The following comes from:
Ali Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism (British
Academy Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 185-87
Predestination explained as foreknowledge
The author known as Ambrosiaster
referred to the questions raised by Paul’s statements about Jacob and Esau as a
‘complaint’ or ‘accusation’ (querela), and said that pagans interpreted
Paul’s statements as disproving Christianity’s claim to present a just God.254 He
interpreted Jacob and Esau as types who represented believers and non‑believers.255
His explanation of the Jacob and Esau story was that this referred to God’s
foreknowledge. Ambrosiaster explained predestination as foreknowledge in an
emphatic manner, using the word ‘foreknowledge’ or variants of it fifteen times
in his comments on Rom. 9:11–16 to underline his argument that this was
foreknowledge of autonomous human decisions.256 He repeated nine times that God
was just.257 Reading Ambrosiaster’s comments on Rom. 9:11–16, what come across
strongly are his prioritising of justice, his overwhelming concern to interpret
predestination as God’s foreknowledge of autonomous human actions, his
references to the ‘will’ (uoluntas) and the ‘mind’ (mens) of the
individual as the factor determining God’s responses, his references to merit,
his suggestion that all nature is good and only the will creates evil, his
concern that man should not be able to make excuses (the same argument that
Evagrius, Jerome and Pelagius used), his reference to God’s universal salvific
will [1 Tim. 2:4], and the fact that in order to preserve God’s justice he
cited Acts 10:34, Rom. 2:11:God is not a (p.186) respecter of persons,
to show that God did not have pre‑selected favourites, just as Ambrose and
Jerome did. Ambrosiaster then suggested that the complaint should cease because
he had resolved the issue.
He thus worked hard to interpret Paul’s words to show that God’s
judgements were dependent on man’s autonomous decisions:
For when they were not yet born nor had they done anything either
good or bad, so that God’s plan might continue according to his election, it
was said not on the basis of works but on the basis of the calling, that the
elder would serve the younger, as it is written: I loved Jacob, but Esau I
hated [Mal.
1:2–3]. That is in Malachi. Paul proclaims God’s foreknowledge in these
matters, because nothing else can happen other than what God knows will happen.
For through his knowledge of what each of them will be in the future, he said:
‘This one will be worthy, who will be the younger, and the one who will be
older will be unworthy’. He chose one and rejected the other as a result of his
foreknowledge. And God’s plan continues with regard to the one he chose because
nothing can happen except what God knows and has planned with regard to him,
that he will be worthy of salvation; and concerning him whom God rejected,
likewise God’s plan continues, that he planned concerning him, because he will
be unworthy. This God does as one who knows the future and not as a respecter
of persons [Acts 10:34, Rom. 2:11], for he condemns no‑one before they
should sin, and he crowns no‑one before they should conquer. This relates to
the case of the Jews who defend their previous privilege as sons of Abraham.258
Ambrosiaster’s explanation of Paul’s meaning is at odds with
Augustine’s interpretation, in which prevenient grace was the cause of an
individual’s virtue and God’s foreknowledge of an individual’s free decision
was not a viable escape route from that truth, as Augustine explained:
But it is surprising to see the steep cliffs they hurl themselves
over when they are trapped by these difficulties and fear the nets of truth.
They say: ‘He hated one and loved the other of those not yet born because he
foresaw their future works’. Who would not be surprised that the Apostle lacked
this very clever idea? . … Where now are the merits, where are the works either
past or future, carried out or to be carried out, as if by the strength of free
will? Did not the Apostle offer a clear statement concerning the excellence of
gratuitous grace, that is, of true grace? . … Is it on (p.187) account of the
future works of both of them which God foresaw? No, heaven forbid this also.259
It is noteworthy that in around AD
428–9, Prosper of Aquitaine wrote to Augustine saying that among earlier
interpreters of Scripture the consensus understanding of predestination was
that it was God’s foreknowledge of autonomous human actions.260
Notes for the Above:
(254) Ambrosiaster, In epistolas Paulinas, on Rom. 9:1–13
(ed. Vogels, CSEL 81/1, p. 317); all references and quotations are taken from
the γ-text of Ambrosiaster’s Commentary on the Pauline Epistles.
