Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Hermann L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck on Matthew 5:32 and Debates Concerning Divorce in Rabbinic Judaism and Other Literature

  

5:32 A: Anyone who dismisses his wife, except on the grounds of fornication, makes her an adulteress.

 

Jesus recognizes only πορνεία as a ground for divorce, because by it the marriage union is actually abolished. The ancient synagogue knows a whole series of reasons for divorce; the school of Shammai takes the stricter standpoint, while the school of Hillel sometimes judges laxly to the point of frivolity. The Old Testament base passage is Deut 24:1: “If a man marries a woman and consummates the marriage with her, and then if she finds no favor in his eyes because he found something shameful עֶרְוַת דָּבָר in her, and he writes her a letter of divorce.…” The expression ערות דבר, literally, “a thing of disgrace,” that is, a disgraceful thing, is entirely indefinite and may denote something morally disgraceful as well as something physically repulsive.

 

1. Interpretation of the base passage Deut 24:1.

 

Mishnah Giṭṭin 9.10: The school of Shammai said, “The husband shall cast away יְגָרֵּשׁ his wife only if he has found in her a thing of shame דְּבַר עֵרְוָה (i.e., something shameful); for it is said, ‘Because he has found in her a thing of shame’ (Deut 24:1).” In contrast, the school of Hillel said, “Even if she burned his food; for it says, ‘Because he found in her anything shameful at all.’ ” (The school of Shammai thus understands ערות דבר narrowly = a shameful thing, that is, sin of fornication, the school of Hillel broadly = anything shameful, that is, not merely sins of fornication). R. Aqiba († ca. 135) said, “Even if he finds another who is more beautiful than she; for it is said, ‘And if she finds no favor חֵן in his eyes’ (Deut 24:1).” (Aqiba understands חן in the sense of grace, beauty.) ‖ Sifre Deuteronomy 24:1 § 269: “If she finds no favor in his eyes” (Deut 24:1). The school of Shammai said, “The husband shall not cast out his wife unless he has found in her a disgraceful thing ערות דבר; for it says, ‘Because he has found in her a disgraceful thing’ (Deut 24:1).” In contrast, the school of Hillel said, “Even if she burned his food; for it says, ‘Because he found some shameful thing in her’ (Deut 24:1).” The school of Hillel said to the school of Shammai, “If it says ‘something’ דבר, why does it (also) say ‘shameful’ ערוה? And if it says ‘shameful,’ why does it (also) say ‘something’? If it said ‘something,’ but not ‘shameful,’ I would say, ‘she who moves away (from his house) because of “something” may marry (elsewhere), and she who moves away because of “a shameful thing” may not marry (elsewhere).’ And do not be surprised: if she (the woman who committed fornication) is forbidden to the one who (until then) was allowed to her (i.e., her husband), should she not be forbidden to the one who (until then) was forbidden to her (i.e., another man)? Then Scripture teaches, ‘(Because he found in her) something shameful … and she departs from his house (and becomes another man’s wife)’ (Deut 24:1f.). And if it said, ‘shameful thing,’ but not ‘something,’ I would say, ‘Because of a “shameful thing” she shall depart (from his house), because of “something” (else) she shall not depart.’ Then Scripture teaches ‘something’ דבר (he has found) and she moves away from his house.’ ” R. Aqiba said, “Even if he finds another who is more beautiful than her, as it says, ‘If she finds no favor (no pleasure) in his eyes’ (Deut 24:1).” ‖ A baraita in m. Giṭṭ. 90A: The school of Hillel said to the school of Shammai, “Does it not already say ‘something’ דבר (Deut 24:1)?” The school of Shammai answered them, “Does it not already say ‘shameful’ ערות (Deut 24:1)?” The school of Hillel said to them, “If it said (merely) ‘shameful’ and not ‘something,’ I would say, ‘Because of “something shameful” she shall depart (from her husband’s house), but because of “something” (else) she shall not depart.’ Therefore, it said ‘something’ דבר. And if it said (merely) ‘something’ and not ‘shameful thing,’ I would say, ‘Because of “something” she may marry another, but because of a “shameful thing” she may not marry another.’ Therefore it said ‘shameful’ ערוה.” Now what does the school of Shammai do with this דבר “something”? (It says,) “It says here (Deut 24:1) דבר and it says there (Deut 19:15) דבר: ‘By the testimony of two witnesses or by the testimony of three witnesses the “thing” דבר gains validity.’ As there (Deut 19:15) it is a matter of two witnesses, so here (Deut 24:1) it is a matter of two witnesses’ ” (i.e., not of any arbitrary thing, but of shameful things which, like criminally punishable things, must be established by the testimony of two witnesses). The school of Hillel said, “Does it say ערוה בדבר = ‘shameful based on testimony’?” And the school of Shammai said, “Does it say (as one should expect according to the understanding of the words ערות דבר by the Hillelites) אי ערוה או דבר = ‘either something shameful or anything (else)’?” The school of Hillel answered, “This is precisely why we read ערות דבר, which can be interpreted thus (= ‘a shameful thing’) and thus (= ‘anything else’).” R. Aqiba said, “Even if he finds another woman.” What is the basis of the disagreement? It is as Resh Laqish (ca. 250) thought. For Resh Laqish said, “The word כִי is used with a fourfold meaning: it means אי ‘if’; דלמא ‘perhaps’; אלא ‘but, rather’; דהא ‘because.’ Now the school of Shammai thought that the words in Deut 24:1 כי מצא בה ערות דבר meant ‘because דהא (= כי) he found something shameful in her,’ and R. Aqiba interpreted it as ‘if he further found something shameful in her.’ ” ‖ Jerusalem Talmud Giṭṭin 9.50D.29: How do they (the Hillelites) interpret the words of the school of Shammai (i.e., the words ערות דבר to which the Shammaites refer)? (These words are written,) lest it be said, “She who departs (from her husband’s house) because of a shameful thing is forbidden, but she who departs because of another thing is permitted (to marry another).” R. Shela from Kefar Temarta (ca. 280) said, “Against the opinion of the school of Shammai (that ערות דבר refers only to shameful things and not also anything else) argues: ‘Her first husband, who dismissed her, cannot take her back again to be his wife’ (Deut 24:4).” How do we understand these words? If in the sense that they forbid her to him (to remarry), then she is already forbidden to him (as an adulterous wife)! Rather we understand them in such a way that this gives a (further) prohibition to him (i.e., that the man also cannot take back again a woman dismissed for other reasons; this shows that דבר, contrary to the opinion of the Shammaites, has an independent meaning beside ערות, that consequently ערות דבר is to be understood in the sense of the Hillelites = something shameful or anything else). It says, “For the woman who suffers by her separation and for the man who suffers from his flow” (Lev 15:33). The earlier teachers said, “She shall be in her separation, not putting make-up on her eyes or body until she comes into the water bath.” Then said R. Aqiba to them, “From here there supposedly comes a proof (that the menstruant should not clean herself)? If you say so, she also brings herself into ugliness, so that he (her husband) sets his eyes on casting her out” (because the ugliness of the woman is considered a reason for divorce according to R. Aqiba). The opinion of the earlier teachers is the same as that of the school of Shammai. (Like the school of Shammai, the earlier teachers consider only something shameful in a woman as a reason for divorce; therefore, they do not fear that a man will dismiss his wife because of ugly appearance, and therefore they forbid the menstruating woman from cleaning herself). The opinion of Aqiba corresponds to that of the school of Hillel (which says that a man may dismiss his wife if he finds anything else displeasing about her besides shameful things).—The interpretation of Lev 15:33 by the earlier teachers and its rejection by R. Aqiba is also found in the SLev 15:33 (305A) and b. Šabb. 64B.

