But, when they had learned by this experience that Caecilian was in
union with the rest of the world and that pastoral letters from the overseas
Churches had recognized him, but not the one whom they had wrongfully ordained,
they were ashamed of their silence, because they could not answer the objection
that a Church, unknown in so many countries, was in communion with condemned
men, but they had cut themselves off from communion with all the rest of the
blameless world. By their silence they were consenting to non-recognition by
the rest of the world of a bishop whom they had ordained for the Carthaginians.
To meet these two objections they chose, according to report, to take their
case against Caecilian to the overseas Churches, ready for either contingency;
if they could triumph over him by some crafty trick of false charges, they
would get full satisfaction for their ambition; if they could not, they would
remain fixed in the same obstinacy, as if they really had what they claimed,
namely, that they had to endure biassed judges—and this is the excuse of all
crooked litigants. But, in fact, they were overwhelmed by absolutely truthful
evidence, and it could most justly be said to them: ‘Look! are we to think that
the bishops who were judges at Rome were not good judges?’ There still remained
in reserve a general conference of the whole Church where the case could be
taken up with the judges themselves, and, if it could be proved that their
decision was wrong, their sentence could be revoked. Let them show what they
will do; we can easily prove that nothing was done from the fact that the world
is not in a state of unity with them. But, if anything was accomplished, they
were beaten even there because their separation from the Church is evident.
What they did afterward is very plainly shown from the emperor’s
letter. They presumed to criticize, on the grounds of false verdict, the
ecclesiastical judges—bishops of such influence, by whose judgment the
innocence of Caecilian and their own malice was published—and this, not to
their colleagues but to the emperor. He gave them another trial at Arles,
doubtless with other bishops, not because it was necessary, but by way of
yielding to their obstinacy and wishing by all means to restrain their excessive
boldness. Yet, as a Christian emperor, he did not venture to sustain their
disorderly and unfounded complaints by giving a judgment on the court of
bishops which had sat at Rome, but, as I said, he appointed other bishops. And
even from these they chose to appeal to the emperor in person. In this affair,
you have heard how he despised them; would that by his decision he at least had
made an end of their senseless rivalries! And, as he yielded to them by taking
up the question after the bishops had decided, with an apology to the holy
prelates, it could be wished that they, too, having nothing more to say, yet
unwilling to give in to his verdict to which they had appealed, might at length
yield to truth. He ordered that both sides come to him at Rome to try the case.
But, when Caecilian, for some reason or other, did not go there, notified by
them, the emperor instructed them to follow him to Milan. Then, some of them
began to withdraw, angered because Constantine had not followed their example
by instantly and speedily condemning the absent Caecilian. When the wise
emperor learned this, he forced the rest of them to come to Milan under guard,
and, as he wrote, when Caecilian also arrived, he had him appear, heard his
case, and with the care, precaution and foresight manifested in his letters, he
declared him completely innocent, and his accusers guilty of base injustice.
(Augustine, Letter 43.19-20 (c. 397-398), in Augustine of Hippo, Letters (1–82) [trans. Wilfrid Parsons; The
Fathers of the Church; Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1951], 198-200)
To quote an
Eastern Orthodox apologist:
From the preceding, we can surmise the following:
1. Augustine acknowledges that the Bishop of
Rome can be wrong, because it can be “most justly said” that the Roman Bishop
and his cohorts were “not good judges.”
2. The appropriate way of overturning a
finding from a Roman Bishop would be to appeal to the whole Christian world in
an ecumenical council. It should be noted that in Augustine’s time, every
single Council at this point was called by an Emperor, not by the Bishop of
Rome.
3. The Donatists were in the wrong in the
preceding matter because they avoided having the issue decided by an
ecumenical council. Augustine is confident that the entire
Christian world would have condemned the Donatists, evidenced “by the fact that
the whole world does not communicate with them.” They avoided appealing to such
a council because they knew they would lose. So, their only shot was with
the Emperor. Any continued appeals to Constantine were only addressed
by him because of his patience with their intransigence.
Conclusion. The
Roman view that an Ecumenical Council can be vetoed or ultimately confirmed
only by a Bishop of Rome, is at best, incomplete. Rather, we can see
in the writings of a western Bishop with a very high view of the Apostolic See
in Rome that he believed it completely legitimate for an ecumenical council to
have veto power over that same Apostolic See.
Ramifications.
In Augustine we have a suggestion that a dispute can be taken above the Bishop
of Rome and to an Ecumenical Council. In Athanasius, we have an example of
someone taking a dispute above the councils that condemned him to the Bishop of
Rome. Though I believe the historical circumstances are very different
(Athanasius was looking for protection more than he was making a serious
ecclesiological stand giving supremacy to Rome is such matters), we can at
least conclude this much–the issue of who had supremacy, and when such a
party did, was not settled categorically in the early Church. (Craig Truglia, “Augustine’s
View of Supremacy: Pope Versus Council,” Orthodox Christian Theology,
February 22, 2017)
