Does Foreknowledge and Free Agency Post a
Dilemma in Mormon Thought?
Mormon thought, although lacking a systematic theology,
affirms at least a few. remarkably. consistent propositions about the nature of
God, his relation to and the nature of reality. Indeed, the personal God of Mormonism
is conditioned by and related to other temporal realities as eternal as Himself
in contrast to the Absolute of traditional theology which is the unconditioned,
unrelated and timeless basis of all Being. Mormonism has resolved many of the
paradoxes inherent in an Absolutist conception of God by adopting·the notion of
God conditioned by the nature of reality. Nevertheless, Mormon thought has often
been characterized by two seemingly contradictory propositions: 1) God has
infinite foreknowledge; and 2) man possesses free agency. (For example, Orson
Pratt replied to a Catholic Priest: ''God's mind is not limited in knowledge,
therefore the future is known to Him as well as the present. We believe the
mind (of man) to be free .... in willing 'and acting." (Millennial
Star, XI. p. 235,36)
The tension between absolute foreknowledge and the
genuine free agency of individuals is commonly expressed in an argument:
1) If I am morally free, then I am genuinely able (not
merely apparently so) to either do or not to do X
2) If God foreknows that I will do X, then
3) I cannot not do X. (1, 2) Otherwise, it
is either the case that
4) God's foreknowledge is fallible, (2, 3) or · ·
5) I am not truly free. (1; 3)
6) But God is not fallible.
7) Therefore, I am not free. (1, 2, 3)
If the above argument is sound, then absolute
foreknowledge and free agency are not co-possible.
Many have tried to resolve the contradiction by
suggesting that God's knowledge of the future does not cause the future;
rather, the future gives rise to God's foreknowledge. Such an answer is merely
an evasion of the thrust of the argument, however, because causation is not
mentioned in the premises of the above argument. The problem is not one of
causation per se, but of fatalism, a philosophy which states that future events
are inevitable.
Others have tried to resolve the contradiction by
suggesting an analogy comparing the knowledge a parent has about the action of
his child and the foreknowledge of God: "a parent can predict the actions
of his or her children at times with great accuracy without necessitating
determinism; in such a manner God knows our actions." There are two problems
with this solution. First, the analogy breaks down at the most crucial point of
similarity. While the knowledge a father has of his child does not suggest
determinism because any father could be, indeed at times is, wrong; the
foreknowledge of God suggests determinism because His knowledge is necessarily
infallible. In fact, to properly be termed "knowledge," propositions
derived there from must be true. Second, the logical implication of the analogy
is that our future actions can be predicted without error on basis of our past actions,
that our nature is so determined that we could not possibly change. The analogy
is actually based on a premise of "soft determinism."
Others have tried to solve the problem by suggesting an
alternative concept of omniscience, thereby modifying premise number two. Such
an approach has been very popular in Mormon thought. For instance, the
proposition "God cannot learn new truths," has been officially
pronounced false by Brigham Young and his counselors. (see Millennial Star
XX-VII, 1865, pp. 658-669) Early Mormons suggested that the nature of truth has
the same-properties as the greatest possible integer. Just as "the
greatest possible integer" is a meaningless term because no such integer
could exist given infinity, so a comprehensive knowledge of truth would be
impossible because the realm of truth is infinite. (see Samuel Richards
Journal, March 25, 1855)
In relation to foreknowledge, some suggest that
propositions about the future are neither true nor false because the future is
not yet determined. An alternative definition of omniscience was suggested by
B. H. Roberts that is relevant to this conception of truth. Rather than
proposing that God knows all things past, present, and future as in the
absolutist tradition, Roberts suggested that God is omniscient in the sense
that he knows only that which is possible to know. In Roberts view, for
example, it is impossible even for God to know what a perfectly round square
looks like. Since propositions that are contingent on free choice cannot be
determined, they also fall into this "impossible-to-know" category.
(See Seventy's Course in Theology 1912] 2:70.)
Critics of B. H. Roberts modification of omniscience
might assert that such a definition of omniscience disregards a notion of truth
as absolute. In this view, the proposition that "the future will happen in
a specific manner" is necessarily true because the occurrence of one
future possibility precludes the possible occurrence of all other
possibilities. In fact, in this line of reasoning the proposition "things
will happen in the manner that they will happen" is self-evident. But if
such a statement is true, then:
(1) Statements about future events are either true or
false.