 

The LXX rendered the words of Deut 24:1 that pertain here with: ὅτι εὗρεν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα = “something unseemly, shameful.”—Targum Onkelos Deuteronomy 24:1 reads, “If a man takes a wife and has intercourse with her, and then if she does not find favor in his eyes because he finds in her the transgression of a commandment עֲבֵרַת פִּתְגָּם, let him write her a letter of divorce.…”—Similarly, Tg. Yer. I.

 

Accordingly, the school of Shammai, in agreement with unnamed older teachers, declared a divorce permissible only if the wife had been guilty of something shameful. It used as scriptural evidence the expression ערות דבר in Deut 24:1, which was conceived and interpreted as a unitary term “something shameful.” The same view is held by the LXX.—The school of Hillel recognizes this ground of divorce of the Shammaites, but adds to it a second: the husband may dismiss his wife by a letter of divorce if he finds anything displeasing in her. Proof: the expression ערות דבר (Deut 24:1), which is interpreted as “something shameful and anything else.”—R. Aqiba, who also holds the Hillelite point of view, further considers divorce justified even in the case that a man’s inclination turns to a woman he likes better than his current wife. He acquires the biblical justification by taking the causal clause “because he found something shameful in her” (Deut 24:1) as a conditional clause. Thus, the passage provides the following sense for him: “If she (first) does not find pleasure in his eyes, if he (second) has found something shameful in her or (third) anything else in her, then he writes her a letter of divorce.…”—Targum Onkelos and Yerušalmi I know as the only reason for divorce the transgression of a commandment by the wife: to them ערות דבר (Deut 24:1) = עברת פתגם.

