The Reformed orthodox did not, as
is commonly assumed, make a rigid equation of the Word of God with Holy
Scripture. To be sure, they identified Scripture as the Word of God, but they
also very clearly recognized that Word was, ultimately, the identity of the
second person of the Trinity. They also recognized that the second person of
the Trinity, as Word, was the agent of divine revelation throughout all ages.
These basic doctrinal assumptions concerning the meaning of the term “Word of
God” led the Protestant scholastics to a series of distinctions in their
definition of Word: the Word was, first, either the essential Word of God or
the Word of God sent forth in the work of creation, redemption, or revelation
and, therefore, present in a knowable manner to the finite order. In addition
to the Word incarnate, the Word could be understood in a series of three
interrelated distinctions and definitions: the unwritten and the written Word,
the immediate and the mediate Word, the external and the internal Word.
The historical and covenantal
aspect of the Reformed doctrine of the necessity of a written Word, a
Scripture, was connected, early in the Reformation, with a doctrine of the Word
of divine revelation as unwritten (agraphon) and written (engraphon).
The Word was first heard and later recorded. This historical path of the Word
from moment of revelation to written text not only appears in the ancient
histories of the Bible that refer to the events that took place before Moses
but also in the prophetic writings, where divine revelation to the prophet
preceded the production of the text. The Reformers and their orthodox
successors not only recognized this pattern in the production of Scripture,
they viewed it as of utmost importance to their conception of Scripture as Word
and to their doctrine of the authority of Scripture. Related to this point,
particularly in view of the question of authority, is the problem of the way in
which the Word operates — it is heard and written and, therefore, known both internally
and externally, the former knowledge or impression having a profound impact on
the individual and on the individual’s ascription of authority to the Word: as
a corollary of the doctrine of Scripture as Word, Protestantism must also
include a discussion of the reading and hearing of the Word in the locus de
Scriptura sacra.
These considerations stand in
some opposition to the view of orthodoxy as holding to a rigid definition of
Scripture and Scripture alone as “Word” in distinction from the view of the
Reformers, according to which Scripture “contains” the Word and “witnesses” to
it. The Reformers are associated with a “dynamic” approach to Word and
Scripture that allowed a distinction between the living Word or the Word
incarnate in its revelatory work and the written text, while the orthodox are
associated with a static view of Word that rigidly identified “Word” with
“text.” Contrary to Brunner’s assertions, the orthodox were not at all blind to
the message of the Johannine Prologue that Jesus is the Word of God. If they
did not allow the words of the Prologue to undermine their sense of Scripture
as Word and as the source of revealed doctrine, this does not mean that they
forgot the fact that in some sense Christ is himself the revelation of God or
that he is the Word preeminently and immediately in a manner beyond the manner
of Scripture. Whereas Brunner was led by his affirmation of Christ as Word to
relativize the Scripture, the orthodox tread a fine doctrinal balance in their
distinction between the essential, the unwritten and written, the external and
internal Word.
A similar critique of the
orthodox perspective is found in Althaus’ characterization of Polanus’ theory
of knowledge as a variety of dualism: on the one hand, Polanus holds Scripture
to have an objective certainty reflected in the scientific character of
theology and the self-authenticating nature of the scriptural revelation; on
the other hand, Polanus insists on a subjective and inward working of the
Spirit which confirms the truth of Scripture. Althaus describes the gift of
revelation in Scripture as an “isolated supernatural act,” set beside the event
of the inward work of the Spirit. But is this a genuine dualism and, therefore,
a substantive departure from the thought of a Calvin or a Bullinger?
Concerning the relationship of
the divinity to the truth of Scripture, Polanus wrote, “Faith in the divinity
of Scripture is by nature prior to faith in the turth of Scripture; we,
however, first believe that it is true and subsequently believe that it is
divine. Unless you believe first that Scripture is true, you will never believe
that it is divine.” This argument, according to Althaus, is tantamount to an
assertion that “all knowledge, faith, doctrine, and theological demonstration
finally ends in some ultimate, immutable, and first truth . . . which is some
other than holy Scripture, the Word of God.” Althaus sees this as a combination
of a formal supernaturalism with an empirical attitude in theology. But we must
distinguish between an autonomous scientific empiricism and an empiricism of
divine evidences, of the inward working of the Spirit, and of the revelatory
working of God in his word: in the latter, the conviction of the divinity of
Scripture comes, via faith in the truth of Scripture, as a work of God rather
than as a realization of man, with the result that the “formal revelatory
character” and the “formal Authority” of Scripture are not — as Althaus would
have it — distinct from the content of the faith. Indeed, the inseparability of
the external Word of Scripture from the internally known Word was integral to
the Reformed response to Roman Catholic emphasis on an internal Word of
spiritual tradition known to the heart of believers.
The contrast between the formal,
self-evidencing character of Scripture as divine and the inward confirmation of
Scripture’s truth and divinity by the testimony of the Holy Spirit is created
by the logical, rationalizing nature of Polanus’ argument rather than by an
real sense of rift between the objective truth of Scripture and its subjective
apprehension: it is not as if the Spirit testifies inwardly to the truth of
Scripture apart from actual encounter with the scriptural Word, or as if the
Spirit that, by the act of inspiring the original writers of Scripture, gives
to the text its character as Word can be any other than the Spirit that
testifies to the believer of his work and of the truth of his work. This
interpretation follows from Polanus’ insistence, in an Aristotelian fashion,
upon the undemonstrable nature of all principles. As Althaus himself admits,
the separation between in se and quoad nos breaks down at this point —
leading us to conclude that Althaus’ insistence on “two souls” in Polanus’
doctrine of Scripture mistakes a logical, dichotomizing method of exposition
for an objective dualism. (Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed
Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725,
4 vols. [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2003], 2:182-84)
