,
God cannot act outside of the order of nature, by which the exercise of natural
agents’ action is ruled.
Response: As St. Thomas explains (in De potentia,
q. 6, a. 1, ad 3), there is no parity here, for the order of justice directly
designates an order to the ultimate end, outside of which God cannot act,
whereas, by contrast, the laws of nature do not directly designate an order to
the ultimate end but, rather, an order of one creature to another. Thus, God
cannot, in an extraordinary manner, order us to despair or to hate God, for
this would represent the denial of his infinite goodness.
7. Further insistence: Moreover,
God cannot act outside of the particular moral precepts that rule the interrelationships
between men. For example, God cannot, in an extraordinary manner, command
murder. Therefore, similarly, God cannot act outside of natural laws.
Response: I deny the major premise. See what St.
Thomas says in ST III, suppl., q. 67, a. 2: “There can be a divine
dispensation even to the first principles of the natural law, for the sake of
signifying or showing forth some divine mystery. {{55}} For example, we see the
dispensation to the precept given to Abraham in relation to the slaying of his
innocent son. However, such dispensations are not granted to all generally, but
only to certain individual persons, as also is the case for miracles.” Likewise,
see ST I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2 and q. 100, a. 8, ad 2: “When Abraham
consent to kill his son, he did not consent to murder, for his son was due to
be slain by the command of God. Who is Lord of life and death, for He Himself
inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account
of the sin of our first parent. If a man executes that sentence upon the Divine
authority, he will no more be a murderer than God would be.” Likewise, as
Cajetan’s comments on this article:
Just as this statement, “the dead
cannot rise,” is necessary (according to natural power) . . . and when God
raises someone, He does not falsify that proposition or do away with it, but,
instead, acts above (not contrary to) nature, so too in the present case, this
conclusion, “One must not murder” in the sense in which it is expressed,
namely, by a private authority with certain other conditions, is a necessary
conclusion; . . . however, since God orders the performance of an act which
would be murder he not to command it, he orders an action that is not outside
or contrary to the precept but, rather, as it were, one that is above it,
provided that he orders that the commanded act be performed by a superior authority.
(Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the
Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio:
Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:78-80)
