Nemesius of Emessa (d. 420), "De Natura Hominis" Chapter 2 and the Nature of Scripture

The following is from chapter 2 of De Natura Hominis by Nemesius of Emessa (d. 420). I am reproducing it here as it is sometimes used as a proof-text for the patristic acceptance of Sola Scriptura.

 

Greek (PG 40:588-89):

 

πολλῷ διενήνοχεν ἀλλήλων τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχαί. Πάλιν δὲ, προκόπτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βιβλίῳ, προστίθησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ [ἀσαφές] καὶ τοῦτο· « Καὶ μήν, ὦ σοφώτατε κατήγορε, λέξεν ἂν ἡ φύσις πρὸς σέ, γελοίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ζῴῳ γελοίαν χρὴν δοθῆναι σώματος κατασκευήν· » οὕτως οἶδε τοῖς διαφόροις κατ’ εἶδος σώμασι διαφόρους ἐνούσας ψυ- χάς. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τούτων Εἰ δὲ τὴν ψυ- χὴν ἀπεδείξαμεν μήτε σῶμα οὖσαν, μήτε ἁρμονίαν, μήτε κράσιν, μήτε ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων, ὡς οὐσία τίς ἐστιν ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ. Ὅτι μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁμολογεῖται πᾶσιν εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα, μήτε συμβεβηκός, δῆλον, ὅτι ἀσώμα- τός ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ εἶναι. Ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς χωριζομένης, τὸ σῶμα πάντως φθείρεται. Τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ χρησάμενον ἔστιν ἀποδεῖξαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον οὖσαν. Εἰ γὰρ μήτε σῶμά ἐστιν (ὅπερ φύ- σει διαλυτὸν ἀποδειχθῇ καὶ φθαρτόν), μήτε ποιότης, μήτε ποσότης, μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν φθειρομέ- νων, δῆλον, ὅτι ἀθάνατός ἐστι. Πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσι τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἀποδείξεις παρὰ τε Πλάτωνι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖναι μὲν περισχε- λεῖς καὶ δυσεκτανόητοι, καὶ μόλις τοῖς ἐντεθραμμένοις ἐκείναις ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις γνώριμοι· ἡμῖν δὲ ἀρχή, πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ἡ τῶν θείων λογίων διδασκαλία, τὸ πιστὸν ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα, διὰ τὸ θεόπνευστος εἶναι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μὴ κα- ταδεχομένους τὰ τῶν Χριστιανῶν γράμματα ἀρχή, τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν φθειρομένων ἀποδεί- ξαι. Εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐστι τῶν φθειρομένων, ἔστι δὲ ἄφθαρτος, ἔστι καὶ ἀθάνατος. Ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ἀρχούντως ἔχειν παραλειπτέον.

 

It seems that Galen, the admirable physician, also follows this view: that in each kind of animal there is, he thinks, a different kind of soul. For he says right at the beginning of the first book of his treatise On the Usefulness of the Parts: “And if this is so, there will be many parts in animals, some larger, some smaller, and some altogether indivisible into another kind; and all of them are needed by the soul. For the body is its instrument, and for that reason the parts of animals differ greatly from one another, because the souls too differ.” Again, as he proceeds in the same book, he adds this: “And indeed, most wise accuser, nature would say to you that a ridiculous soul ought to be given a ridiculous bodily constitution.” Thus he knows that different souls dwell in bodies differing according to kind. So much for this. But if we have shown that the soul is neither body, nor harmony, nor mixture, nor any other quality, it is clear from this that the soul is a certain incorporeal substance. That it exists, indeed, is admitted by all. And if it is neither body nor an accident, it is clear that it is an incorporeal substance and nothing among the things whose being consists in being in something else. For these things both come into being and pass away apart from the corruption of the underlying subject; but when the soul is separated, the body necessarily perishes. By the same arguments one can prove that the soul is immortal. For if it is not a body—something that by nature is dissolvable and corruptible—nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor anything else among perishable things, it is clear that it is immortal. There are many proofs of this immortality, in Plato and in others; but those are elaborate and difficult to understand, and scarcely familiar even to those trained in those disciplines. For us, however, the starting point for proving its immortality is the teaching of the divine oracles, which carries conviction from itself because it is God-inspired. And for those who do not accept the writings of Christians, the starting point is to show that the soul of perishable things is nothing. For if it is nothing among perishable things, then it is imperishable, and therefore also immortal. So this part can be left here for the time being.