(255) Ambrosiaster, In epistolas Paulinas, on Rom. 9:10
(ed. Vogels, CSEL 81/1, p. 311).
(256) Ambrosiaster, In epistolas Paulinas, on Rom. 9:11–16
(ed. Vogels, CSEL 81/1, pp. 313–23). The evidence to support this argumentation
can be found in the translation and text of Ambrosiaster, In epistolas
Paulinas, on Rom. 9:11–16 in the appendix at the end of this chapter. The
total of 15 uses of the word ‘foreknowledge’ includes only occurrences of the
words praescientia and praescius, and omits the times he referred
to God’s knowing the future (nouit/ sciens futurum, etc), of
which there are several also. Ambrosiaster also propounded this argument that
predestination was God’s foreknowledge in his comments on Rom. 8:28–30 (ed.
Vogels, CSEL 81/1, pp. 289–93).
(257) Counting uses of the words ‘justice’ (iustitia),
‘just’ (iustus) and ‘not unjustly’ (non iniuste).
(258) Ambrosiaster, In epistolas
Paulinas, on Rom. 9:11–13 (ed. Vogels, CSEL 81/1, p. 313), ‘Nam cum nati
nondum fuissent aut aliquid egissent bonum uel malum, ut secundum electionem
propositum Dei permaneret, non ex operibus, sed ex uocatione dictum est, quia maior
seruiet minori, sicut scriptum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui [Mal.
1:2–3]. Istud in Malachia habetur. Praescientiam Dei flagitat in his causis,
quia non aliud potest euenire, quam nouit Deus futurum. Sciendo enim quid
unusquisque illorum futurus esset dixit: “Hic erit dignus, qui erit minor, et
qui erit maior, indignus”. Vnum elegit praescientia et alterum spreuit. Et in
illo quem elegit, propositum Dei manet, quia aliud non potest euenire quam scit
et proposuit in illo, ut salute dignus sit; et in illo quem spernit, simili
modo manet propositum, quod proposuit de illo, quia indignus erit. Hoc quasi
praescius, non personarum acceptor [Acts 10:34, Rom. 2:11], nam neminem
damnat, antequam peccet, et nullum coronat, antequam uincat. Hoc pertinet ad
causam Iudaeorum, qui sibi praerogatiuam defendunt, quod filii sint Abrahae.’
(259) Augustine, Ep. 194.8.35–9 (ed. Goldbacher, CSEL 57,
pp. 204–7), ‘Mirum est autem, cum his coartantur angustiis, in quanta se
abrupta praecipitent metuentes retia ueritatis. “Ideo”, inquiunt, “nondum
natorum alium oderat, alium diligebat, quia eorum futura opera praeuidebat.”
Quis istum acutissimum sensum defuisse Apostolo non miretur? . … Vbi nunc
merita, ubi opera uel praeterita uel futura tamquam liberi arbitrii uiribus
adimpleta siue adimplenda? Nonne apertam protulit Apostolus de gratuitae
gratiae, hoc est uerae gratiae commendatione sententiam? . … An propter opera
quae futura praeuidebat amborum? Immo et hoc absit’.
(260) Prosper, apud Augustine, Ep.
225.8 (ed. Goldbacher, CSEL 57, p. 467), ‘When the opinions of earlier teachers
on this matter are reviewed, one and the same judgement is found in almost all
of them, by which they have taken the plan and predestination of God as being
based on his foreknowledge, so that God made some people vessels of honour and
others vessels of reproach for this reason, namely, because he foresaw the end
of each person and knew in advance how each would will and act in the future
under the help of this grace’; ‘Retractatis priorum de hac re opinionibus,
paene omnium par inuenitur et una sententia, qua propositum et
praedestinationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, ut ob hoc Deus alios
uasa honoris alios contumeliae fecerit, quia finem uniuscuiusque praeuiderit
et, sub ipso gratiae adiutorio in qua futurus esset uoluntate et actione,
praescierit.’
