Wednesday, September 10, 2025

Peter Abelard (1079-1142) Presenting the Different Views Among the Patristics Concerning the Permissibility of Lying

  

154      LYING IS ALLOWED FOR NO REASON . . . OR IS IT

 

1.     Augustine, On Lying: (Aug., De mendacio 14.25; PL 40.505) The sixth kind of lie harms no one and benefits someone, as for example, if anyone, knowing that someone’s money is to be taken unfairly, lies when he says he doesn’t know where it is. The seventh kind of lie, which also harms no one and benefits someone, is if a person lies, not wanting to betray the person being sought in order to be put to death.

2.     Augustine, again: (Aug., De mendacio 21.42; PL 40.516) There must be no lying of the sixth sort. Not even is the truth of testimony rightly corrupted for someone’s temporal benefit and safety. No one should be led toward eternal salvation, helped by a lie. Nor should there be any lying of the seventh sort. Anyone’s convenience or temporal safety should not be preferred to faith. No one should be so badly moved by our right deeds, and he is made worse in his mind and moved further from piety.

3.     Augustine again, on Psalm five: (Aug., Enarrat. in Psalmos, Ps. 5.7; PL 36.85-86) Let no one think a complete spiritual person, at whose death the soul does not die, should, either for his sake or someone else’s, lie for this temporal life. But since it is one thing to lie, and other to hide the truth, if indeed it is one thing to say something false, another to keep the truth quiet; if someone by chance, does not want to betray a person in this visible life, he ought to be prepared to hide the truth not to say something false, so he neither betrays nor lies, and does not kill his should for someone else’s body.

4.     Also: (Aug., Enarrat. in Psalmos, Ps. 5.7; PL 36.86) There are two kinds of lies in which there is not great fault, although they are not without fault: when we joke, or lie for a neighbor. The first is not destructive, because it does not deceive; for the person, to whom it is said, knows it is said for the sake of a joke. The second is milder, since it holds some kindness. It should not be called a lie because it does not have a duplex heart; just as, for instance, if someone, to whom a sword is lent, promises to return it, when asked, to the person who gave it; if perchance, the latter is delirious when he asks for his sword, it clearly should not be returned until his sanity is restored, lest he kill himself or others. No duplex heart is involved, since the one to whom the sword was entrusted, when he promised to return it did not suppose a mad man would ask for it back. Clearly, sometimes to keep a true thing quiet does not incur blame, but to say something false is not found to be conceded to Christians.

5.     Isidore, in The Highest Good, book two, chapter five: (Isid., Sent. ii.30.6; PL 83.632 B) Sometimes it is worse to think about, than to speak, a lie. Occasionally an incautious person happens to tell a lie precipitously; however, he is not able to contemplate a lie without effort.

6.     And: (Isid., Sent. ii.30.7; PL 83.632 C) It is written (Wis 1.11) “the lying mouth kills the soul” and (Ps 5.7) “he will destroy those who speak lies”. Faultless people flee this kind of lying also, so that someone’s lie is not defended by their lie, and they do not harm their own soul, endeavoring to offer safety to another’s flesh; although we believe this kind of sin is easily forgiven.

7.     Augustine, on questions about Genesis, chapter one hundred forty-five: (Aug., Quaest. in Heptateuchum i.145; PL 34.586-87) It is often asked what Joseph means, saying to his brothers (Gn 44.15 LXX): “Didn’t you know that, in augury, there is no body like me?” Because it was said, not seriously, but as a joke (as the outcome taught), should it be considered not a lie? Lies are told seriously by liars, not in jest. When things are said only in jest, they are not counted as a lie.

8.     Hilary, on Psalm fourteen: (Hil., Tract. in Ps. 14.10; PL 9.305 A) A lie is especially necessary, and sometimes falsity is useful, when we lie about someone hiding, to the person employed to murder him, or if we give deceitful testimony for someone in danger, or if we deceive a sick person about the difficulty of a curse. It is important, according to the teaching of the apostle (cf. Col 4.6) for our speech to be seasoned with wit. (Yes and No: The Complete English Translation of Peter Abelard’s Sic Et Non [trans. Priscilla Throop; 2d ed.; Charlotte, Vt.: MedievalMS, 2008], 403-5)

 

 

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