Augustine is now faced with the
problem of harmonizing his conclusions with the call to universal salvation, as
expressed in the words of the Apostle: [Deus] uult omnes homines saluos
fieri (1Tm 2,4). Having said that there are many ways of interpreting this
passage, Augustine makes a shift from the general understanding of the
principle concerning God’s desire for man’s salvation to a more restricted
interpretation of it. He clearly states that the term omnes must not be
understood as referring to “all men”, but to “all the predestined”. Augustine’s
peculiar understanding of the word omnes acquires a different semantic
meaning in this particular context: a context which only applies to those who have
been mis-á-part by God’s mysterious and inscrutable design. In other
words, Augustine bends the objective meaning of 1 Tm 2,4 to safeguard his
personal theological view. A further confirmation of the change of perspective
in the interpretation of this Pauline passage is the bishop of Hippo’s
contention that God allows us to will what He himself wills, in the same way
that He sends the Spirit which makes us cry: “Abba! Father” (cf Rom 8,15).
Precisely as the Spirit cries in and through us, so God, in willing the
salvation of all mankind, makes mankind desirous of it. (Donato Ogliari, Gratia
Et Certamen: The Relationship Between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of
Augustine with the So-Called Semipelagians [Bibliotheca Ephemeridum
Theologicarum Lovaniensium 169; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003], 87-88)
The Problem of Universal
Salvation: The Interpretation of 1 Tim 2,4
Augustine’s belief that man’s
merits and adhesion to God are themselves the result of God’s operative grace
called for a new insight into the mode by which divine grace is
dispensed to humanity, and about the actual extent of man’s commitment. The
depiction of God’s sovereign and absolute grace, acting at the core of
Christian faith and life, drove Augustine to a stern but (within his
theological system) logical conclusion about a restricted dispensation of
grace. In his eyes, this was supported by the undeniable fact that a portion of
humanity was not reached by the benefits of divine grace; for instance, the
heathens who have not heard the preaching of the Gospel, or have refused it,
and the infants who die before receiving the baptismal regeneration. Besides, concepts
such as massa damnata and certus numerus electorum makes it even
more difficult to imagine how Augustine could still believe in a divine will
oriented towards the salvation of all mankind. If God has sent his only Son
into the world, so that the world might find salvation through him (cf. Jn
3,17), how is it that He allows so many to perish by withholding the means (the
gift of faith and final perseverance) by which they would find salvation and
glory? Does not such a restriction do away with the doctrine of universal
salvation? Since the soteriological perspective is all-embracing, it is obvious
that such questions are not peripheral to Christian faith and theology, and it
is therefore important to see how the bishop of Hippo faced the resulting
challenges, and what solutions he suggested.
To begin with, we may look at a
biblical passage which Augustine used quite often, particularly during the
Pelagian controversy: Si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui
sunt (2 Cor 5,14). As it appears from the context, this passage was not
only quoted to support his theological argument about the physical and
spiritual “death” caused by original sin (a death which all those who come into
the world experience), but also to stress the universality of Christ’s
redemption, intrinsically related to the universality of original sin. In
harmony with this Pauline quotation, Augustine assumes that it is precisely on
account of the universality of redemption that the universality of original sin
must be posited. The Son of God came into the world and took up human flesh
with no other goal than that of enlightening, delivering and saving all men who
are under the shadow of death (cf. Lc 1,79). That is why he died on the cross
for all, no one excluded. Yet, even though Augustine would have wished to dwell
without reserve on the concept of universal salvation, his mind eventually took
him elsewhere. It is no doubt true that Christ shed his blood for everybody
but, would affirm Augustine, super alios perdendos, super alios mundandos:
super perdendos iustus, super mundandos misericors. Overwhelmed by the task
of defending his doctrine of sovereign and gratuitous grace, he failed to
integrate the concept that, for God, there are no boundaries or limits to the
salvation of humanity. This is evident from the different amount of consideration
that the two issues of Christ’s Redemption and Adam’s fall receive
respectively, and above all from Augustine’s peculiar interpretation of a
classical scriptural locus in which the claim of God’s universal
salvation is clearly stated: Deus omnes homines vult salvos fieri (1 Tim
2,4).
If we turn to the context of this
affirmation, we shall realize that Paul is talking about the duty of Christians
to pray for all men, since all men are the object of God’s salvific will.
Proclaimed over against the Gnostic claim that salvation can only be reached
through gnosis, this principle strongly indicates that salvation depends
rather on God’s salvific will, that will which has become effective through the
incarnation of Christ “who gave himself as a ransom for all” (1 Tim 2,6).