(2) That which is affirmed in a true statement about
future events must occur; otherwise the statement is false and cannot occur.
Thus, the effect of such "whatever will be will
be" reasoning is to establish a notion of determinism that is equally
incompatible with free choice as that held by believers in an absolute God
(and, it might be added, independent of any assertion of God's foreknowledge).
It seems, therefore, to be the case that if man is truly
free, the future must be indeterminate, and that if the future is
indeterminate, it cannot be known by God.
There are many who claim that a God who does not
infallibly know the future is not an adequate object of faith. First, if God
does not know the future infallibly, then he could discover truths that would
contravene what He thought He knew. This objection can be satisfied by
suggesting that what God knows He knows surely. In fact, if it is proper to say
that God "knows" at all, then his knowledge must be correct.
"For what God knows must be true: and indeed what anybody knows must be
true, since it is impossible to know what is false." (Anthony Kenny, in Philosophy
of Religion, W. Rowe Ed., p. 51)
Another problem with the objection to relative
foreknowledge is that it implies that unless one knows everything, then one
cannot surely know anything. However, could a Mormon possessing a testimony
fear that he might learn truths tomorrow that might contravene his knowledge
termed "testimony?" In fact, we must all be totally ignorant even of
the truth of our own existence if it is true that one must know everything to
know anything.
A second objection to relative foreknowledge asserts that
God could not reliably predict the future if He did not know it surely. This
argument can be answered by recognizing that God is also omnipotent; i.e., He
is capable of accomplishing all possible things. It may be that what God
declares, He has power to bring to pass instead of knowledge that it will come
to pass. Thus, God's declarations about future conditions may be a function of
His omnipotence rather than His omniscience.
Possibly the most definitive answer to those offended by
the proposition that God's foreknowledge is relative to individual choice is
the suggestion that, for Mormons at least, Jehovah of the Old Testament is also
the Christ of the New Testament. Even though Jehovah was very God, and as such
"all-knowing," "yet learned He obedience by the things which He
suffered" (Heb. 5:8) and "continued from grace to grace ... because
He received not a fulness at first." (D&C 93:12,14) It also appears
that God genuinely had something to learn about our use of free agency, for the
Gods created the earth for the benefit of other eternal individuals,
"proved them herewith, to see if they will do all things whatsoever the
Lord their God shall command them." (Abr. 3:25) Such a statement is meaningless
if every reaction to God's commandments was foreknown.
In conclusion, whether or not it is actually the case
that God foreknows the future infallibly, the assertion that God could learn
future truths is most consistent with the assertion that man possesses free
agency and with the Mormon understanding of God. It may also be the case that
outmoded theological dichotomies have been applied to terms that are meaningless
when analyzed. Nevertheless, the problem of foreknowledge and free agency is not
likely to be resolved without further definition. (Blake Ostler “Does
Foreknowledge and Free Agency Post a Dilemma in Mormon Thought?,” Seventh
East Press [December 1, 1981]: 10)
Editor:
While Blake Ostler's article on foreknowledge and agency
suggests some interesting points, his thought is often fuzzy and illogical. He
also overlooks several important considerations that have bearing on the
"dilemma" in question.
1. To begin with, his statement of the basic argument is
flawed. The way the argument is structured and worded the conclusion is
predetermined. In the third statement Mr. Ostler has injected the hidden
premise that there is no agency by the very use of the word "cannot."
The argument would read much differently by changing the word 'cannot" to
"will not." There is also a problem with the way the argument is set
up in that it does not follow the rules of logic, An example of this is Mr.
Ostler's splitting the "If, then" statement into two different
assumptions as he did. (The "then" portion of the statement is
dependent on the "if" portion and technically should not be divided.)
2. The suggestion that the statement "the future
gives rise to God's foreknowledge" is "merely an evasion" is in
itself an evasion of the dilemma because it accepts as its premise that the
argument previously presented is unflawed, which it is not. The question of causation
is integral to the dilemma itself and if the argument does not take that into account
it is worthless.