 

2. Grounds for divorce which are due to the woman.

 

α. The principle, recognized by both the Shammaites and the Hillelites, that a woman was to be cast out for a shameful thing, was so general that it required a more detailed definition of what was to be regarded as a shameful thing.

 

A baraita in y. Giṭṭ. 9.50D.27: The school of Shammai said, “A man should cast out his wife only if he has found something shameful in her ערוה (= fornication).” Here I hear only of one who moves away (from her husband’s house) solely because of fornication ערוה. Whence with respect to her who goes out with her hair unraveled, and whose garments are torn at the sides, and whose arms are bare? Scripture teaches, ‘Because he found something shameful in her’ (Deut 24:1).”—Accordingly, “shameful” means fornication per se; in a broader sense it was understood to mean anything contrary to good morals. So also t. Soṭah 5.9 (302): (R. Meir [ca. 150] said,) “There is someone in whose bowl a fly falls; he takes it, sucks it out, and (then continues to) eat what is in it. This is an ungodly man who sees his wife going out with her hair undone, and how her heart is frolicsome with her slaves and her neighbors, and how she spins in the street and bathes with the men. To cast out such a woman (by divorce) is an obligatory commandment; see Deut 24:1: ‘If a man marries a woman, … and if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found something shameful in her, … and she departs from his house’.…”—Parallel passages with changes in detail can be found in y. Soṭah 1.17A.32; b. Giṭ 90A. ‖ A baraita in b. Giṭṭ. 89A: If a woman eats in the street, drinks greedily in the street, suckles (her child) in the street, she shall be divorced, as R. Meir († ca. 150) said of these all. R. Aqiba († ca. 135) said, “When the women spinning in the moonlight begin to speak about her.” R. Yohanan b. Nuri († ca. 110) answered him, “In that case, you would probably not leave our father Abraham a daughter who would be allowed to stay with her husband (for a woman will soon be spoken about), and the Torah says, ‘Because he found a shameful thing in her’ (Deut 24:1) and there it says, ‘On the testimony of two witnesses or on the testimony of three witnesses the thing דבר obtains validity’ (Deut 19:15). As it is a clear matter there (Deut 19:15), so it is a clear matter here (Deut 24:1) (and not womanly gossip)”; see b. Giṭ. 90A at § Matt 5:32 A, #1, about halfway through the first paragraph.—The Mishnah called these violations of good morals that entail divorce transgressions of Jewish law; see m. Ketub. 7.6 (in the next paragraph).

 

β. According to Tg. Onk. and Yer. I on Deut 24:1 (see § Matt 5:32 A, #1, second paragraph), the transgression of a commandment by a wife is a ground for divorce.

 

We learn more about this from m. Ketub. 7.6: The following women are to be dismissed by a letter of divorce, but without payment of the marriage prescription: the one who transgresses the law of Moses and Jewish law. What is meant (in this context) by the law of Moses? If, for example, a woman gives her husband food that has not been tithed to eat, or if she lets him have intercourse during her menstruation (without telling her husband that she is unclean), or if she does not separate the yeast, or if she takes vows upon herself and does not keep them. What is meant by Jewish law? If she goes out with her hair unraveled, if she spins in the street, if she talks to any man she pleases. Abba Saul (ca. 150) said, “Also she who shames the man’s parents in his presence.” R. Tarfon (ca. 100) said, “Also a yeller. What is a yeller? She who talks in her house (confidentially with her husband), and her neighbors hear her voice.”—This Mishnah passage shows that the commandment transgressions that are grounds for divorce are not the commandments of the Torah in general, but only those commandments that were specifically incumbent upon women.—There is a partial parallel in t. Ketub. 7.6f.

 

γ. Another reason for divorce that comes up is the behavior of a wife that is likely to bring the husband into ill repute.