Believers are called to proclaim this universal salvific will of God, and
freely to co-operate with it, making salvation the motive of their life and
actions. The Greek Fathers were of course in a position to understand Paul
correctly. Reading 1 Tim 2,4 (Θεὸς ὅς πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι) literally,
they would interpret it instinctively in a nuanced way, made possible by the
flexibility of the Greek language. There are in fact two Greek verbs to
indicate the action of willing. The first, θέλω, points to a firm desire,
whereas the second, βούλομαι, expresses the decision to bring to effect that
which has been desired. The application of this nuance to God’s universal
salvific will makes it possible to posit in God an “antecedent” will (viz. that
all men be saved), as well as a “consequent” will, by which He brings into
effect his decision, taking account of man’s own will, choices and actions. God
wants all men to be saved, but this will of his shall not become effective if
they refuse to respond positively and co-operate with him. The same interpretation,
resting on the possibility for man to refuse salvation, can be found also in
some Latin Christian writers.
Augustine, by contrast,
interpreted the Latin verb uelle as referring exclusively to God’s
absolute will (cf. Ps 113,11: Omnia quaecumque uoluit, fecit), and opted
for a univocal solution. Rather than trying to understand the meaning of Paul’s
statement about God’s universal salvific will, he was at pains to reconcile the
Apostle’s words with his conviction that the salvation brought about by Jesus
Christ does not reach all humanity, as is proved by infants and heathens/pagans
who die without baptismal regeneration. This standpoint of the bishop of Hippo
does not take us by surprise, of course, for it was the logical outcome of his
doctrine of the absolute sovereignty and gratuity of divine grace. Once the
extreme consequences were applied (viz. the concept of a restricted
predestination and election) and regarded as decisive in order to save God’s justice
and the gratuitousness of his gifts, Augustine found himself in the awkward
predicament of being forced to modify the literal interpretation of 1 Tim 2,4
so that it could fit in with his predestinarian view. So he sacrificed the more
traditional exegesis of 1 Tim 2,4 and chose to interpret it quite flexibly in
order to accommodate it to his view of a restricted dispensation of grace.
Once again, the watershed in
Augustine’s approach to the issue of universal salvation is the personal
“revelation” experienced in dealing with God’s grace and election in his De
diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, when he was enlightened over the
meaning of 1 Cor 4,7. Before this work, 1 Tim 2,4 did not present any
difficulty. As to its interpretation Augustine aligned himself with the
traditional understanding. Thus, in his Expositio quarundam propositionum ex
epistula ad Romanos, where he points to the necessity for Christians to be
conscientiously subject to legal authority (cf. Rom 13,5) by referring to the
words of 1 Tim 2,4, he states that God wants all men to be saved, even those
who hold authority or are in a high position, and who may act against the
interests of the Christians. What Augustine ultimately stresses is that God’s
salvific will might not always be efficacious because of a deficit in man’s
co-operation. God wishes, as it were, to save man through man. But the ill will
or the bad conscience of the latter may jeopardize God’s wish to save
everybody.
Augustine’s exegesis of 1 Tim 2,4
underwent a significant change in his works written after the De diuersis
quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, namely after the bishop of Hippo had made up
his mind about a de facto non-universal salvific will on the part of
God. In the De spiritu et littera (412), for instance, the Pauline
quotation is recalled against the background of the origin of the uoluntas
credendi. If, argues Augustine, this originates from human nature (of which
God is the creator), how is it that not everybody is endowed with it? And if it
is a gift of God, why is it not offered to all, since He wants all men to be
saved? Although the immediate aim of the bishop of Hippo is to counteract the
Pelagian emphasis on liberum arbitrium, his reference to 1 Tim 2,4 is
introduced to ask if God’s will to save all men does not eliminate human free
will. The emphasis is on the efficacy of grace, on which God’s salvific will
ultimately depends.
A letter to Paulinus of Nola (ca.
414) shows a further shift in the interpretation of 1 Tim 2,4. There Augustine
was confronted with a precise question from his fellow bishop: if God wants to
save all men, why – asks Paulinus – according to Rom 11,28, was the enmity of
the Jews towards the gospel of Jesus responsible for the Gentiles’ coming to
faith? Did not God have the power to bring to faith both Jews and Gentiles? In
answering this question Augustine introduces an important distinction. By a
rhetorical device he affirms that God’s call to become members of Christ is
addressed to people ex omni genere hominum, viz. to people
“representing” all human races. The fact that such call is not addressed
to all men (omnibus hominibus) is indicative of his conviction that not
all men are called to become members of Christ, and that not all are saved
through him, although no one is excluded from this initial perspective. It is
clear that, rather than the universality of salvation, it is the role of
Christ’s mediation that he emphasizes, a mediation which reaches out to some
people from all races, but not to all people from all races.