3. Another example of Mr. Ostler's faulty logic occurs
when he arrives at the amazing conclusion that in stating "things will
happen in the manner that they will happen" one establishes a notion of
determinism. Again, not necessarily so. For, as Mr. Ostler wrote, this line of
reasoning is self-evident.
Therefore, according to Mr. Ostler, determinism is the
only possibility, as things will always happens as they will happen. The point
he is missing again is causation. Why will things happen the way they will
happen? To be compatible with agency the statement "whatever will be, will
be chosen." Here again Mr. Ostler's slip of prejudice is showing.
4. Mr. Ostler makes the following statement: "Thus
God's declarations about future conditions may be a function of his omnipotence
rather than His omniscience. [Text missing in OG] to explain that a God who causes
all things to happen according to his previous declarations has automatically
closed the door on agency.
5. The next-to-last paragraph contains a rather distorted
use of scripture. (Strangely enough, the only scriptures used tend, with Mr.
Ostler's interpretation, to support the incompatibility of agency and
foreknowledge. He ignores such obviously important references as Doctrine and
Covenants 93:24 "And truth is knowledge of things as they are, and as they
were, and as they are to come." 2 Nephi 9:20[God] knoweth all things, and
there is not anything save he knows it." D&C 38:2 "The same which
knoweth all things, for all things are present before mine eyes;")
The most glaring shortcoming here is the failure on Mr.
Ostler's part to realize that both Hebrews 5:8 and D&C 93:12,14 refer to the
mortal Christ, whose veil over his premortal recollection was still largely
intact.
6. The final, yet predictable, problem with his article
is the conclusion. Having already decided his position on the matter he consistently
tilted the evidence towards his bias. Mr. Ostler seems rather reluctant to attribute
to God the full range of godly attributes.
Among those things Mr. Ostler did not consider (but
should) is that perhaps there are things we do not know about Time which God
understands perfectly and is able to make use of. His knowledge of the "future"
may be a function of the fact that all things are "present" before
his eyes (using the word with both time and space connotations). (see-Isaiah
55:8-9) (Randall L. Hall and Bradford J. Hall, “Foreknowledge
and Agency,” Seventh East Press 1, no. 9 [January 18, 1982]: 9)
Editor:
The response of Hall & Hall to my article regarding
foreknowledge and free-agency (Seventh East Press, 1:9) obscures many aspects
of my argument. First, they refused to deal with my basic argument and misunderstood
the thrust of my article. Second, they missed the point about the
logical problems facing one who admits both infallible
foreknowledge and free-will. I employed the following lines of logic:
(1) If I am morally (i.e., categorically) free, then I am
genuinely (not merely apparently so) able to either do or not to do X.
(2) If God foreknows that I will do X, then I cannot not
do X.
(3) Otherwise, it is either the case that
(a) God's foreknowledge is fallible, or
(b) I am not truly free (1,2).
(4) However, God is not fallible.
(5) Therefore, I am not free (1,2,3,4).
Hall & Hall suggest that I should not have employed
the phrase "I cannot not do X" in relation to the statement "God
foreknows that I will do X." Instead they suggest the phrase "I will
do X." Their suggestion is, however, incongruous with the argument. Apparently
they intend to satisfy the dilemma suggested by implying that if one freely,
chooses X, and X is foreknown to
God, but God does not cause X, then free-will and
infallible foreknowledge are compatible. There are two problems here.
First, the dilemma does not involve whether or not I will
do X; but whether or not I can do X freely. Second, the phrase "I will do
X freely" is logically incompatible with the phrase "God infallibly
foreknows that I will do X." As Nelson Pike pointed out in his book God
and Timelessness:
The claim that God knows in advance how another will act
with his free-will is incoherent. If God knows (infallibly believes) at Time'
(T1) that Jones does A at T2, it follows that Jones is not able at T2 to do
other than A at T2. Thus, if God foreknows [infallibly believes] at T1 that
Jones does A at T2, it follows that Jones does A at T2, but not freely. If God
believed at T1 that Jones does A at T2, if follows that Jones action is not
free, for he could not do otherwise. (p. 78)
Hall & Hall also suggest that my argument "does
not follow the rules of logic." The only error that they could find was a
simple error in presentation. The "if" portion of the statement in
(2) should not have been divided from the "then" portion. Pointing
out such an error, however, does not constitute a refutation of this or any
argument. Thus, the argument outlined stands.
