The second argument: Why are
crimes punished by the law if they are committed of necessity? Why does the
judge pass sentence on the person through whom God has acted? For if a murder
has been committed, no punishment will be inflicted upon the sword. But the
wicked when they commit their crimes are, according to Luther in exactly the
same position in God's sight as is a sword in someone's hand. I reply that
there is an answer to this objection if with due humility rather than ungodly
arrogance one reflects on the way in which divine providence governs human
affairs. For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to
imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity
comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and
steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do
evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said,
they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a
single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another. For
they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as
to bring his judgments to execution. This subject is one that I am touching on
lightly with, as it were, only a brief mention, since elsewhere it will have to
be treated at greater length and with more attention. But his attempt to heap
odium on Luther from comparing the wicked to a sword deceives no one and only
shows up his brazen impudence. For they are the Holy Spirit’s words, not Luther’s:
O Assyria, rod of my anger! Again: Why does the axe boast, which is guided by
the hand of him that cuts? (Isa. 10). (John Calvin, “On Book Two,” in The
Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defence of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human
Choice Against Pighius, ed. A. N. S. Lane [trans. G. I. Davies;
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1996], 37-38)
