After surveying the concept of “propitiation” in ancient Greek literature, Chrys C. Caragounis offered the following summary (contrary to critics of propitiation, such as C. H. Dodd et al):
In the light of such facts, it is impossible to explain away the ideas
of propitiation by the so-called ‘crude’ beliefs of the ancient Hellēnes, who
were trying to propitiate capricious, whimsical and unpredictable gods. Even in
those cases in which the gods were wrathful and needed sacrifices to be
propitiated, there was always some good reason why the gods were understood to
be wrathful. One of many examples here – mentioned above – was the wrath of
Apollōn on account of his priest Chrysēs, whose daughter had been abducted by
Agamemnōn (Homēros, Ilias, I. 100). But in addition, we have treated
cases in which the term is used in connection with offended humans (e.g. the
case of Helen and Stēsichōros in Isokratēs, Helen 66) and more
importantly in connection with gods, where there was no trace of sin on the
part of men and not trace of wrath on the part of the gods (e.g Nestōr’s case
in Homēros Odysseia III. 419). Here, the sacrifices were intended to
ensure the continued favor of the gods, who were invoked to assist the
worshipper, in the same way as expecting mothers ‘propitiated’, i.e. sought the
kindly help of Eileithyia, the goddess of childbirth. Is this not also the way
Christians pray today? The term propitiation was also applied in contexts which
are free from any form of what is thought of as superstitious heathenism,
contexts which are charged with enlightened ethical principles and values and
where no sacrifices are mentioned or intended. This was exemplified by
Menander, Frg 164, in which the favor of the god is sought not by
sacrifices or gifts but by humbling oneself as well as Menander Epitrepondes
1098, where propitiation is raised to an ethical principle: “by doing
nothing wicked nor foolish” and by Lysimachos, Frg. 1a. 28, in which
propitiation takes place not by bloody sacrifices but “by fasting”! and by
Cornelius Alexander, according to whom Moses propitiated God by nothing other
than his intercessory prayer! In a similar vein Diōn Chrysostomos, Περὶ
Βασιλείας (Third Discourse on Kingship) 52, in a passage that recalls Ps
40:6: “sacrifice and offerings Thou didst not desire”, argues that “the gods
are not glad with offerings and sacrifices of unjust men” but take delight in
those who honor them “by good works and just acts.” We may ask: Where is the
difference here between the so-called “crude pagan Greek” practice of
propitiation and the Biblical understanding of God? In these passages, among
others, the idea of propitiation is raised to a level where not only every
trace of crudity is absent, but more than that it is connected with good and
righteous conduct, in purity and holiness; cf. “regards virtue as holiness and
evil as ungodliness” (Diōn Chrysostomos, ref. above).
It is thus impossible to draw a sharp line of differentiation between
the way propitiation works in the Hellenic context and the way it works in the Hebrew
or even Christian contexts. Propitiation works in analogous ways in both.
Offence needs to be put right. This is valid even for our modern, ‘enlightened’
society, with all its refinements, in which propitiation is still a necessary
category – even though it does not involve animal sacrifices. As we have seen,
this was often the case also in the Hellenic society!
Thus, the argument that propitiation belongs to the so-called ‘crude
Hellenic view of propitiating capricious and unpredictable gods’ is
contradicted by the literary evidence and ought, therefore, to be banished from
our discussion of this issue. (Chrys C. Caragounis, “Expiration—Propitiation—Reconciliation:
What Are the Facts?,” in New Testament Investigations: A Diachronic
Perspective [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 487;
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2022], 275-76)