Again, Hall & Hall suggest that causation is integral
to understanding the problem of foreknowledge and free-agency. I admit that, causation
is essential in a discussion of naturalistic determinism; however, the dilemma
of foreknowledge and free-will is completely independent of the question of causation.
Once again, they fail to deal with the problem of the inevitability of future actions
entailed in the idea of infallible foreknowledge, which arises without reference
to causation in the argument.
Hall & Hall suggest that the statement "things
will happen in the manner that they will happen" and the suggestion that
such reasoning is self-evident would bind me to determinism. They failed
however, to note that I discussed this statement in relation to meaningful and
meaningless statements. The former statement is meaningful only if one assumes
absolute truth and, therefore, determinism as Hall & Hall suggest.
However,· I believe such a statement is meaningless
precisely because the future can be infallibly foreknown given an ·
indeterminate future contingent on free choices is questionable.
Again, Hall & Hall obscure my point that trust in
God's declarations about the future may rely on His omnipotence (in a finite
sense) rather than on His omniscience. Their point is well taken, for what is
brought to pass by omnipotence does indeed assume God as an intervening cause.
However, the notion that God can bring to pass his purposes by omnipotent
action despite evil choices of free agents does not necessarily imply universal
determinism. What I have in mind is something like that suggested by William
James' The Dilemma of Determinism, which combines a notion of omniscience
(compatible with scriptural declarations of omniscience) with a notion of categorical
free-will:
(1) God knows now all possibilities.
(2) God knows now how He will respond to whichever
contingent possibility occurs in order to insure the realization of His
purposes.
(3) God knows now what His purposes are and that He will
achieve them.
(4) God does not know now, in every case, exactly which
possibilities will be chosen or become actual.
James' outline of omniscience brings me to Hall &
Hall's last objection that a conditional foreknowledge is not compatible with
the scriptures. They admit that the scriptures which I quoted (Heb. 5:8;
D&C. 93:12-14; Abraham 3:25) "support the incompatibility of agency
and foreknowledge." However, the scriptures which they quote to support
their notion of infallible foreknowledge (D&C 38:2; 2 Ne. 9:20) may also be
compatible with a definition of omniscience which intends that "God knows
all that is;" but need not include that which is not or is not yet. Note
that such scriptures are in the present tense: "He knoweth all things, and
there is nothing save he knows it."
Thus, such scriptural statements are not incompatible with a notion of
omniscience which suggests that God knows all that is present. Also, in relation
to the possibility that even God could yet learn new truths as they come into existence.
In conclusion, Hall & Hall are too quick to assume
that the temporal and conditioned God of Mormonism can be identified with the
timeless Absolute of classical theology. If all things are present before God's
eyes in terms of timelessness, as they seem to suggest, then God could not have
foreknowledge because neither before nor after exists for a timeless being. If
they intend to say that God is timeless, I ask, "Was there a time before
God became God?" Such absolutist preconceptions militate against the
Mormon idea of God, for the claim that God is timeless involves the idea that
God lacks temporal extension, and is therefore not corporeal in any sense of
the word "body." Timelessness also involves the idea that there are
no spatial contrasts between God and His creations, or in classical
terminology, totally unrelated. I believe that the idea of timelessness which
is creeping into Mormon thought is a betrayal of the dynamic God spoken of by Joseph
Smith who is forever becoming and for whom no absolute limits exist in terms of
knowledge, power or goodness.
Mormonism's chief strength rests in its understanding of
its Hebrew roots, in its concept of a personal, temporal and dynamic God
involved in helping other beings to become as much like Himself as they freely will
to become. It is sad indeed that so many Mormons prefer to emphasize classical attributes
such as timelessness, immutability and even absolute actuality which contradict
. the insights of the restoration. A static God who is timeless could neither
act nor be acted upon; he could not relate nor be related to. Such a being is
necessarily impersonal, and therefore, not an adequate object of faith. Thus,
in attempting to resolve the dilemma of foreknowledge and free-agency, Hall
& Hall do little more than to offer a mass of confusion. (Blake Ostler, “Foreknowledge
and Agency,”1, no. 11 Seventh East Press [February 7, 1982]: 9)
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