In the Contra Iulianum
(420/421), 1 Tim 2,4 is referred to in the context of the initiative of
salvation which, according to Julian, must be ascribed to man, whereas
according to Augustine it belongs to God. In order to counter Julian’s
viewpoint the bishop of Hippo emphasizes the expression Deus uult,
rather than the word omnes. Since God’s will is absolute and does not
depend on man’s initiative (which is in fact forestalled by divine grace), the
word omnes must be understood as meaning multi, namely all
those who are going to be actually saved by God’s mercy. The omnes
of 1 Tim 2,4 as well as the omnes of Rom 5,18 (Per unius
iustificationem in omnes homines ad iustificationem uitae) are thus
understood in a restricted manner. The point at stake is that any initiative in
the direction of salvation belongs to God’s absolute will, whose fulfilment,
for Augustine, is certain, and cannot be frustrated by man’s free will. Once
again, this change of exegesis was supported by Augustine’s conviction that not
all men are saved, a conviction which was corroborated by the specific case of
heathens/pagans who do not embrace Christian faith, and of infants who die
before being baptized. It is evident, however, that, rather than trying to
interpret 1 Tim 2,4 objectively, Augustine was preoccupied by opposing Julian’s
view with his own staunch belief about the absolute gratuity of grace.
The explanation developed in the Enchiridion
ad Laurentium (421/422) deserves special attention because it represents
Augustine’s mature solution to the problem of God’s universal salvific will.
Here too, rather than explaining 1 Tim 2,4 according to Paul’s intention, he is
more preoccupied by saving the absolute transcendence and infallibility of
God’s plans within the framework of sovereign grace. The fact that not all men
are actually saved cannot simply be ascribed to the ill will of those who
refuse to be saved. If it were so, it would mean that God’s will were
deficient, and that it could be easily jeopardized by man’s free will. God’s
will, on the contrary, is certa et immutabilis et efficacissima.
Thus, argues Augustine, salvation
depends exclusively on God, both with regard to children (who, lacking the use
of free will, could not possibly choose salvation) and to adults (whose will to
be saved is prepared by God himself: Praeparatur uoluntas a Deo: Pr
8,35, LXX). Against the traditional understanding that God wants to save all
men if they, in their turn, want to be saved, Augustine interprets 1 Tim 2,4 in
two ways. Firstly, he emphasizes the verb uult, in connection with the
necessity for prayer, in order to affirm that God saves those He wants to save.
This does not mean, continues Augustine subtly, that there is nobody whom God
does not want to save, but that there are no men who could possibly be saved
other than those whom God wants to save. Secondly, he stresses the term omnes,
interpreting it, once again, according to the restricted meaning of omne
hominum genus, by which he meant that God chooses his elect among all races
and from different conditions of life.
As in the above works, so also in
the De correptione et gratia Augustine keeps himself at a distance from
the natural and obvious sense of 1 Tim 2,4, and interprets the term omnes
as all those who have been predestined, and who, as such, represent all
mankind. The same idea is taken up in the De praedestinatione sanctorum where,
once again, Augustine does not deny the principle of God’s universal salvific
will, but restricts it in its actual realization. Remembering Jn 6,45 (Omnis
qui audiuit a Patre et didicit, uenit ad me), he gives the following
example: “Just as, then, we speak correctly when we say of some teacher of literature
who is the only one in a city, ‘This person teaches literature to everyone
here’, not because everyone learns, but because no one of those who learn
literature learns it except from him, so we say correctly, ‘God teaches
everyone to come to Christ’, not because everyone comes to him, but because no
one comes to him in any other way (non quia omnes ueniunt, sed quia nemo
aliter uenit)”. Finally, in the De dono perseverantiae the issue of
God’s universal salvation is not tackled by an exegesis of 1 Tim 2,4, but it
takes the form (sub contrario) of the following question: Cur non
omnibus detur Dei gratia?
There is no doubt that this
variety of restricted interpretations given to 1 Tim 2,4, which are
unacceptable from an exegetical point of view, respond to the theologian’s (and
not the exegete’s) preoccupation of safeguarding the omnipotence of God in the
framework of the doctrine of absolute grace and predestination. Only from this
perspective can we fully understand (but not justify) Augustine’s position. The
lack of one definitive interpretation remains, in fact, an indication of his
uneasiness to reconcile the traditional (literal) meaning of 1 Tim 2,4 with his
own theological doctrine of sovereign grace and predestination. It was, above
all, an attempt to lay the foundation of his belief that 1 Tim 2,4 could not
possibly contain the affirmation that God wants all men to be saved by an
absolute will. If that were the case, then all men would be certainly saved,
but since in reality many find themselves otherwise (e.g., the unbaptized
children and the heathens), Augustine concludes, it means that de facto
God’s grace of salvation is not offered to all. The chief methodological fault
in Augustine’s approach is that he moves from the level of a general,
metaphysical principle, viz. God’s universal salvific will, to the pragmatic
level of its realization in history, at least in the way he “imagines” that
God’s salvific will happens concretely. For Augustine, in fact, it is a perspicua
ueritas that only the predestined are saved. (Donato Ogliari, Gratia Et
Certamen: The Relationship Between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of
Augustine with the So-Called Semipelagians [Bibliotheca Ephemeridum
Theologicarum Lovaniensium 169; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003], 357-66)