 

Tosefta Ketubbot 7.4: If a woman vows that she will not lend a winnow, sieve, mill, and oven, he dismisses her (by divorce letter) and does not give her a wedding prescription, because she makes him bear an evil reputation before his neighbors.—The baraita in b. Ketub. 72A extends the vow to the effect that she will not make beautiful clothes for his children.—Here also belongs the violation of the duty to show due honor to the husband. The wife of R. Yose, the Galilean (ca. 110), is often held up as a model of a wicked wife אנתתא בישא. The students urge the teacher to finally dismiss her by a letter of divorce; in doing so, they assert as a reason for divorce the following: “She does not honor you!” (y. Ketub. 11.34B.52; Gen. Rab. 17 [11D]; Lev. Rab. 34 [131D]). Moreover, a woman’s manifest character as a so-called “wicked wife” was in and of itself a sufficiently valid ground for divorce; yet there was disagreement as to whether or not her being cast out was a mandatory obligation for the husband. Babylonian Talmud Yebamot 63B: Raba († 352) said, “It is an obligatory commandment to dismiss a wicked wife; see Prov 22:10: ‘Drive away the mocker, and the quarrel will go away, and there will be an end to trial and reproach.’ ” … In the Book of Ben Sira it is written, “A good gift for her husband is a good wife”; further, it says, “A good wife is placed on the bosom of the godly” (cf. Sir 26:3). A wicked wife is leprosy to her husband. What is the remedy for this? Let him dismiss her (by letter of divorce), and he will be cured of his leprosy (cf. Sir 25:25). There is a parallel passage in b. Sanh. 100B. ‖ A baraita in b. ʿErub. 41B: … Three do not see gehenna (because they have already had hell on earth), namely whoever has to deal with oppressive poverty, with abdominal suffering and with the authorities (with creditors, Rashi). Some say, “Also he who has an evil wife.” Those (who do not include a wicked wife among these) think that it is an obligatory commandment to divorce a wicked wife (so if the man fulfills this duty, he has nothing more to do with the wicked wife). They were led to their opinion, because either her wedding prescription (to be paid out at the divorce) is very large, or because he has children by her, so that he cannot divorce her. With respect to what does something follow from this? With respect to taking those sufferings upon oneself out of love (because by doing so they gain atoning power to save from gehenna).—Also R. Yose, the Galilean, appeals to his disciples that the dowry of his wife to be repaid is too large. Thus, he did not consider divorce in this case to be an obligatory commandment. Only when his disciples raised the required sum does he consent to the dismissal of his wife.

 

δ. The childlessness of the woman is also considered to be grounds for divorce.

 

Mishnah Yebamot 6.6: If someone has married a woman and waited ten years with her without her giving birth, he is not entitled to remain single. If he casts her out, she may marry another, and the second husband may wait with her (again) ten years. If she has had a miscarriage, (the ten years) are counted from the time of the miscarriage.—The dismissal of the barren woman is not necessarily required by this passage from the Mishnah; the man may also keep her with him, but he must then add a second wife to her. In contrast, t. Yebam. 8.4 (249) presupposes her dismissal as customary: If a man has married a wife and waited with her ten years without her giving birth, he is not entitled to remain single, but he dismisses her and gives her the marriage prescription; perhaps he did not obtain to be cultivated by her, and although it is not a proof, yet an intimation in regard to this is the following: “Then Sarai took Hagar the Egyptian at the expiration of ten years, and gave her to Abram as a wife” (Gen 16:3). Incidentally, we learn from this that dwelling outside the land (Israel) is not included in the number (of ten years). If he was sick, or if she was sick (during the ten years), or if her husband had gone to a distant place, or if her husband had been bound in prison, (the time in question) is not reckoned in the number of the ten years. If he has dismissed her, she may go and marry another; perhaps she did not attain to be cultivated by the first husband (while she will possibly attain it with the second husband).—The same is found as a baraita in b. Yebam. 64A.—The scriptural proof for the above passage from the Mishnah is also given in Gen. Rab. 45 (28B) by Resh Laqish (ca. 250) from Gen 16:3.

 

ε. Finally, the man could dissolve his marriage without further ado if the woman did not meet the requirements and conditions under which he had married her.

 

Mishnah Ketubbot 7.7: If a man becomes engaged to a woman on the condition that no vows are upon her, and it turns out that such vows are upon her, the engagement is invalid. If he has taken her home without any mention of the vows, and it turns out that there are vows upon her, she will be dismissed (by a letter of divorce) without a marriage prescription. (If he has betrothed her to himself) on the condition that there are no bodily defects on her, and it turns out that there are such defects on her, she is not betrothed to him. If he has brought her home without any mention of the defects in her body, and it turns out that there are such defects in her, then she is released without a marriage prescription. All the bodily defects that make priests unfit (for priestly service) also make women unfit.—The parallel passage that is expanded in several ways in t. Ketub. 7.8f. (269) cites as examples of concealed vows justifying the dissolution of marriage that the woman would not eat meat or drink wine or wear brightly colored clothes. The last sentence reads in the Tosefta: All bodily defects that make one unfit in the case of priests also make one unfit in the case of women; moreover, in the case of women: the smell of the mouth, smell of sweat and a mark on which there is no hair.—This sentence is also found in y. Qidd. 2.62D.18.