 

Here, the Greek text uses θεοπνευστος (cf. 2 Tim 3:16) to describe “the divine oracles” ("τῶν θείων λογίων"); however, unless one reads into θεοπνευστος “formal sufficiency,” it is not a meaningful proof-text for Sola Scriptura. It is true that Nesemius believed that “the divine oracles” “carries conviction from itself,” but again, only if one thinks that Scripture carrying any weight/authority in and of itself is one to one equivalent to Sola Scriptura can one conclude such. Furthermore, he limits its “sufficiency” only to the immortality of the soul in this passage.

 

The same applies to the Latin version:

 

Latin (PG 40:587, 590):

 

Videtur autem nostram hanc opinionem approbare etiam admirabilis ille medicus Galenus, et in quaque specie animalis diversam esse animae speciem arbitrari. Scribit enim statim in principio libri primi De usu partium, hoc modo: « Atque si hoc ita est, multae animalium partes erunt, aliae maiores, aliae minores, aliae etiam quae in aliam speciem secari non possunt, quibus omnibus animae opus est. Nam corpus ejus est instrumentum, eamque ob rem multum a se differunt partes animalium, quandoquidem et anima. Deinde in progressu ejusdem libri addit et hoc de simia: « Atqui, sapientissime accusator, dicat natura tibi, animali anima ridiculo oportuit ridiculam corporis structuram dari. » Ita differentibus specie corporibus differentes inesse animas cognovit. Atque ista quidem de his disputata sunt. Quod si animam ostendimus neque corpus esse, neque harmoniam, neque temperationem, neque aliam ullam qualitatem, dubitandum non est quin substantia quaedam sit anima, vacans corpore: nam esse quidem, inter omnes constat. Si autem neque corpus est, neque accidens, profecto substantia est corporis expers, neque de iis est quorum, ut ita dicam, esse in alio est positum. Haec enim adveniunt et recedunt, sine subjecti interitu: at anima dum sejungitur, prorsus corpus exstinguitur. Eisdem rationibus licebit uti ut eam immortalem esse doceamus. Si enim neque corpus est (quod natura sua dissolvi et interire probatum est), neque qualitas, neque quantitas, neque aliquid e numero caducorum, obscurum non est quin immortalis sit. Multae quidem sunt ejus immortalitatis certissimae rationes apud Platonem et alios, sed spinosae et ad cognoscendum difficiles, et vix iis notae qui in illis scientiis magno opere versati sunt. Nobis autem satis est ad demonstrationem animae immortalitatis doctrina divinarum Litterarum, quae a se fidem habet, nec foris petita probationis eget, quia divino instinctu et inflatu data est. Adversus eos qui Christianorum Litteris non utuntur, satis est quod non numerari animam in iis quae occidunt demonstravimus. Si enim nihil est eorum quae occidunt, sed interitum omnem effugit, immortalis profecto est. Itaque hoc, quod abunde declaratum sit, omittendum est.

 

The admirable physician Galen also seems to approve this view of ours, and to think that each species of animal has a different kind of soul. For he writes immediately at the beginning of the first book of On the Usefulness of the Parts as follows: “And if this is so, there will be many parts of animals: some larger, some smaller, some also incapable of being cut into another species, and all of them are needed by the soul. For the body is its instrument, and for that reason the parts of animals differ greatly from one another, since the souls too differ.” Then later in the same book he adds this about the monkey: “Indeed, most wise accuser, nature would say to you that a ridiculous animal ought to be given a ridiculous bodily structure.” Thus he recognized that different souls dwell in bodies differing by species. So much, then, for these matters. But if we have shown that the soul is neither body, nor harmony, nor temperament, nor any other quality, there can be no doubt that the soul is some incorporeal substance, devoid of body; for that it exists is admitted by everyone. And if it is neither body nor accident, it is plainly a substance without body and not one of those things whose being, so to speak, consists in being in something else. For such things come and go without the destruction of the underlying subject; but when the soul is separated, the body is completely destroyed. By the same arguments we may also prove that the soul is immortal. For if it is neither body — something shown by nature itself to be dissoluble and perishable — nor quality, nor quantity, nor anything else among the things that pass away, it is obvious that it is immortal. There are indeed many very certain arguments for its immortality in Plato and others, but they are intricate and difficult to understand, and scarcely known even to those who have devoted much study to those disciplines. For us, however, the teaching of the divine Scriptures is enough for demonstrating the immortality of the soul; that teaching carries conviction from itself and needs no proof sought from outside, because it has been given by divine inspiration. Against those who do not accept the writings of Christians, it is enough that we have shown that the soul is not to be numbered among perishable things. For if it is nothing among the things that perish, but escapes every kind of destruction, then it is certainly immortal. So this point, having been sufficiently made clear, may be passed over.