GOD IS SPIRIT
Having identified and discussed these propositions and
corollaries central to Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine being, I would
like to briefly turn to his understanding of God as Spirit. As I have shown
elsewhere, Irenaeus considers the identification of God as Spirit essential to
his argument that one God created and rules over all things, material and
spiritual.
Previous scholars have recognized that his understanding
of God as Spirit draws upon the Stoic conception of pneuma as that which
pervades all things and spreads throughout space. So, for instance, we see him
write in AH 2.13.7:
If, however, they acknowledge that he (the Father) is
vacuity, then they fall into the greatest blasphemy; they deny his spiritual
nature (id quod est spiritale eius). For how can he be spiritual who
cannot fill even those things which are within him?
While this Stoic influence on Irenaeus has been
recognized, scholars have not appreciated how Irenaeus’ notion of spirit is
influenced not just by Stoic notions of pneuma but also by the two propositions
fundamental to his conception of divine being. In AH 2.7.6, for
instance, he writes
: . . . those things which are corruptible, and earthly,
and compound (composita), and transitory cannot be the images of those
which according to them are spiritual, unless these very things also are
admitted to be compound (composita), circumscribed (circumscriptione),
and having a shape (figuratione), and thus no longer spiritual, and
diffusive (effusa), and incomprehensible (incomprehensibilia). For
it is necessary that they have a shape and be circumscribed so that they may be
true images, and then it is absolutely certain that they are not spiritual. If,
however, these people maintain that they are spiritual and diffusive and
incomprehensible, how can those things which have a shape and are
circumscribed, be images of those which do not have a shape and are
incomprehensible?
Here Irenaeus defines that which is created in
contradistinction to that which is spiritual. His identification of the
spiritual as “diffusive” (effusus) betrays the influence of Stoic
thought. However, other qualities listed reveal the importance of the ideas of
infinitude and simplicity to his notion of spirit. His contention that spirit
is not circumscribed (circumscriptio), does not have a shape (figuratio),
and is incomprehensible (incomprehensibilis) means that spirit should be
regarded as infinite. His declaration that spirit is not compound (compositus)
means that spirit should be regarded as simple.
His identification of spirit as that which is infinite
and simple is not limited to this passage. In AH 2.17.2 Irenaeus
questions the way in which his Gnostic opponents think about the production of
aeons. At the end of the section he offers spirit and light as illustrations of
things which are simple in contrast to those which are compound: “And [are the
aeons] simple (simplices) and uniform (uniformes), and in every way
equal (aequales) and similar (similes) among themselves, as spirit and
light are emitted, or [are they] composite (compositi) and different (differentes),
dissimilar (dissimiles) in their members?” His argument continues into the next
section where the contrast he draws implies that the notion of infinity is
essential to his idea of spirit:
Furthermore, according to this reasoning each of them
(the aeons) will be understood (to exist) separately, divided from one another,
just as human beings, not mixed with nor united the one to the other, but in a
distinct shape (figuratione discreta) and with a defined area (circumscriptione
definita), each one of them has been delineated by a magnitude of size (magnitudinis
quantitate)—[all of ] which are characteristic of a body, and not of a
spirit.
According to this contrast, spirit does not have a
distinct shape, a defined area, and is not delineated by a magnitude of size.
That is to say, spirit is not subject to limits that characterize finite things
such as bodies—spirit is infinite.
Irenaeus is not the first to make the connection between
Stoic notions of the Spirit and infinity or, at least, the idea of “enclosing,
not enclosed.” In On the Giants 27 Philo describes the Spirit of God
with the words: “But now, the Spirit which is upon him is the wise, the divine,
the indivisible, the undistributable, the good Spirit, the Spirit which is
everywhere diffused, so as to fill the universe.” While in On the Confusion
of Tongues 136 he writes, “God fills all things, he contains but is not
contained.” Once again we see that Irenaeus fits well in this tradition of
thought established by Philo.
The identification of God as Spirit is an important
aspect of Irenaeus’ theology proper. Spirit is what God is. The substance of
God, the immaterial divine stuff common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Nonetheless, Irenaeus’ comments in AH 2 on spirit are fleeting in comparison to
the extended and repeated arguments by which he establishes the infinity and
simplicity of the divine being. This suggests that spirit is not the
fundamental concept for his thinking about the divine being but is rather a biblical
and philosophical concept that suits his identification of God as infinite and
simple. (Anthony Briggman, God and Christ in Irenaeus [Oxford Early
Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019], 99-101)
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