 

3. Grounds for divorce which are due to the man.

 

α. The wife has the right to demand the dissolution of her marriage if the husband’s illness and occupation result in adversities in case of which the continuation of the marriage cannot reasonably be expected of the wife.

 

Mishnah Ketubbot 7.9f.: If there are any bodily defects on the husband (during marriage), he is not forced (by the court) to dismiss her. R. Simeon b. Gamliel (ca. 140) said, “In which case do the words apply? In the case of minor bodily defects; but in the case of major bodily faults, one forces him to dismiss her. And the following are those whom one forces to dismiss her: a leper מֻכֵּה שִׁחִין, one afflicted with a polyp (in the nose), the collector of dog excrement (see below), the smelter of copper, and the tanner, whether he was so before he was married, or whether he became so after he was married.” And about all of them R. Meir (ca. 150) said, “Even if he agreed (made it a condition) with her (before marriage), she may say (afterward), ‘I believed that I would be able to bear it; but now I cannot bear it.’ ” But the scholars said, “She must bear it against her will except for the leper, because she makes him consumptive (through conjugal intercourse).” It happened in Sidon that a tanner died who had a brother who was (also) a tanner (and claimed the widow for levirate marriage). Then the scholars declared, “She may say, ‘Your brother I could bear, but you I cannot bear!’ ” ‖ Tosefta Ketubbot 7.11 (269): Who is meant by the “collector” המקמץ? This is a tanner. Others say, “This is one who collects refuse (used for flaying and tanning); the copper smelter: this is he who makes copper liquid; the one afflicted with a polyp: this is he who has bad breath.” R. Yose b. Judah (ca. 180) said, “In what case has it been said of the (excrement) collector and copper smelter and tanner, ‘He dismisses her and gives the marriage prescription’? If he is willing and she is not willing, (or) if she is willing and he is not willing. But if both of them are willing (namely, to continue living together in marriage), they can do it; but as for the leper, even if both of them are willing, they cannot do it.” Rabban Simeon b. Gamliel (ca. 140) said, “I met an old man among the lepers in Sepphoris, who said to me, ‘There are 24 kinds of leprosy; in the case of all of them a woman is harmful only to those afflicted with the oozing leprosy.’ ”—Parallel passages can be found in y. Ketub. 7.31D.22 and b. Ketub. 77A; in the latter passage there is the remark, “What does מקמץ ‘collector’ mean?” Rab Judah († 299) said, “The collector of dog excrement.”

 

β. A number of passages are noteworthy in which vows are mentioned that the husband forces his wife to make and the execution of which put her in an extremely undignified position. To protect the women against this, the Mishnah specifies the cases in which the actions of the men are to be answered with the dissolution of the marriage and the payment of the marriage prescription. However, the whole thing gives the impression that it was only a trick of the men’s world to get hold of a convenient means of divorce in this way.

 

Mishnah Ketubbot 5.5: R. Simeon b. Gamliel (ca. 140) said, “Also, if anyone compels his wife to vow that she will not do any work, he must dismiss her and pay out her marriage prescription; for idleness leads to spiritual ruin.” ‖ Tosefta Ketubbot 7.4 (268): If someone compels his wife to vow that she will not lend a winnow, sieve, mill, and oven, he must dismiss her and pay off the marriage prescription; because she will (thereby) acquire a bad reputation before her neighbors. (A similar text is found in t. Ketub. 7.4 at § Matt 5:32 A, #2, β.)—The same is found as a baraita in b. Ketub. 72A. ‖ Tosefta Ketubbot 7.6 (269): If someone compels his wife to vow that she will let everyone taste of her food, or that she will fill it and pour it out on the dunghill, or that she will tell everyone the words that were spoken between him and her, he must dismiss her and pay out the marriage prescription, because he has not dealt with her according to the law of Moses and Israel.—The same is found somewhat shorter in m. Ketub. 7.5. ‖ Mishnah Ketubbot 7.1: If someone compels his wife to vow that she will have no benefit from him, he must appoint a provider for her for 30 days (if she is unable to support herself on the earnings of her own hands); if the vow extends beyond that time, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription. R. Judah (ca. 150) said, “In the case of an (ordinary) Israelite, if the vow is for one month; but if for two, he must dismiss her and pay the wedding prescription; and in the case of a priest’s wife,234 if it is for two months; but if for three, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription.” There is a parallel passage in t. Ketub. 7.1 (268). ‖ Mishnah Ketubbot 7.2: If someone compels his wife to vow that she will not enjoy any of the fruits, he must dismiss her and pay off the marriage prescription. R. Judah (ca. 150) said, “In the case of an Israelite, if the vow is for one day; but if it is for two, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription; in the case of a priest’s wife, if it is for two days; but if it is for three, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription.”—There is a parallel passage in t. Ketub. 7.2 (268); here R. Judah notes, “The daughters of Israel would rather not taste food and fruit than be divorced from their husbands for a day.” ‖ Mishnah Ketubbot 7.3: If someone compels his wife to vow that she will not adorn herself with any adornments of any kind, he must dismiss her and pay off her marriage prescription. R. Yose (b. Halapta [ca. 150]) said, “In the case of the poor, if he has not specified a certain time (but this must not exceed 12 months), in the case of the rich, thirty days.”—More fully, t. Ketub. 7.3 (268). ‖ Mishnah Ketubbot 7.4: If someone compels his wife to vow that she will not go to her father’s house, then, if the father lives with her in the city, it is for one month; but if for two, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription. If he dwells in another city, it shall be for one feast [but if for two feasts, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription; in the case of a priest, it shall be for two feasts], but if for three feasts, he must dismiss her and pay the marriage prescription. ‖ Mishnah Ketubbot 7.5: If someone compels his wife to vow that she will not go to a house of mourning or a wedding house, he must dismiss her and pay off the marriage prescription, because he locks her up (he withdraws her from fellowship with people, so that later no one will take care of her either). But if he has something else to complain about (that his wife meets licentious men there), he is entitled to do so (and does not need to dismiss his wife).—There is a parallel passage in t. Ketub. 7.5 (269).

 

4. On the basis of the passages given in #1–3, one may say that in the Mishnaic period there was no marriage among the Jewish people that could not have been summarily dissolved by the man in a completely legal way by handing over a letter of divorce. And that it was no different later is proved by b. Giṭ 90A: Rab Papa († 376) said to Raba († 352), “If he found in her neither something shameful (fornication) nor anything else (but nevertheless dismissed her), how does it stand (must he take the divorced woman back)?” He answered, “What he has done, he has done!”—So even the dissolution of a marriage without any reason is valid, so the husband cannot be forced to take his divorced wife back.

 

5. Statements against frivolous dissolution.

 

Babylonian Talmud Giṭṭin 90A: Rab Mesharshia (ca. 350) said to Raba († 352), “If a man sets his mind on casting out his wife while she dwells with him and serves him, how does it stand?” He applied to such a one: “Do not do anything evil against your neighbor, while he stays with you in confidence (Prov 3:29).” ‖ Babylonian Talmud Giṭṭin. 90B: כי שנא שלח (“For I hate divorce,” Mal 2:16). R. Judah (ca. 150) said, “If you hate your wife, dismiss her.” R. Yohanan († 279) said, “Hated is he who dismisses.” But they are not of different opinion: in one case (namely in R. Yohanan’s saying) it is about the first wife, in the other case about the second. For R. Eleazar (ca. 270) said, “If a man casts out his first wife, even the altar sheds tears over him; see Mal. 2:13f.: ‘And this you do secondly: you cover with tears the altar of Yahweh, with weeping and wailing, so that he may no longer turn to the offering and accept good things from your hand. And do you say, “Why?” Because Yahweh is witness between you and the wife of your youth, with whom you have acted unfaithfully, since she is your companion and the wife of your covenant.’ ”—The saying of R. Eleazar is also found in b. Sanh. 22A. ‖ Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 22A: Rab Shemen b. Abba (when?) said, “Come and see how hard a divorce is! For behold, king David was permitted (to be with Abishag) (see 1 Kgs 1:1ff.), but he was not permitted to put away one of his 18 wives (to marry Abishag).” (Hermann L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, A Commentary on the New Testament from the Talmud and Midrash, ed. Jacob N. Cerone, 4 vols. [trans. Andrew Bowden and Joseph Longarino; Bellingham, Wash.: Lexham Press, 2022], 1:348-57)

 

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